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Summary: 
This Essay is not meant to deliver a new history of Turkey-EU relations. NeitheLis ita fully-
fledged discourse analysis of the debate on Turkish Accession within German Newspapers. Its 
focus lies instead on the poI-itical language, more precisely on the discursive Iogics, which 
were used within the discussion on the complex policy decision of whether or not Turkey can 
or should join the European Union. lts major claim is thereby, that it is the character of 
language that determines the way in which discussion about politics are structured. 
Language is accordingly defined, first, as a collectively derived 'tool-kit' which is 
only used by individuais. Every individual statement, indeeciany individual reflection, is thus 
framed by col-lective structures and must obey predominant linguistic rules (to a certain 
extent) in order to be meaningful and enable the individual to communicate with its 
environment. On the other hand it is equally true, that .every meaningfu1 statement must re-
define those structures, so as to adjust them and make them useful within the individual 
speech situation. What emerges from this perspective on language, is a mutual and tense 
relationship between structure and agency, between continuity and change and between the 
other and the self, i.e. a dialectical relationship between both, which is necessary to construct 
a meaningful reality. 
In consequence, and secondly, every meaningful statement must connect to a 
historicist beyond, i.e. an other time beyond the individual speech situation. The individual 
present must thus be embedded in speculations about past and future, in order to endow the 
statement made with the necessary element of consistency and direction in time, without 
however, proving that something like a meaningful history/futııre does exist outside of 
language. 
Thirdly, but equally emergıng from the first point, it is indispensable for every 
meaningful statement to refer to a collectivist beyond, i.e. the speculative and imagined other, 
which is not directly involved within the individual speech situation. This is done to endow 
the statement made with the necessary element of direction in (social) space, without, 
however, implying an authentic representation of the other within the statement made. 
Accordingly, every statement within a political debate cannot avoid potentially 
ideological speculations about a teleological connection of past and future, as well as it cannot 
avoid a stereo-typical representation and evaluation of difference, ranging from the same (or 
self), over similar ( or core ), to different ( or peripheral other) and contradictory ( or the outside 
other). On the other hand, however, it is exactly the actual utilisation of these linguistic tools 
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within a communicative confrontation between two or more individual debate participants, 
which tri_ggers a mutual re-definition of them ana:-thus enables an inter-subjective creation of 
a social reality. 
Yet, this does not mean that conurnı-nicat-iorr 1ead-s necessarily to dialogue and 
understanding. It can equally lead to misunderstandirıg, or be performed through mutually 
exclusive monologues. Instead it means that all kinds of statements are formulated within a 
present ne_gotiation and bargaining process, in w.hich commonsensical knowledge about the 
self and the other, about the past and the futuroe, is~rn-defined according to the new situation at 
hand. 
It is thus feasible to approach the complex discursive landscape of the debate on 
Turkish accession to the EU, from the perspect-ive of language. If one does so it becomes clear 
how the specific argumentation used connect to certain discursive logics, so as to receive from 
them the necessary normative horİzon it needs to produce itself as authentic reflection on 
reality, which can trigger consistent and morally legitimate decisions. 
The structuring discourse logics used within the debate, can be categorised under the 
labels of the French notion of Civilisation, the German notion of Kultur, and the English 
notion of cosmopolitanLsm. This categorisation thereby is constructed as ideal-type 
categorisation, which reduces an over-complex debate-reality and creates clear-cut 
distinctions between the camps, in order to provide a structure that can trigger understanding. 
However, it does not suggest that the ideal-types formulated strictly correspond to anything 
real. lt thus resembles both, the structuring frame of language and the ideological and stereo-
typical distortions, which necessarily emerge from this reductionist, selective and speculative 
procedure of structuring. 
The ideal types of Civilisation, KulJur and cosmopolitanism are accordingly defined as 
discursive logics, which produce mutually exclusive but interdependent, ideological 
evaluations of historical and social development. Yet, although these evaluations do not 
correspond to any social reality, they are nevertheless able to re-create it through their 
employment of a self-referential and self-evident, i.e. quasi-realistic narrative, which sets 
itself off against the other logics and thus produces itself as the more realistic and more 
trustful altemative. Hence, by doing this, the discursive logics employ the linguistic 
fundamental ofa dialectical relation between two poles (thesis and antithesis), whereby reality 
logically must emerge in between those poles (as a synthesis) . An argumentative chain based 
on the logic of Civilisation , for example, can thus materialize itself as more realistic, when it 
is able to disqualify counterargum~nts as being based on the ' amoral ', 'unrealistic' and 
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'obsolete' boundaries of a thesis Kultur and antithesis cosmopolitanism, which are 
accordi-ngly synthesised and balanced within the logic of Civilisation. However, this process 
works as well from out the other discursive logics, exactly because neither of them can be 
verifıed or falsified, i.e. objectively proven by the yardstick of an outside reality. Instead, they 
produce reality among-each other verify themselves by falsifying the altematives, within a 
mutual but tense relationshi_p of dependence and exclusion. Accordingly one can define tJ:ıe 
three discursive logic-s as fundamentally based on the same linguistic method of dialectical 
production of reality, whereby, they however, essentially differ in the way they emphasis on 
one feature of society and de-empha:sise the corresponding altematives. 
Whether one or the other discursive logic is used does therefore not depend on their 
objectivity, but insteacl on thei-r utility for the identity project of the debate participant that 
employs one of them. The analysis of (a selection of articles from) the German debate 
illustrates this fact by applying the theoretically derived ideal-type categorisation to 
newspaper articles, which were published in between 2002 and 2004. The statements made in 
those articles are all essentially based on normative speculations about what the specific 
qualities of European societies are. in so doing they deri ve their meaning not primarily from 
their analytical quality. Their meaning rather depends on their capacity to construct an 
internally consistent narrative, i.e. their ability to re-produce the framing discourse logics of 
Civilisation, Kultur or cosmopolitanism and to establish an ordering hierarchy among them 
within the speech situation at hand. 
The thesis concludes thus that it is impossible to arrıve at an objectively right 
evaluation of the compiex social environment around the political decision whether Turkey 
should join the EU or not. However, the more channels for communication exist, where 
individuals can confront and (re-)negotiate their commonsensical knowledge with or against 
each other, the more probable it is that a dynamic debate emerges, which keeps the fruitful 
dialectical tension alive. 
The question, whether an entity called Turkey will join a European Union or not, is 
thus not so important. More important is the question how one can intensify the 
communicative engagement between individuals of both, the societies of the EU Member 
States and the Turkish society. 
Vll 
Introduction: The never ending stories of Turkey and Europe 
A history of Turkey-EU relations could start in 1959, when the Turkish RepuhLic submitteclone 
month after Greece an official application for membership of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to the Commission. On the Turkish side, the reasons for the appfication were 
both political and economic. Recognition of Turkey as a member of the Westem community of 
nations was the political maxim of Turkish foreign policy since the Tanzimat (re-organisation) era 
in 1864. The Turkish Republic, established in 1923 proceeded with the westemisation course and 
by 1959 Turkey was already member of several Westem institutions such as Council of Europe 
and NATO and an application to the EEC was seen as logical engagement of its general 
orientation tot the West (Hale 2000, pp.174). Another minor political reason connected to this 
one was the political competition with its neighbour Greece, which equally aspired for EEC 
associate membership and had delivered its note for application shortly ahead of Turkey. 
Economically membership was equally interesting fo r Turkey so as to gain easier access to the 
markets of its biggest trad ing partners with in the EEC, notably Germany and to quali fy more 
easily fo r IMF credits fo r re-structuring its economy and attract foreign investment (Steinbach 
2003, pp.283). 
This decision by the Turkish govemment then was warmly welcomed on the side of the 
EEC countries, since it verifıed the attractiveness of thi s new and stili rather experimental 
community and thus was a useful proof for its intemational increasing acceptance, for its open 
and expansive character, as well as for its ability and will to integrate new members and cultures 
(Ibid .). Another reason for the enthusiastic welcome was the political necessity for the westem 
European EEC to spread its sphere of influence vis-a-vis the Warsaw-Pact Community at the 
other side of the Iron Curtain and integrate a strategically important Turkey with a powerful army, 
which was also a loyal NATO partner (Ilkin 1990, pp.35). Especially Germany, however, was 
additionally interested to integrate Turkey, because of its need for workforce to rebuild the 
economy and maintain its sensational growth by using Turkish Gastarbeiter to fiil in the 
increasing vacancies. Despite this rather pragmatic reasons, there was nevertheless alsa the 
important idealistic dimension of furthering and stabilise with this means democracy in the south-
eastem part ofthe continent (Redmond 1993, p.26). 
8 
Although there were some doubts, on especially the French side, whether Turkey could be 
considered geographically as well as culturally as a part of Europe, these doubts where quickly 
overcome (Ilkin 2000, Ibid) . Turkey' s strategic importance and its ideological determination 
towards the West were considered to be enough w.arrant for the appropriateness of Turkish 
application to the EEC. This quick consent was favoured by the fact that- under the impact of the 
Cold War and its civilisational fault-line between two universalistic ideologies (Liberal capitalism 
and democracy vs. communism) - a cultural relativi sm like the one of the French government 
was not fitting the political narrative and necessities of the era of super powers and their world 
wide competition (cf. Hughes 2004). 
Accordingly an Association Agreement was negotiated, which outlined a two stage 
process towards a customs union between the EEC and Turkey and which furthennore stated in 
its Art 28 . the general future goal of full accession of Turkey to the political Community. It was 
signed then in Ankara in 1963, whereby this ratification was accompanied by the statement of 
Walter Hallstein, the president of the European Commission at that time, that: "Turkey is a part 
of Europe" (quoted from Hale 2000, fbid. ). 
However, since then many years have past and many changes occurred within and outside 
of Europe: the Cold War has ended and left the US as the sole super power within an increasing 
globali sed and multi -polar world haunted by internationally operating terrorism. The EEC does 
not exist anymore, but is superseded by the much more political and by now internationally well 
accepted European Union. The EU has furth ermore recently enlarged towards the East and 
entered with this enlargement into a ' post-Cold War' phase of re-position towards the non-
European, intemational community and re-definition of its i"ntemal structures. However, this 
phase of change does not occur - unlike the developments of the 50s/60s - within a prosperous 
era of growing economies. lnstead, it wears the mark of crisis, economic stagnation, demographic 
regression and the increasing incapability of the European welfare state to balance the growing 
gap between poor and rich ( cf. Modood 1997). 
Yet, despite ali the changes, one thing remained the same: Turkey is, over 40 years after 
the Association Agreement stili not a member of the European Community. And its future 
perspective of integration seems to be more and more ambiguous, since the public debates in 
Europe increasingly revive the cultural relativistic reservations, as they were mentioned by the 
French govemment in the 1960s. This argumentation is based on the claim that Turkey belongs to 
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a completely different, non-European, cultural block, let us say, the Islamic Orient, which cannot 
be integrated into an individualistic, se_cularised but Christian and somewhat enlightened 
Occidental community as it exists in Europe. in case it would be nevertheless integrated, this 
would ensue the destruction of Europe' s unique modes of socio-economic and political 
organisation. The post-Cold War world order - frequently referred to as ' The New World 
Disorder ' (cf. Manwaring & Corr, 1999) - seems to support this cultural-relativistic logic since it 
increasingly creates new, cultura! fault-lines between greater civilisational blocks (cf. Huntington, 
1993). This causes especially an increasing_ polarisation between an US empire, its sphere of 
influence, and the rest, due to the strong competition for scarce resources and world trade shares. 
in such a conflict ridden and disordered world, marked by global competition and migration 
flows, cultural bounds seem to regain their importance and Europe would do well - as the 
proponents of such a cultural relativistic logic suggest - when it tries to keep up its integrity and 
purity within an European Union, that excludes Turkey and remains a 'Christian Club' and 
' Fortress Europe'. Hence, the EU should rather conso lidate the recent enlargement and must not 
engage ın an idealist vision, which ultimately causes the Union's over-stretch and internal 
dissol ution 
Of course, there are also di fferent vo ıces , proposıng an integration of Turkey into a 
European Union, which they perceive as a coming, balancing force or broker in World politics. 
They argue that the integration of an state with an Islamic population would prove the universal 
scope of the Union 's values and its openness towards people from other cultures, so as to set a 
sign of understanding and communication between West and East, calm down the resentments on 
both sides and thus help to re-establish rational and political dialogue with Islamic countries as 
well as towards the Islamic minorities within Europe (cf. Prantl May 2004). This is the more 
necessary since modem, complex and multi-cultural societies, which are increasingly connected 
and dependent on each other, need to manage cultural differences in a pragmatic way, need to 
find modem and adequate solutions for the mutual problems posed by globalisation, instead of 
relying on anachronistic, xenophobic and racist visions of society, aimed at purity and exclusion 
ofthe other (cf. White 2000, pp.83 ; Kristeva 2001 , Amin, 2004). 
The recent decision by the Council to start Accession negotiations with Turkey (03-10-
2005) then seemed to adhere to this more universalistic logic, although one has to state that this 
decision is anything but a clear prospect for an integration of Turkey. Rather it means again 
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postponement of the final decision to a later date. Meanwhile the hot public debates are ebbing 
down everywhere in Europe and it looks as if the political pragmatism ofthe EU decision makers 
again successfülly prevented them to absorbed by the ideological enthusiasm ofa pubiic debate, 
which was lead by the dramatising zeal of feuilleton scribblers and the search of political pressure 
groups for .a political vision that distinguishes them from others. 
However, 10 deduce a political decision vis-a-vis Turkish accessıon from the public 
debates in several EU member states seems to be rather difficult, since those discussion were not 
particularly concemed with the pro and con ofa political integration of Turkey, its repercussions 
on the decision-making, and economic structure, as well as on the foreign policy prospect of the 
Union. Although these considerations were definitely apart of the discussion, they were in much 
(not ali) of the debate contributions merely the ingredients, used to brew a much larger soup about 
the self-understanding of European societies. As can been seen in the above mentioned, somehow 
arbitrarily selected and simplified examples of a cultural relativistic or universalist position 
within the debate: Turkey was once again the ' significant other' which served as the passive 
mirror to an introspective and Eurocentric debate of the societies placed on the European 
peninsula about themselves. 
And indeed, Turkey is not just another state to be integrated, Turkey's relationship to the 
Christian societies of the continent has a long tradition of mutual constitutive resentments and 
antagonisrn, dating back to the first Turkish rush towards the West, namely, to 'their', the 
Ottomans, robbery of ' our', European Constantinople. It equally refers to the 'sick man ' of 
Europe whose despotic impotence in the l 91h and 201h century caused the clash of Russia and 
Austria in the Balkans and thus triggered the age of the Great Wars. The other side of the coin, 
however, telis a different story; the story of the crusades and their attempt to rescue the Holy 
Land from the Islamic infidels, to make ita part of the Res Christiana, an undertaking that unified 
the antagonistic aristocrats on the continent vis-a-vis the Islamic (but also Orthodox, pagan, or 
Jewish) other, and led not only to pogroms inside of Europe, but also to the plundering of 
Constantinople by the righteous knights of the Cross in 1204. it tells furthermore the story of an 
Imperial Europe of great nations that legitimised its domination of the Orient with the narrative of 
a common, historical mission of Europe to civilise the despotic and backward East. This hubris 
and chauvinistic ambition, one could accordingly claim, was the primary reason for the partition 
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of the Ottoman realm and led finally to European self-destruction in the First and ensuing Second 
World War. 
As one can see, there rs indeed much historical ballast, which rather obstructs an 
objective, pragmatic and future-oriented public debat-e with ali its ideological potential. This 
becomes the more significant, since these historically based narratives seem to supply a much 
needed (although maybe illusionary) principle of consistency and continuity in times of major 
political re-configuration of world politics after the Cold War and the ensuing disorder and 
discontinuity of social relations, between and within increasingly complex and globalised 
societies. It is this context, which made the debate about Turkish Accession what it was; a highly 
emotionalised palaver about what Europe, the EU and the attached societies are actually suppose 
to mean, what their inner qualities, their historical development and their future prospects are. 
This essay therefore tries to analyse the debate about Turkish Accession according to the 
political logics, which were used in order to formulate a vision of (European) societies. it claims 
that one can detect in this debate three major discursive logics, which mutually produce each 
other, so as to set the discursive frame for negotiating a meaning among them. These logics, 
which will be treated as fictional , ideal-types, are: First, the offensive discursive logic of 
Civi/isation , which is connected to the French Enlightenment and European Orientalism. 
Secondly, the defensive discourse logic of Kultur, which is connected to conservative or 
continental Romanticism and European Occidentalism. Thirdly, the reflective discourse logic of 
Cosmopolitanism, which can be traced back to liberal Enlightenment and European 
lndividualism. 
Tracing back these discursive logics to French or liberal Enlightenment or to conservative 
Romanticism respectively, does not mean that they are historically derived from specific French, 
liberal or conservative/continental schools of thought or that they are generally geographically 
placed. Within the analytical framework of this essay, this procedure should rather be understood 
as the attempt to use the historical perspective so as to trigger understanding for the way in which 
historicism and ideas of continuity help to infuse meaning into discourse positions taken within 
daily debates about complex political questions. Historicism is part ofa language based logic that 
helps to define a certain position within the debate by endowing it with the necessary element of 
direction and consistency, without however, proving that something like history does exist 
outside of the logic used (cf. Skinner 2001}. That is why it is necessary to note, that the discursive 
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logic of Civilisation, as also the other two logics, are treated as fictional ideal-types, which are 
neither necessarily to be found outside of this paper, or display a complete picture ofa discursive 
landscape and posSible statements uttered, nar do they suggest that these political discourse logics 
are historically deı:ived .and continuing. 
Yet, these fictional ideal-types are useful to structure an analysis ofa debate like the one 
on Turkish Accession, just because they help to simplify and limit the scope of possibilities and 
thus allow categorisation and a subsequent formulation of some principle mechanisms, which 
enable us to infuse meaning into an otherwise over-complex and thus meaningless social reality. 
Thereby, they also resemble the simplifying and ideological use of political theory in debates 
about daily political problems, and are thus useful in two perspectives: These ideal-types reduce 
the complexi-ty ofa political debate, but simultaneously they reveal in so doing how ideological 
distortions emerge within political debates, how they make use of simplification and ideal-type 
categorisations. 
Nonetheless, despite these initial qualifications, the second part of this essay will attempt 
to prove empirically that the theoretically derived ideal-type categorisation is indeed of some use 
for the understanding ofa political debate, by applying it to a selection of statements made within 
the recent debate about Turkish accession. The selection thereby, is basically derived from the 
debate in German quality newspapers. 
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1. The fortresses of Europe or the monasteries of Europe? - European Kultur vs. European 
Civilisation vs. European Cosmopolitanism 
How can we understand something so complicated and blurred like the notion Europe, which was 
and is filled with so many different and even contradictory meanings depending on the 
perspective taken, that it by now can mean almost anything and accordingly nothing in particular? 
Of course, one could claim for matters of simplification and concreteness that nowadays the 
European Union stands for what is European, but even in the combination of Europe with the 
institutions and regulations of the political body called European Union it is exactly the first part, 
the European-ness of the union which is highly debated and contested. Does this political and 
economic body represent Europe and the Europeans or is it just a political design meant to rescue 
the sovereignty of the participating nation-states, whereby it only hides this 'realist ' rational 
behind the ideological veil ofa proclaimed Europeanisation (Milward, 2000)? And connected to 
this, does the recent discussion about European identity - as it vividly took place around the 
decision to start negotiation talks with Turkey - indeed mark the begin of a European 
consciousness and an European Civi l Society? Or is just the opposite the case, namely that the 
preoccupation of intellectuals and public debates with the ambiguous notion of identity 
illuminates the lack ofa clear political vision within the union and its democratic deficit (Strath 
1999, p.19)? 
However, despite the imprecision of the notion Europe or rather, just because of its 
fuzziness, one can argue that it is perfectly suitable to work asa predicate that attaches normative 
qualities to whatever political project to which it is connected, whereby the specificity of this 
quality does not derive from an essential and inherent content of the term Europe, but instead 
from the context in which it is mentioned (cf. White 2000, pp.70) . Central Europe, Fortress 
Europe, European Enlightenment, European civilisation, European imperialism or European 
Union ali create a meaning in between the terms employed, through their connectiveness, and 
equally important through their exclusion of alternative words and combinations. 
For example, if one makes use of the specific combination Fortress Europe, the first 
notion, fortress, implicitly employs a net of certain associated words (tike closed walls, defensive, 
security, control, danger outside), while it simultaneously excludes altemative sets of 
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associations, as for example, openness, peace, free floating between inside and outside, ete. These 
specifıc associations are then connected to the notion Europe, build a certain net of meaning 
around it and are thus binding and containing it. Putting the word Fortress in front of the word 
Europe, thus opens up specifıc horizons of meaning for the term Europe ( everything connected to 
the symbol fortress) while it at the same time limits altemative modes of understanding 
(everything connected to the opposite ofa fortress). Simultaneously the term Europe within this 
couple equally infuses certain associations to the fortress, opening up its possible meaning by 
connecting it to the more abstract net of associations attached to Europe (e.g. the EU, political 
regulations, globalisation, Europeanisation) while simultancously receiving from it limits as well 
(excluding opposite terms like Asia, maybe nation-states, certainly non-Europeans). 
However, one could equally endow the notion ' Fortress Europe' with quite different 
associations and accordingly change its meaning completely. A fortress could be understood as an 
outpost of civilisation that works as a safe haven and economic centre within a chaotic 
wildemess, empowering the citi zen living around it with the necessary security and structure they 
need to cultivate their environment. It thus losses its closed and defensive character and 
accordingly the connected term Europe opens up to its surrounding (including then Asia, nation-
states, non-Europeans) and can be understood in less di scriminating but rather inclusive terms, 
enabling the civilised (not only European) people in its frontier regions to interact freely, trade 
with each other and live peacefully together. 
üne can see with this little example that the meaning ofa specifıc notion always depends 
upon the net of associated notions put around it and further, that language is a tool that 
necessarily allows for ambiguity and various even contradictory interpretations. In order to really 
understand what the people meant that said ' Fortress Europe' we accordingly have to excavate 
the implicitly employed net of associated terms with which the statement was framed. To grasp 
the frame of a statement however, means to look beyond the surface of language, to go into the 
socio-political context in which the statement was uttered and to re-establish the specifıc 
historical environment and its specifıc perspective on past, present and future, in other words, to 
re-create the discursive fom1ation of reality that took place ata certain time, in a certain place and 
employed accordingly a certain language (Gutting 1994, pp. 15). 
However, this essay is not meant to add a new history of the 'Idea of Europe' . it is not 
meant to be another attempt to write a total history of an European Civilisation at a certain time in 
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a certain place. it rather approaches the discursive formation of reality from the ı:ıerspective of 
Janguage, to show how the Iogic of Iinguistic oppositions or Iinguistic constructions of difference 
influence the formulation of political visions of society. it employs therefore, as stated above, an 
ideal-type analysis of the ways in which debate participants talk about society, how they infuse 
meaning to their statements about it and try to formulate certain common frames for a social 
reality which are meant to lead to Iegitimate political decisions. 
This essay argues that there are three main, opposing perspectives on society within the 
debate about Europe, or three opposing argumentative Jogics of talking about it, which are 
mutually exclusive but necessarily presuppose the existence of their counterparts so as to 
determine the frame in which a debate about the quality of a ('European') society can be 
discussed (cf. Entman 1993, pp. 51). They resemble thus the way in which meaning is constructed 
by language, namely the fıxing of certain notions within a web of related notions while excluding 
but simultaneously binding the opposite notion within a Iinguistic continuum ranging from the 
same, via similar to different and contradictory. 
The first ideal-type I will label as the political discourse logic of (European) Civilisation, 
ı.e. a logic that Jays a certain net of associations around the term Europe which can be 
summarised under the (French) notion of civilisation. This discursive logic or perspective has 
essentially an universal horizon and thus furthers the integrative perception on cultures as being 
functional items, hierarchically ordered - depending on the stage of development they are in -
within a overarching world civilisation (or society), and which thus connects to the Orientalist 
discourse of European Empires. As such it frequently works as an emphasis on the character of 
society as being diverse although working towards the general establishment of the abstract and 
superior qualities of the core and in so doing presupposes a kind of Darwinist evolutionary 
principle of social development. It thus emphasises on the natura!, historical inclination of this 
(social) core to widen and spread its superior civilisation and accordingly assimilate other 
cultural blocs (or parts of the society) into its historic mission of perfection and harmonising the 
outside, by making those outside cultures understand (i.e. the educative role of Europe's elite as 
world's teacher, which it however obtained because of its ability to Jearn from other cultures). 
It is furthermore formulated predominantly in terms of a teleological developing history 
and thus treats past, present and future as something displaying an inherent Jogic, a Iogic 
however, which is understood and used to realise the best possible future for the whole under the 
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leadership of the core society or social elite. it essentially has a positive outlook on the future , 
emphasising on the potential and long term development of society and accordingly one can 
attach a quest for the all-embracing to this discursive logic, in which the spreading of the values 
of the core is a necessary element since only this can prove their supposed superi.or quality. This 
logic consistently values penetration of different societies by the core society as something 
positive, necessary and .historically legitimised. it is thus expansive (in order to be inclusive) and 
directed to an outside, because this is the discursive logic ofa (discursive, social, geopolitical, 
socio-economic, political) powerful core legitimising its position vis-a-vis a periphery, and the 
latter ' s inclusion into its sphere, or vice versa, it is the logic ofa powerful periphery aspiring to 
take over the core (i.e. a offensive identity project). 
This discursive logic, 1 would argue, is mainly the one that treats Turkish access10n 
positively. 
The second ideal-type, which is diametrically opposed to the one 1 labelled (European) 
Civilisation, but yet necessarily relying on it, is the discursive logic of (European) Kultur. This 
discursive logic or perspective, has essentially an cultural relativistic horizon and thus denies the 
integrative perception on cultures as being functional items of an overarching world civilisation, 
rather pointing at the fundamental difference between them and highlighting their specifıcity and 
unique outlook on reality. it thus connects to the Occidentalist discourse of dissident nationalism 
which assumes an unbridgeable fault-line between culturally determined (national) societies so as 
to deny the civilisational inclusiveness of the Em pire. Within the debate about Turkish accession 
to the EU, this formation functions frequently as an emphasis on Europe' s character as being 
intemally united, while fundamentally different towards the non-European, its natura!, historical 
inclination to deepen and secure its unique modes of social organisation and accordingly exclude 
other cultures/civilisations. This logic consistently values (inter-)penetration (i.e. bigamy) of 
societies and multiple identities as something impure, degenerated and in-authentic. Accordingly 
one can attach a quest for origin or the search fora pure core, i.e. past-essence, to this discursive 
logic. This outlook thus implies an historic mission of perfection and harmonising towards the 
inside, by purifying the community from connections with (inferior) outside cultures. However, it 
thereby shares the same assumption ofa teleological, Darwinist historicism with its counterpart 
logic, although it values history in an opposite direction, not as something that will peacefully 
harmonise the differences between cultures by convincing the inferior cultures in the periphery to 
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adapt to the superior norms of the core. it rather highlights a conflict ridden perception of history 
in which fundamental dissimilar cultures and their mutually exclusive worldviews clash-. This is 
because within this logic there is no single core but many cores, a multi-polar, unstable world in 
which the way to one truth is not found through communicating superior norms to others and the 
subsequent assimilation of them (since real understanding of other cultures is impossible), but by 
exclusion or (violent) elimination of the inferior other core outside Accordingly the penetration of 
the ideally united and pure culture by other, outside cultures is valued as something negative, 
something that poisons the integrity and strengths of the inside society and accordingly its ability 
to survive. 
The hasis of this logic is hence often a positive perception of the past (as something to be 
conserved or re-established). it is furthermore formulated predominantly in present tense and in 
the terms of a pessimistic outlook on the future, emphasising on the problems and threats 
challenging the functioning of the society or the EU. it is thus exclusive and directed to an inside, 
because this is the discursive logic ofa (discursive, social, geopolitical , socio-economic, political) 
inside core fearing to be increasingly marginalised (besieged core) or the discursive logic ofa 
weak periphery trying to render the position of the core illegitimate (i.e. a defensive identity 
project) . 
This discursive logic, I would equally argue, is mainly the one that treats Turkish 
accession negatively. 
To come back to the example of the Fortress Europe, this Kultur logic could be associated 
with the first understanding of the notion, which 1 proposed, emphasising on the defensive 
character of the fortress, its closed walls that provide security to an inside, precluding free and 
dangerous interaction with the outside so as to guarantee the integrity and surviving of the core 
and enabling the inhabitants to live a peaceful and fruitful life within its walls. The other logic, 
Civilisation, instead could be associated with the perception of the Fortress Europe, which is an 
outpost of civilisation, a centre of commerce and safe haven in the wilderness, where the people 
that live around it can meet and interact freely according to the generally accepted rules of the 
gate keepers, who thereby provide structure and stability to an otherwise dangerous wasteland and 
thus enable the people to !ive a peaceful and fruitful life increasingly outside of the castle walls 
As one can see from this specific example, as well as from the somehow arbitrarily 
characterised oppositional discourse logics, Kultur vs. Civilisation above: They are based on an 
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initial opposition, but the more one tries to differentiate between them, the more one discovers 
fundamental sim-ilarities, which, however, are there, because without these similarities it would 
be impossible to create difference between them, to set them into a dualistic relationship and 
create meaning i-n between. In other words, one can determine.. the meaning of a notion tike 
Europe, or Kultur, ete only by fixing their position within a net, by creating a cluster of related 
words around it and connecting this cluster to, and <lifferentiating it thereby from, other, 
alternative clusters, which propose another position of the notion in question . This dialectical way 
of constructing reality, therefore requires oppositions so as to determine the framework in which 
meaning emerges in form of relations of similarity and difference between them. 
This above proposed framing of the debate thus can be called the discursive formation of 
Kultur vs. Civilisation, whereby these notion mark the outer boundary of the possible discourse 
and create a closed frame which allows to negotiate a meaning in between these poles exactly 
because they employ the same hidden assumption. These hidden assumptions, or underlying 
similarities between Civilisation and Kultur are, first, their teleological perception of history, 
secondly (but related to the fırst point), their assumption of an essence or core, thirdly (and 
related to the second point), their hierarchical evaluation of difference and fourthly, their 
assumptions that these differences occur on the level of collectives. Based on these underlying 
assumptions they however, trigger different, even contradictory conclusions : Civilisation , on the 
one hand suggests an increasing, peaceful absorption of the weaker groups in the periphery by the 
superior core through a civilising, educative process that transforms the periphery's uncivilised 
modes of social organisation and makes them comply with the rational rules of the civilised core 
(cf. Bollenbeck 1999, p. 292). Kultur instead suggests a conflict ridden interaction between 
several cores, in which that core survives which is able to upkeep its integrity and defend it vis-a-
vis the other, similarly aggressive cores, whereby the aim and end of history - the peaceful 
brotherhood of men - is reached not by absorption of the other, but instead, by its elimination 
(although absorption/assimilation is just another way of eliminating difference and thus 
conceptually similar). 
However, these two ideal-type definitions are simplifications and extreme ideological 
versions, full of racism and aggression . The point, however, that I wanted to make and which 1 
want to verify throughout this essay, is, that these two narratives are and must be fictional , amoral 
outer limits to a debate about societies, their inner qualities and mutual interaction, which inform, 
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or better, provoke a dialogic construction of reality, as something which is exactly to be found in 
between of both, as something whidr is in opf)osition to both balanced; balanced between 
intemal and extemal, balanced between difference and sameness, between individual and 
collective, between power and moral, and_ balanced between equality and freedom . in other 
words, one has to excavate the hidden assumptions that connect these diametrically opposed 
discursive logics, in order to deconstruct their conspiracy and liberate our political vision from 
their ideological grip. 
This is broadly said, the program ofa thircl ideal-type, a reflective logic, which I will cali 
the discourse logic of Cosmopolitanism. It is essentially build on the premise of being a balance 
of those other two logics, of being a moralistic 'third-way', a post-Kultur vs. Civilisation account, 
which is based on the other two, but simultaneously differentiates itself from them by 
deconstructing their hidden, ideological assumptions. As such it takes over the perception from 
the Civilisation logic that (world) society is diverse, without implying, however that there is an 
overarching truth (resembiing thus Kultur). lts ideal is in consequence something akin to a 
contextual universalism (or equally, as we will later see universal contextualism). Accordingly 
it characterises society as being united in diversity (or, again diverse in unity) and thus balances 
the ideoiogical logics of Orientalism and Occidentalism in a paradoxical way, thereby proposing 
an anti-essentialist vision of society which refrains from core-periphery pattems and a historicist 
past or future utopia. 
it rather accounts for the constructivist perception of society, stating that sameness and 
difference are always imagined and mutually depending on each other, so that every core can 
been seen as the periphery of another core and vice versa. lnstead of an core-periphery and related 
superiority-inferiority ordering of difference, it suggests hence an egalitarian mutuality between 
both; between individual and collective, and between the same and the other. Consequently, it 
proposes mutual integration, of the individual/collective and the self/other instead of 
assimilation or exclusion/elimination, whereby it also denies the teleological historicism of the 
former logics by introducing a dynamic and individualistic perception on society and historical 
development. Doing this also changes the perception of society: in opposition to the two 
preceding logics it is not assumed that society is constituted by a fıxed 'fault-line' of difference 
between nations (the container theory of society, cf. Beck 1999, pp.39). Society is rather seen asa 
constantly changing entity, because it is mutually (re-)constructed within a (fair) and ongoing 
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dialogue between individuafs, who communicate with each other, within and between 
societies/cultures. Cosmopolitanism accordingly values interpenetration (i.e. bigamy) of 
societies/cultures and multiple identities as something positive, fertile, art-full and authentic. 
Tbe-anti-ideological and individualistic logic of cosmopolitanism tries in this manner to 
avoid an abuse by political groups that need to legitimise their advantageous power position 
within society, by directing difference to the other of the in tema! ( cf. Kul tur) or outside periphery 
(Civilisation). it does so by denying historicism, as well as an teleological/hierarchical evaluation 
of difference based on distinctions along core-periphery or inside-outside patterns, associated 
with different stages of a supposed civilisational/cultural development. Instead it proposes a 
rationa! deliberative system of dialogue between culturally distanced individual as the libertarian, 
non-repressive and authentic core of its logic. However, its focus on the individual, with which it 
is able to prevent the ideological abuse of this logic by collectives or political pressure groups, 
does simultaneously also prevent its utility for the formation of common political action aimed at 
changing the general (and possibly unfair) modes of social relations within and between societies, 
since its distanced individual would have to step back from its solitary and reflective position and 
join an active, communal core that necessarily has to try to marginalise the core of opponents. 
ft is thus diffıcult to associate this logic completely with a rejection or apprehension of 
Turkish membership to the EU, since its theoretical foundation - at least within the scope of this 
idea-1 type - does not allow the formulation of common and generalising discursive position 
towards a specifıc problem within the field of foreign policy. 
To use1he example of the ' Fortress Europe' once more, one could perceive this logic asa 
device that denies tfıe connection of Europe with the fortress altogether, by suggesting something 
akin to Rabelais' monastery of joy with its motto: "Do what you want", so to say proposing the 
'Monastery Europe' instead; a monastery which is placed in the wilderness, which is an outpost 
of civilisation that provides security and structure to the people around and within its permeable 
walls, while it simultaneously is non-aggressive and integrates different cultural horizons in an 
egalitarian way into its vision, so as to allow for individual freedom and cultural dynamism. 
What emerges then is a pleasant, libertarian vision of Europe, but yet it is as the former 
two logics neither more realistic nor unproblematic. l rather claim that this Cosmopolitanism is 
equally not a position that is able to provide a non-fictional and more authentic narrative about 
(European) society. lnstead, it relies on the very same linguistic logic of oppositions, proposing a 
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{supposedly new) ' third way' which is positioned in opposition to the other t\vo logics and 
'reveals' their hidden assumptions (by denying teleological historicism, denying core-periphery 
pattems and suggesting an individualistic, non-hierarchical evaluation of difference) . in so doing 
it implies that it is the somewhat more rational and realistic successor of those t\vo, thereby 
suggesting, first , that those t\vo logics, which 1 consciously treat as fictional ideal-types, where 
once before at a certain point of time indeed perceived as absolutely realistic depictions of 
societies, and as such not allowing for individual criticism and alternative thinking and secondly, 
it_ suggests that thi s stage is now ' overcome', what means that it through the backdoor re-
introduces historicism and utopia, this time as a kind of meta-historicism of theoretical thinking 
and consequently does not avoid the creation of core-periphery or inside-outside pattems. 
As indicated above, it is the logic of language, which suggests historicism, core-periphery 
patterns and a mutual and tense relationship between individual and the collective. Within the 
fomrnlation of political visions about society, distinctions between past, present and future, have 
to be made and difference has to be created, according to the lingui stic mode ranging from the 
same, over similar to contradictory. At the same time it is the character of language, as a 
collective too l that is only used and vo iced by individuals, which implies the tense mutuality 
between both , individual and group. Furthermore it is important to note, that language is 
necessarily a too l that reduces the complexity of reality by treating it as a set of causally linked 
ideal-types, whereby it structures our thinking along the !ine of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, 
although it, on the other hand, inevitably allows for ambigui ty, re-definiti on and re-configuration 
of exactly these ideal types. lt thus allows for both, fo r continu ity and fo r change. Languages 
enables the formulation of fixed ideal-type categories, but it does not preclude their subsequent 
breaking-up and redefinition. For example, the threefold ideal-type construction consisting of 
Civilisation and Kultur as thesis/antithesis couple and cosmopolitanism as its synthesis, can 
consequently be redefined so as to switch to thesis/c ivilisation, antithesis/cosmopolitanism and 
synthesis/ Kultur, ete. lt is for that reason equally suitable to switch position between those three 
ideal-types, in the way that for example Kultur and Cosmopolitanism are depicted as the fictional , 
amoral boundary logics - Kultur, as an totalitarian, collectivist vision of society and 
Cosmopolitanism, as an atomistic individualism and elitist version - so that Civilisation emerges 
as balanced, realistic synthesis-logic in between those two radical, anachronistic and amoral 
visions of society. 
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ln this respect, one has to note that the 'new third way' which the logic of 
Cosmopolitanism suggests is not at ali new, but is rather the same old attempt to formulate a 
moralistic narrative of a synthesis which is balancing the (from its point of view) essentially 
amoral, radical and anachronistic logics of Kultur and Civilisation. For that reason, J suggest that 
this dualism between the ideal-types Kultur and Civilisation necessarily suggests a third way, or 
better, that Cosmopolitanism is able to depict itself as the superior third way just because it 
produces its complementary logics as radical, fictional, amoral and anachronistic outer limits, 
thereby proposing its own logic as the adequate, modern, balanced and moralistic, say, only 
meaningful logic in between. That is why any 'third way' is always thought of being in between 
two fictional outer limits of the discursive landscape, a third way, which however itself only 
exists as a fictional ideal-type, and which, the more one tries to differentiate it from the radical 
boundary logics, reveals similarities with them and accordingly dissolves into several third ways, 
some - as in the case of Cosmopolitanism as third way - tending more into the direction of 
Kultur (like universal contextualism), other into the direction of Civilisation (e.g. contextual 
universalism); or even, as shown above, switches positions with those logics altogether, so as to 
find itself depicted from the perspective of another logic, at the outer limits of the discourse. 
This, however, is not to suggest an 'anything goes' within political discourses and 
language in general. lt is meant to illuminate how political visions of society - as they were also 
negotiated within the debate about Turkish accession - are mutually constitutive and that they 
thereby follow a discursive logic suggested by language (i.e. the logic of oppositional ideal -types, 
structured along thesis, antithesis, synthesis). It is nevertheless impossible to ultimately fix a 
certain meaning of society along their historically legitimised position. This is precisely due to the 
ambiguity and variability of possible usages of language, which breaks these ideal-types up 
again, re-defines and re-formulates them, adds new associations to them and detaches old 
associations from them, so as to re-write their suggested historical fundament, re-individualise 
their theoretical generalisations and open up new constellations of meaning. 
The following chapters will develop the above mentioned ideal-type categorisation more 
ın detail , whereby it should be clear that historical narrative employed in these definitions is 
highly selective and artificially constructed. 
However, the skeleton of the dialectical relationship between these three discursive logics 
can be summarised as follows : 
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Civilisation Kultur Cosmopolitanism 
Universalist and ' idealistic ' 
üne (world) history but 
different stages 
Focus on future harmony, 
which has to be constructed 
Static future , dynamic 
present/past 
Political society created by 
rational individuals 
Cultural relativist and 
' realistic ' 
Different, mutually exclusive 
but equal histories 
Either contextual universalism, or 
universal contextualism 
Both 
Focus on past harmony, which Focus on present harmony, which 
has to be re-constructed is due to a mutual construction of 
past/future 
Static past, dynamic Static present, dynamic 
present/future past/future 
Spiritual community resulting Both 
fro rn collective traditions 
Inclusion and assimilation of Exclusion or e limination of Mutual integration between both 
core/periphery and inside/outside 
lnter-penetration 
the peripheral other the outside other 
One-way penetration by most No penetration into home 
advanced society (or core) 
Offensively directed towards 
culture (inside) 
Offensively directed towards 
outside and defensively on the the inside and defensive 
inside towards the outside 
Pacifıst or passivefy distanced 
Connects to Orientalism and Connects to Occidentalism Connects to medieval feudalist 
European imperialism and European as well as post- imperiaiism or post-national 
colonial nationalism govemance 
Intemal freedom through Extemal freedom through Freedom and equality, diversity in 
extemal equality and ' unity in intemal equality and diversity unity in diversity, ete. 
diversity' on the inside and in unity inside, unity in 
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'diversity in unity' on the 
outside 
Globalisation as civilising 
force, spreading Western 
norrns and value and thus 
extending democracy 
Responsibility for and 
diversity outside 
Globalisation as nihil-ising Glocalisation 
force , which national or group 
sovereignty and thus 
democracy 
Responsibility for the seJf and Can inforrn both 
engagement with the other distance to the other 
EU as global player and future EU as loca! fortress to 
balancing force within world 
politics 
Pro Turkish Accession, since 
it: 
- would prove the EU ' s 
universal norms and values 
- would counteract 
Euroscepticism outside of EU 
- would enable the EU to fulfil 
a leading role in world politics 
- would increase the 
momentum for institutional 
reform 
- would strengthen the EU 
economically through 
extension and diversifıcation 
of its market 
maintain unique internal EU as safe-haven 
balance between individuals 
Contra Turkish Accession, Either/or/neither 
since it: 
- wou ld endanger the Union ' s 
unique modes of social 
organisation 
-would counteract 
Euroscepticism inside of EU 
- would involve the EU in 
dangerous confiicts 
-would increase the danger of 
institutional dead-lock 
-would weaken the EU 
financial capabilities 
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- would further the 
modemisation ofthe Turkish 
state and at least not harın the 
Union 
-would help to establish a new 
post-national European 
identity 
-would sabotage the 
modemisation ofthe European 
Union and not help Turkey 
-would prevent the emergence 
of an European identity 
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1.1 Civilisation and Orien-talism - Revolutionary Enlightenment and the civilised European 
Em pire 
'Napoleon wanted to offer an useful European exampfo to the Orient, and finally 
also to make the inhabitants ' lives more pleasant, as well as to procure for them ali 
the advantages ofa perfect civilisation.' 
Fourier, Preface historique, Vol. l ofDescrlption de l'Egypte, p.iii 
(quoted from Said, 2003, p.85.) 
A possible history of the civilisational logic could trace it back to the French Revolution in 1789, 
treating it as a symbol of political transformation which brought about the first political 
movement guided by purely secular ideals - universal liberty and equality - so as to formulate a 
more moral vision of society than the aristocratic social command of the so-called ancien regime 
and its anachronistic estate-order could provide (Giddens, 1990, p.23). It thereby changed the 
perception of societies fundamentally, which were now to be defined as vo luntary, political 
communities of rational (i.e. free) individuals. Now, the citizen would have to unite 
democratically so as to define the common will vis-a-vis upcoming tasks. These citizen 
consequently were distinguished from the former, unenlightened inferiors, who surrendered their 
liberty and power to a hereditary and exclusive elite that based its tutelage and despotism on a 
past-focussed, i.e. dynastical and thus irrational and counterproductive legitimation of power (cf. 
Palmer, 410-413). 
Hence, instead of relying on a dynastical perception of history - which does not include 
the principle of change and development, but proposes in its place the unbroken connection of the 
never-changing social order with a past that reaches into times legendary and pre-historic - this 
fundamentally modem logic introduced by the French revolutionaries was built on the premise 
that history embodies an evolutionary principle aimed at future perfection of mankind ( cf. Giesen 
1999, p.38). Accordingly the history of the individuals and their cultural background did not 
count either, instead their will and ability to further the common, general project towards the 
perfection of the free brotherhood of men did. Identity thus should not longer be a matter of birth 
and embedded within the unequal , predestined relationships between the collectives of the 
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estates. Instead, it should be a m-atteJ of the rational will of the individual to choose its (political) 
identity, to establish an equal coaliti0n with other free individuals focussed on the nonnative 
füture of society. 
This is the spirit of Enüghtenment and its educative utopia of producing a rational but also 
moralistic individual, rational because it is able and willing to decide freely what is best for him 
and does not rely on any authority than on that of its own reason, and morality, because its reason 
makes it refrain from abusing its freedom to subdue others, but instead convinces it that it has to 
tolerate others as having the eq-ual right to freedom. This is summarised in one, famous sentence 
by Kant: "Act in such a way that the principle of your action could simultaneously be the 
principle ofa comm0n !egislation" . In other words, Enlightenment was not only tuming history 
up side down, from static, dynastical focus on the past to a dynamic, future-focussed idea of 
progress. it also changed the social perspective by disqualifying the collectivistic perception of 
society, in which historically derived, communal customs dictated to every individual what was 
best for him . Now, society should be constituted by an abstract, impersonal idea of morality, 
through which the individual is able to put itself into the position of others and thus can 
understand in an unselfish way what the best (future) for the whole is. The individual could do so, 
and that is a third fundamental claim of Enlightenment, by using its reason, or, in other words, its 
logic as it is based on language. Language in thi s respect is the bridge between individual and 
collective, a bridge however, which is, in the spirit of Enlightenrnent, a more abstract, new 
language. It should not Jonger be embedded in legends and customs meant to transmit collective 
dogmas to the next generation. Instead Janguage ought to be used critically. The individual thus 
should use Janguage as a tool to reflect on its social reality and communicate with other about it, 
so as to define new visions within a free , intersubjective sphere of egalitarian exchange of ideas 
(cf. Habermas 2001, p.167). üne can thus summarise the spirit of Enlightenment as a 
fundamental change based on a new understanding of language, treating it as the egalitarian force 
between individuals. This is based on the assumption that everyone within society (at least 
theoretically) speaks the same language and can use it as he wants, only bound to the logical 
limits of language, so as to formulate together with other individuals in an intersubjective way the 
state of reality and the future, normative ideal of society. 
This individualistic-egalitarian and liberal-universal scope of Enlightenment thus 
fonnulates an essentially anti-authoritarian idea of society. However, in so doing, it rather seems 
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to contradicı the above mentioned features of the political discourse logic Civilisation in some 
fundamental point-s. Especially those features are missing, which would trigger an (civilisational) 
evaluation of differences in a hierarchical way and between collectives. it was claimed that within 
the logic of Civilisation, core-periphery patters essentially suggest the existence of a more 
advanced core and legitimise consequently its supremacy over a backward or reactionary 
periphery. The characterisation of Civilisation within this chapter instead rather resembles 
important features of what 1 have labelled the reflective, third-way logic of Cosmopolitanism. it 
most significantly possesses the latter's radical, anti-ideological and universal individualism that 
emphasises on an egalitarian and liberal mutuality between rational individuals which, through 
communication, construct society consciously on basis of a commonly but non-repressively 
defined (future) ideal. 
However, this is not a contradiction, since, first, both logics originate from the theoretical 
basis of Enlightenment, and secondly, because we did not yet arrive at the political discourse 
logic of -Civilisation. So far (French) Enlightenment could keep its innocence, because it stili was 
a dissident ideal , a normative, third way theory. As such it was merely reflecting on the old, 
amoral and anachronistic order of ancien regime aristocratism. it thus primarily served as a tool 
to deconstruct the moral legitimation of an ex isting social order and was not used to Jegitimise the 
construction of new institutions. That is why, we can detect only implicit constructions of a 
political other and oppositional political logics within this initial state of Enlightenment, which 
for that reason only indirectly referred to a ' barbaric despotism', without, though, being forced to 
give a face to theses significant other. 
Hence, this can be seen as a setting for the French Revolution, which, however, soon Jed 
to the epoch of Terreur and its persecution of counter-revolutionaries (aristocrats and other 
barbarians) - i.e. individuals that used their reason to formulate other visions of society than those 
in power had in their mind - and which eventually brought to power a caste of militaries that 
could streamline the missionary zeal of Enlightenment into the direction of the outside other- the 
collective of reactionary nations - and thus liberated their own population from a murderous civil 
war by transferring societal progress outside of France with the means of glorious campaigns 
meant to liberate and civilise other populations, whether they wanted to or not. Through this 
nationalisation, i.e. collectivisation of the Enlightenment project and through projecting 
difference outside of the French nation, they could pacify the population and subsequently make 
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ita 'truly' egalitarian brotherhood of men, unified vis-a-vis the uncivilised outside world, which 
was first the monarchic Europe but soon included essentially the despotic Orient (cf. Said, 2003, 
p.8). 
This peculiar synthesis of the individualistic universalism of Enlightenment with the 
national project of France led to a transformation of the character of (French) Enlightenment 
itself. Now it was not anyrnore a vaguely defined theory based on the assumption of rationally 
acting individuals. The historic development of the French Revolution - and especially the era of 
Terreur - seemed to prove that the rather irrational mass of individuals somehow misunderstood 
the principle of Enlightenment. its perversion of the categorical imperative, stating, so to say: 
'Kili everyone until your action is the hasis ofa general legislation, since you ' re the only one 
left'. Now it not longer meant (at least primarily) the intemal improvement of society so as to be 
once a truly egalitarian community of free men, but it was transformed into a civilisational project 
aimed at the progress of humanity as a whole, which basically meant improvement of the peoples 
beyond the French border, so as to make the world once a true brotherhood of (French) men (cf. 
Knobloch et al. 1967, p.28). Through thi s operation then the di fference between the indiv iduals 
within French society was de-emphasised, so to say eliminated through collectivisation. Through 
this procedure di fference was thus symbolically transported to an outside, by individuali sing the 
collective of French citi zen wi th in the figure of a rational nation, which was positioned vis-a-vis 
the outside, irrational world-collective. The missionary zeal of (political) Enlightenment 
accordingly abandoned the idea of producing the rational, enlightened individual and focussed, 
now - and formulated within the political logic of Civilisation - on producing a rational , 
enlightened world (cf. ibid., p.431). 
In the very same way Enlightenment 's egalitarian perception of language - as being a 
logic way to perceive reality, and enabling the individual to critically reflect together with other 
individuals so as to define inter-subjectively a normative vision of society - changed, lost its 
focus on the individual , but simultaneously also its vagueness and abstractness by defining the 
language of Enlightenment geographically or nationalistically, as being necessarily French. By 
this transformation again, the logic of Civilisation could realise - through nationalisation of the 
Enlightenment principles - what Enlightenment itself with its ideal of a critical and free 
individual could not do . It pacified the population, unified it, in short, it created an egalitarian 
brotherhood of men vis-a-vis the non-French speaking, barbaric and uncivilised world . Now 
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indeed reason, liberty and equality existed and they had a place, France, and they spoke a 
language, which was French. Accordingly, the other, the enemy of the revolution was not 
anymore to be searched within the population, but it was there, outside, it was the one who was 
against everything 'we' stand for, the unreasonable, un-free and despotic collective of the world, 
including the equally unenlightened German people, Russia or the Orient, ete. 
Note however, that seen from this perspective, the other individual as such, the German or 
Oriental, was not the enemy as a human, but rather their collectivistic existence, it was their 
German-ness, or Oriental-ness, which had to be fought, since this other 'we' was what held theın 
back in their civilisational immaturity. As an individual they could, or better, to become an 
individual they had to, distance themselves from their backward cultural collective, adapt 
themselves to the advanced French civilisation, in short assimilate into La Grand Nation, the free; 
individualistic brotherhood of men. 
This was hence, what was left from the universal claim of (philosophical) Enlightenment 
and one can easily see that with this collectivisation of the Enlightenment principles, the logic of 
Civilisation, as it was depicted above, can be located right in between Cosmopolitanism and 
Kultur, whereby it seems that it is rather than being the 'golden third-way' more the ' rotten third-
way'. This is because it not on ly allowed for the domination of other cultures, but indeed 
essentially presupposed the French imperial bid for world domination, since only then it could 
prove its civilisational pre-eminence. However, Edward Said showed convincingly within his 
analysis of Orientalism, which he mainly focused on the British colonial mind set, that this was 
nota specific French malady, but rather quickly transformed into a (Western) European logic of 
Civilisation formulated mainly vis-a-vis the Oriental, non-European other. 
Said's book on Orientalism (2003) shows convincingly, that the mechanism of 
collectivising Enlightenment by simultaneously re-individualising it in the form ofa nation vis-a-
vis the outside (seen as the collective other), worked also on a European scale. Europe, as Said 
states, came to know itself by projecting via Orientalism everything it believed it was not, by 
creating the Orient as a significant other or anti-culture: "European culture gained in strength and 
identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self' 
(Said 2003, p.3). Thus, it was necessary for the construction of the European, individual self to 
construct simultaneously the collective Oriental other. As stated above about the French 
civilisational project, this was a mutually constructive mechanism that de-emphasised the 
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differences and ambiguities within the we-group, and thus created the truly egalitarian and free 
brotherhood of (French/European) individuals, by projecting difference and antagoni-sm to an 
outside, despotic, uncivilised collective. In so doing, the Civilisational Iogic was able to generate 
a meaningful (European) individual, endowed with rationality, morality and future development 
exactly by assuming its opposite: the irrational, amoral, collective and timeless Orient (Said 2003, 
pp.72, 162). Exactly because this civilised (and European) individual was able to penetrate the 
collective other, the Orient, because it was able to analyse, understand and represent it (in the 
artworks and scientific elaborations it produced), in short, because it was a traveller in between 
the worlds - between the civilised core and the uncivilised periphery - it was the cosmopolite and 
enlightened individual, that could put itself into the position of the other. It was thus able to 
define a civilised principle for its action, which could form the principle ofa general, collective 
legislation. However, this collective other was the Orient and the general legislation was the rule 
of the individualised European nation over it (cf. Said 2003, pp. l 72 and p.332) .. 
To sum it up, this Civilisational logic is a paradoxical solution to the paradoxical claim of 
Enlightenment that men should be free (allowed to be different) and equal.(i.e. justice between 
the different individuals), so as to arrive at a truly moral , non-hierarchical organisation of a 
society of similarly enlightened and rational individuals. Within the French Terreur, when it was 
tried to build institutions on these principles they proved their amoral capacity, by allowing for 
persecution of those who - sometimes even only symbolically - could not be associated with the 
volonte general, those who were different as individuals or minority, that is those who where 
politically non-conform, morally or culturally abnormal or socio-economically privileged. 
Through the logic of civilisation then, it was possible to pacify the intemal civil war by 
collectivising the population and re-individualising it in the form of the nation vis-a-vis an 
outside. This operation was capable to symbolically equalise the individuals inside (now they ali 
were French in the first place) and thus allowed for intemal liberty and difference, since now this 
difference was contained in the boundary of the nation-state. It thus created trust between the 
individuals on the hasis of linguistically-cultural collective identity, so that they could accept 
difference (even differences in power) and made a specialised and complex, modem mass state 
possible in which individuals necessarily must have different positions. However, it could do so 
by pointing to an even more different, even more collectivised and inferior outside. The mission 
of modemising the world then provided a collective project which legitimised the intemal 
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acceptance of difference and elitist leadership as a meaningful citizen-duty. In this way even the 
poor mass worker, who had nothing to say in French society c0uld feel better off, since he k:new 
that he was superior to the rest of the world, that he - embodied by his nation - was an individual 
that ruled the Orient. He was a chosen one who enj.oyed more freedom and equality than those 
unknown masses beyond the French border. Even more so, his discipline and conformity was 
necessary, it was his historic duty to support the policy of the elite, since this policy was aimed at 
the noble and unselfish undertaking to civilise the world (cf. Cohen 1999, p.3) . 
The pressure of equality, freedom and social progress was thus taken symbolically from 
French (European) society by stating that it was already there. In so doing it transferred the 
pressure of change to the outside wor!d (mostly the Orient), which had to be modemised, 
liberated and equalised, i.e. assimilated and thas dominated. Core-periphery pattems, which still 
existed within society, were nihilised by the very same imagination, namely by stating that French 
(European) civilisation was the core and the world its periphery. The tension between individual 
and collective was equally calmed down, by collectivising the population and re-individualise it 
as nation vis-a-vis the outside world . In short, this logic of Civilisation combines elements from 
the other two political logics of Kultur and Cosmopolitanism in an unique way, so that it can be 
seen as a successful third-way construction. It creates a meaningfui blend which fıts reality, not 
because there is something like reality it is able to grasp, but because it able to construct a logical 
picture of reality as something in between (in between Enlightenment theory and universalism 
and the reality of nation states for example, ete). 
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1.2 Kultur & Occidentalism - Conservative Romanticism and the World of (German) 
Nations 
Deutsches Weltbürgertum ist auf niclits Geringeres angelegt, a1s die Vorzüge der 
verschiedenen Nationalitaten zu vereinigen, sich in aile hlnein zu denken und 
hinein zu fühlen, und so einen kosmopolitischen Mittelpunkt für den deutschen 
Geist zu stiften. Universaiitat, Kosmopolitismus ist die wahre deutsche Eigenart. 1 
Schlegel, Geschichte der romantischen Literatur, Dritter Teil, 1803-1804 
(quoted fronı-Zons, 2001, p.23). 
As mentioned above, one can perceive the discourse logic of civilisation as a way to integrate the 
cosmopolitanism of Enlightenment with a more nationalist/corporatist worldview. This projection 
of difference and social antagonism to a (peripheral) outside facilitated the estab lislunent ofa 
common social project. It allowed in so doing for differences arrd equality by unifying the 
population fora longer period under the same elite leadership. 
Nevertheless, its expression within the civilisational imperialism of France or Westem 
European powers in general , provoked undeı:standably much criticism from out the occupied or 
colonised societies. This criticism, however, can equally be understood as being phrased within a 
reflective third-way construction. It 'revealed' the ideological abuse of the (cosmopolitan) 
Enlightenment principles by a civilisational logic, which thereby produced civilisation as an 
unrealistic outer limit, an unbalanced and thus amoral vis ion of society. This third way of Kultur 
was accordingly constructed as an altemative to the empire-building qualities of the civilisational 
logic, as well as it is opposed to a liberal 'economist' vision of society, which was mainly 
associated with the cosmopolitan (American) metropolis (cf. Buruma/Margalit 2004, pp. 13). 
However, Occidentalism - as it is formulated within the discursive logic of Kultur - can rather be 
perceived as a Counter-Enlightenment movement, than being anti-Enlightenment or anti-modem, 
exactly because it is build on the very same assumptions of Enlightenment, i.e. that history makes 
1 
'Gennan Cosmopolitanism is aimed at nothing less than to merge the merits of the different nations, to 
think and feel into them and by this means establish a cosmopolitan centre for the German spirit. 
Universality, Cosmopolitanism is the true German peculiarity/self' 
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sense and that a moral vision of society can only be achieved by uniting equality with freedom, by 
balancing between individual and collective. 
By distinguish1ng the Kultur logic from a liberal cosmopolite or civilisational vision of 
society, however, the critics within the occupied or colonised societies somehow ironically took 
over the civilisational opposition of an fodividualistic, political and modem inside vs. a 
collectivist, apolitical and anti-modem outside. Nevertheless, seen from the Occidentalist 
perspective it was exactly this collectivist, apolitical and anti-modem, which was depicted as the 
positive core ofa somewhat holistic, traditional community that had to be defended against the 
aggressive universali sm of Westem civilisation and its excessive rational modemism. 
Yet, this negative perspective on civilisational modemity, which instead focussed on a 
romantic idealisation of the past, was not simply a reactionary doctrine of some members of the 
old feudal order. It was instead a thoroughly modem vision of society as well , which was equally 
based on a historicist perception of society and likewise incorporated the Enlightenment principle 
of a moralistic unity between equali ty and liberty, individual and (mass) collective. It was fi xed to 
the sarne assumptions, which it, however valued diffe rently under the historical context of fo reign 
occupation and dom ination. It defined in so doing a vision that was fundam entally opposed to the 
Civilisational logic, which created difference and thus was able to mobilise the population to 
strive for 'our' common good, to deny its characterisation as 'second-class' periphery by an 
imperialist, outside core (Bollenbeck 1999, p. 297). 
Accordingly, one can perceive the ideal-type of Kultur as a modern reaction to 
Civilisation, which tried to disquali fy the inci us ive doctrine of the later. it denied being a part of 
the uncivilised periphery, being an inferior part of World civilisation, which had to be modernised 
according to the model of an advanced {French or Western) core. However, because this Kultur 
1-ogic was forrnulated under the real ity of fore ign occupation, it had to deal with the salient 
inferiority in power vis-a-vis the Western hegemonic power, whose aggressive civilisational 
universalism seemed to be legitimised by its military and economic ability to indeed rule the 
world . 
This, one could claim, was done by reviving through romanticism a religiously inspired 
distinction of power and morality so as to inspire compassion with the powerless but uncorrupted 
and thus innocent weak, who may be ruled, exploited and punished by the stronger, whose inner 
soul , however remained pure exactly because of his inability, or better, unwillingness to rule over 
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others. In so doing it was able to contrast the material and political superiority of the Westem 
civilisational _project, with the 'true' superiority of their deep spiritual soul, which could not be 
dominated by the materialistic, corrupted and heartless rationalism of the West (cf. 
Buruma/Maragalit 2004, pp. 49). 
This perspective consequently seems to propose two alternative interpretations to the 
fundamental Enlightenment princlples of progressive historicism and universal freedom/equality, 
so as to come to a conclusion about human reality that fundamentally opposes the one of the 
civilisational logic with its positive evaluation of historical progress and power, which as it 
claimed, would lead humanity together, towards a world collective of equally rational and thus 
free but moral individuais. 
Firstly, it denied the positive perception of history, as a force that progressively equaiises 
differences between individuals and collectives by educating the weaker periphery to adapt to the 
more rational principles of the advanced core. Instead it proposed a negative perception of 
historical progress based on a rather religious understanding of history as a progressive alienation 
from a timeless, so to say pre-historic past of innocent unity, which was tost exactly because of 
the increasing rational civilisation of humanity.2 Thus, within the logic of Kultur, historical 
development is not a force, which leads towards an utopian future unity of mankind. It is rather 
depicted as a cause for the progressive estrangement from an utopian past unity. Accordingly, this 
perspective values modernity not as a next stage towards the civilisational completion of human 
kind, buı instead, as the next stage within the fail of humanity. Based on this counter historicism, 
it becomes feasible to claim, that the fail can only be reversed by rejecting (Westem) modernity 
and its separating mechanism, its logic of divide and rule. This criticism concentrates on the 
supposedly one-sided and excessive rationalism ofWestem civilisation, which would increase the 
power of the intellect and the individual to the cost of the progressing isolation of the mind from 
its own body (i.e. emotional side) and of the individual from the spiritual body ofthe community. 
The universal civilisation of human kind thus only leads to an empty, superfıcial, soulless and 
aggressive mastering of the material world to cost of an deep and emotional understanding of it 
and a morally because harmonic and balanced life with it. 
This reversion of the civilisational perspective on history consequently allows fora repeal 
of the moral hierarchy between different stages of social development. By reversing the moral 
2 Cf. Said 's opposition ofa timeless Orient and modem West, in Said 2003, pp.72. 
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evaluation of history, the less technically and materially developed society and its old-fashioned, 
corporatist modes of production can be depicted as the morally superior ones, since these are 
supposediy less superficial, less corrupted and less estranged from the ideal ofa past unity of the 
community of men and a life, which is more in harmony with nature and the soul. 
Secondly then, but connected to this different interpretation of history, one can claim that 
the Kultur logic also proposes an altemative interpretation of Enlightenment's declaration to unite 
universal 1iberty with universal equality. At the hasis is the assumption that it is not the liberated 
individualistic reason, which unites the people and makes them a moral brotherhood of man. 
Instead, individual reason is seen as the major force that distinguishes, breaks down unity and 
isolates the human from its natura! and social environment so as to empower one part of the 
whol-e to dominate the others - the mind to dominate the body, men to dominate nature, and an 
individual or minority to dominate (world) society. 
"Knowledge is power'', the famous phrase of Francis Bacon thus gets a new meaning 
under the perspective that power and domination through knowledge is nothing positive but mark 
a regretful loss of an initial state of innocent, na·ive harmony, in which the parts of the whole were 
not distinguished and thus could not try to dominate each other, simply because there was no 
other. lnstead there was only the whole, in which people where equal and did not know the 
sophisticated modes of civilisational domination and thus were free asa whole. Individual , strive 
for power and knowledge are consequentially not depicted as a ' triumvirate of progress', which 
once in the future will establish the truly egalitarian brotherhood of free men. It is rather depicted 
as an loss of the soul, a going astray and illusion, which leads to evermore fragmentation and 
domination by producing evermore exploitable differences. This vicious circle of differentiation 
and exploitation continues until finally a state of universal fragmentation is reached in which 
humanity does not exist anymore in one way or the other: Either it leads to total destruction of 
humanity through an enduring war of everyone against ali (that is total fragmentation as anarchic 
freedom) or it leads to the machine-world, in which ali men are equally enslaved by a rational but 
soulless, imperialistic system (i.e. total fragmentation as final estrangement of body and mind). 
In order to prevent this from happening, one has to abandon the excessive rationalism, its 
one-sided definition of reason, and its illusionary assumption that the rational individual is the 
natura! container of morality. üne has to acknowledge that rationality is only one part of the 
human mind, which is, furthermore, exactly the part that is essentially amoral, because it isolates 
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the self from its environment and treats the outside world as a mere object to be selfishly 
manipulated. A human being whose core is this reason would be no more than a one-sided, 
instrumental creature, which evaluates everything according to a narrow-minded means-ends 
rationality, which essentially prevents it from asking the ' last questions ', to reflect on the morality 
of the ends reached. This kind of rational individualism would instead effectively rule out the 
possibility for the individual to reflect on those ends from out a perspective outside of its own 
rationality, i.e. from the perspective of the whole (cf. Adomo 1975, p.74) . Morality instead is 
vested in those parts of the human mind that connect the individual to the collective, those parts 
which enable it to feel compassion with tbe other, which enable a deep, emotionally 
understanding of the other as being more than a mere object to be manipulated, but instead a 
subject itself. Only if one acknowledges that rationality is just one part of the human spirit ( or in 
German Geist) and balances it with the collective side of the mind and the intersubjective modes 
of knowledge, namely tradition/memory, emotion/compassion, only then the individual is able to 
act morally and contain its community-destroying and selfish hubris. 
This is diametrically opposed to the conclusion drawn from Enlightenment principles as it 
was set out in the previous chapter. There it was stated that the individual has to use its reason so 
as to li berate itself from the tutelage of social authorities and arrive at a true understanding of the 
other, which wou ld eventually enable it to act morally. Now the story is tumed upside down, 
although the aim remains the same: In order to act morally, the individual has to liberate itself 
from the selfishness of its reason, and in order to do so it has to accept the authority of the 
spiritual community over the self as well as the authority of feeling over reason, since emotions 
are, in opposition to reason, a source of knowledge which is not based on distinction and 
domination, but instead based on mutuality and connectiveness and thus allows for a moral and 
community-oriented life. 
Accordingly, this collectivist-egalitarian and liberal-universal scope of the Kultur-logic 
seems to formulate an essentially anti-imperialistic idea of world society. It denies that one part 
(or core) can govem the rest in an unselfısh way, according to universal and rational principles, 
which provide it with a political blueprint for the organisation of whatsoever society. Instead it 
emphasises on the one-sidedness of universal rationality, which neglects that peoples and their 
individual members are fundamentally different in respect to their collective/cultural and 
emotional/irrational modes of being. it tries to disqualify the civilisational logic, by stating that 
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the latter assumes the rational individual to be the natura! container of morality, exactly because 
this - when projected on the world arena - allows for the legitimation of the rule of -one 
individual core over the rest. Accordingly it 'reveals ' that this core - civilised, rational and 
unselfish as it claims to be - only pretends to understand the rest and to represent it in _an 
unselfish way, while in fact it only understands to exploit it materialistically. This violent act of 
suppression is thereby merely masked as an moral act, so as to serve as the principal legitimation 
ofa common world legislation, which is dictated by the Empire (cf. Bollenbeck 1999, pp. 291). 
The logic of civil-isation thus only conceals the empires greed for power and domination 
and it is again the principle of rational individualism, which serves as the empire's ideological 
instrument to estrange the colonised from the collective and emotional part of their bein-g, so as to 
break their resistance and assimilate them as powerless, atomised and opportunistic individuals 
into its sphere of control. To reduce the human mind to its individualistic and rational existence 
thus means, seen from the logic of Kultur, to estrange it from its fellow people, to degenerate it 
into a superficial, materialistic creature that gives its loyalty not to the vision of society, which is 
best for the whole, but to the one that pays-off best for itself (cf. Horkheimer, 1994). 
The vision of society, which is proposed by the Kultur logic, consequently emphasises on 
the cosmopolitan character of the world, as consisting of unique and equally free peoples, while it 
simu ltaneously downplays differences within those societies characterised as people, claiming 
that it is not the individuality of the individual , which makes it unique and moral (cf. Bhabha, 
l 995, pp.45) . It is instead the individuality of its cultural/collective dimension, its life-world, 
which enables it to live free from outside domination and the equalising but amoral force of seif-
enslavement as opportunistic collaborator. 
Stating this, one can clearly see that this vision entails an authoritarian quality, since it, 
similarly to the civilisationat logic, depicts difference as something problematic, something that 
has to be overcome. However, within this vision, difference is not something that has to be 
eliminated in between societies, as the civilisational logic proposes it with its imperialism based 
on universal individualism. In between societies it allows for exactly the same liberal 
cosmopolitanism, which the civilisational logic allows within society. The Kultur logic supposes 
instead, that differences have to be eliminated within society, so as to re-establish a powerful and 
united collective, which is able to liberate itself from outside domination and outside forces, who 
want to weaken the nation exactly by nurturing difference within it, by estranging the people from 
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each other. Society has to be purified, re-establish its past uniqueness, exclude ali the influence 
from the outside in order to maintain its cultural difference towards the outside. It thus is meant to 
secure the surviving of its collective freedom and its own and deep vision of the common good in 
an operation akin to a colonisation of the internal periphery. 
To sum it up, one can state, again, that this logic constructs a paradoxical third-way that 
combines some important features of the civilisational logic with others of cosmopolitanism: As 
the civilisational logic, it proposes a collectivisation of the population through individualisation 
of this collective in form of the nation. However, this nation is not defıned in political terrns but 
rather in ethnical/cultural in order to prevent its inclusion by a more powerful core. Instead it 
proposes a cosmopolitan perception of fundamentally different nations, which are nevertheless ali 
respectively bound to an internal and unique core (i.e. their specific Gerrnan-ness, Turkish-ness, 
ete.), which has to bind the social periphery and contain it vis-a-vis the outside, so as to upkeep 
the nations cultural/ethnical purity by excluding difference. It thus claims to be essentially anti-
imperialistic vis-a-vis an outside, since it logically denies the extension of the state into other 
cultural blocs3, but at the same time it entails effectively authoritarian and racist qua!ities, because 
it cannot allow for different individual and minority cultures within its boarders, i.e. its is cultural 
imperialistic on the inside. 
Consequently, one can perceive this logic (at least within the scope of an ideal-type) as a 
alternative equation between liberty and equality, which is diametrically different than the one of 
the civilisational logic. While it states that nation-states have the equal right to freedom (non-
hierarchical assessment of difference on the level of collectives), it suggests on the other hand, 
that the freedom of their respective members is only morally sustainable as it is embodied within 
the freedom of the collective (hierarchical supremacy of the nation-state over its individual 
members). üne can oppose this to the logic of Civilisation, which denies the moral equality 
between states (hierarchical assessment of difference on the !eve! of collectives), so as to enable 
the rational and culturally distanced individual to !ive freely within the world-nation of equal man 
(non-hierarchical assessment of difference on the level of individuals). 
However, both logics have proven their anti-humanitarian qualities within European 
history: The civilisational logic perrnitted imperial domination and exploitation of 'uncivilised' 
3 At least as long as it not connected to a racial imperialism, tike it was used to legitimise the elimination of 
other cultures/peoples outside of the boarders of the Third Reich so has to make space ('Lebensraum ') for 
its own nation. 
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cultures and suppressıon of ' reactionary' individuals, while the Kultur logic and its sallent 
xenophobia and anti-individualism legitimised several ethnical-cleansings and the persecution of 
minorities and dissidents. 
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1.3 Cosrnopolitanism - Liberal Enlightenrnent and Reflective Individualisrn as the cure for 
a plagued Continent 
Die westlichen Demokratien !egen ihrem Demokratiebegriff die auf der jüdisch-
christlichen Tradition beruhende Anthropologie zugrunde-, dass der Mensch zwar 
in der Lage ist das Gute zu erkennen, dass es ihm aber vernıehrt ist, es jemals voli 
zu verwirklichen. Jede Form des Messianismus ist ihnen zuwider; sie erb!icken im 
Zustand der Entfremdung das Schicksal des Menschen im Industriezeitalter. Die 
Aufhebung der Entfremdung aber streben sie nicht an, weil sie die menschliche 
Natur nicht für manipulierbar halten. 4 
Emst Fraenkel, Deutschland und die westlichen 9emokratien, 1991, p.271 
From the perspective of liberal Cosmopolitanism, the logics of C-ivilisation and Kultur can thus 
be perceived as extremist, amoral visions of politics, which pave the way fora totalitarian and/or 
imperialistic society. This is due, one could claim, to their attempt to collectivise, to unite the 
people vis-a-vis an (inferior) other, to provide them with a communal project - the ascertainment 
of an utopian common good - so as to establish social harrnony. They both are essential 
ideological, since they both try define one major direction, one vision for the whole, so as to 
release the modem mass men from his dis-embeddedment and dis-orientation, whereby they only 
differ in their proposed direction of historical and social movement: Civilisational republicanism 
defınes the position of the individual within the communal search foran all-embracing, universal 
future, in which there is no outside periphery anymore. The conservatism of Kultur on the other 
hand, dissolves the individual within a collective will that is aimed at the (re-)establishment ofa 
pure but past core, in which there is, as it once was, no inside periphery. 
4 
' The concept of democracy within Westem democracies is based on the anthropology of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, stating that men may are able to recognise the good, but that they can never fully realise 
it. They [Westem democracies] detest every form of messiahnism; they perceive the condition of 
alienation as the destiny of men in the industrial age. However, they do not try to fully release men from 
this alienation, since they perceive the human condition as something that cannot be manipulated.' 
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In order to reach this harmonic collective, they claim, that it is necessary to overcome 
difference between core/periphery patterns within or- between societies. They do so by morally 
denying the right of existence to the periphery, oy l-0ading it with the guilt for being the periphery, 
of being the origin of distinction and- d-ifference. However, in this operation, they hide the 
dependence of their vision of what the core is from the existence ofa periphery, they hide their 
mutuality with the periphery. There Is no superior core, without an inferior periphery and it can 
no longer exist, when the periphery would finally be included ( cf. Giesen 1999, p.18). There is no 
utopian vision of the common good or definition of the core values of society, without 
simultaneously supplyfog a negative picture, the individual evi! or the anti-values of the 
periphery. in order to define, that is produce a core, there must be simultaneously a production of 
a periphery. 
At this point it is suitable to make one thing clearer: Core/periphery must be broadly 
understood within this ideal-type-analysis, namely as variation of the linguistic tool of dialectical 
production of meaning. Fundamentally core/periphery pattems mark no more than a difference 
between two items, perceived as thesis and anti-thesis. However, it is impossible to differentiate 
them without implyj ng a connection between the differentiated paı1:s (as a matter of fact every 
differentiation is a connection), without suggesting that they are embedded within a greater whole 
that unites their differences within an over-arching totality or synthesis. Without the assumption 
ofa synthesis, there could by no difference, since we had to look on every item in its own right, 
isolated, dis-connected, an individualised artefact from which we can not create connections to 
other parts, no causai links and thus no meaning (cf. Norris 1994, p.11 O). 
This is a dialectical logic how it was used also by Hegel. He stated that every notion does 
not have a meaning or an essence in its own right, but only the totality of alt notions enable a 
complete understanding of the single, particular notion. in this sense every notion must 
necessarily expand beyond its conceptual boarders, refer to an other, oppositional notion, together 
with which it strives for higher unity. This synthesis, then is not to perceived as a sote 
compromise or middle way, but as an insight of higher quality, in which the existing differences 
are dissolved (Adomeit, 1995, pp. 112) 
This logic can thus be perceived as a discursive logic that creates meaning, exactly by 
initially differentiating and subsequently synthesising the differentiation within a higher order or 
whole (language) that is more than its parts. This seems to be then a rather objective and self-
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evident definition of !he way in which language works and enables as well as determines our 
understanding of the world. However, it is important to note the underlined words above, for 
what do they suggest'? Obviously they refer to the way in which meaning is in fact constructed 
within discussions, i.e. the-actual usage of language within time and space. üne party voices a 
thesis, another party the antithesis, they so to say create distance between each other's opinions 
(distinct discursive localifies) in order to explore the empty wasteland in between. They meet 
finally somewhere in between and are thus able to subsequently formulate a solution together. 
This solution is accordingly formulated as a synthesis, which spans over the whole discursive 
space, include the formerly distinct localities and allows thus for the perception of the unified 
whole from every particular locality within this space. 
This, one could claim, is the basis for a cosmopolitan understanding of social 
communication. A communication which is libertarian, in the way that it does not a priori value 
between the several discursive localities in form of core/periphery (like Kultur and Civilisation 
do), but instead suggest that every discursive locality/difference is the periphery ofa core that ~ 
must be mutually constructed (Kristeva, 200 l ). it further claims that this subsequently established 
core or synthesis is only the point of departure for new communication, new constructions of 
difference. ln other words, thi s core is nothing more than a new peripheral locality, which 
necessarily seeks out for or produces a counter part so as to enable again their merger within a 
new synthesis, an expanded core. 
It is this view, which was famously articulated by Kari Richard Popper, the author of 
'Open society and its enemies', stating that every knowledge is necessarily preliminary 
knowledge, never fıxed, essentially true, even more so, that every knowledge must provoke 
criticism and always must leave room for its potential revision (Popper, 1998, pp. 145). lf it does 
not aHow this, then it is wrong knowledge, that is ideology. 'True' science (and indeed every 
other way of cornmunicating) is accordingly, nothing that reveals true, unchangeable knowledge, 
but a libertarian method that questions existing knowledge, treats it as thesis, and formulates an 
antithesis to it, not more ( cf. Popper 200 l, pp. 294 ). 
Accordingly, an open, cosmopolitan society is marked by the absence ofa government 
that formulates (positively) the common good for its people, that decides between legitimate and 
illegitimate knowledge about society, so as to define a collective core and marginalise a periphery 
or minority and thus restrict open communication (Habermas 1981, cf. Edgar 2005). Its only task 
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should instead be, to prevent the emergence ofa fixed core or majority that could repress other 
individuals or minorities and their vision of the good (Kymlicka, 2000, p.93). it is thus a minimal 
coHective legislation that ensures negative freedom, i.e. the freedom from repression and force. In 
other words, it prevents the apriori exclusion of possible knowledge from social communication, 
so as to enable the Civil Society to negotiate an ideal consensus (a synthesis) to which every 
citrzen concerned could agree ( cf. Habermas 1981 & lbid. 1998, p.283). However, this consensus 
itself is nothing more than a preliminary synthesis, it must be open for criticism and potentially 
revisable. it must be possible for the population to get rid of a once established consensus or 
common legislation (or govemment), since otherwise this legislation would de facto degenerate 
into an ideological belief of having once and for ali found a perfect, static vision of society 
(Dahrendorf 1998, pp. 31 ; cf. Massing 2003 , p.231 ). This is the normative picture ofa diverse, 
essentially non-egalitarian, in-perfect but free society, in which the freedom of opinions and their 
competition shall lead to ever more equality, it shall allow the common strive for equality and not 
forcefully establish it in form of abolishing freedom for the excluded. 
This however, reminds strongly at the future focussed utopia of the logic of Civilisation. 
Not only thi s, we can also detect some important features of the Kultur logic within thi s 
normati ve ideal type, exactly because it is normative and ideali stic, t hat is, it cannot but foımulate 
a moralistic vision of society that necessarily excludes amoral visions of society. As the title of 
Poppers classical work on open society already suggests, it has enemies, which is actually a 
paradox for an inclusive open society, since from the libertarian perspective there are no enemies, 
but just competitors. How can an enemy logically be defined from within the cosmopol itan 
vision? Obviously, the enemy of the open, cosmopolitan society is the anti-cosmopolitan that 
wants to close down society, it is the imperialist, the totalitarianist or the fundamentalist, ete. 
However, it is not the open society that excludes him, since then it would cease to be an open 
society, no, he does so voluntarily. He excludes himself, in the sense that his antagonism makes it 
impossible to make him a part of the open communication because he would nihilise, destroy it 
like a virus. ln other words, since he disrespects the core ofa contract-based, open society - its 
deliberative method of institutionalising conflict in form of egalitarian communication - he must 
be marginalised , or better he deserves to be excluded, he is the new other and it his own fault. 
If there is a common evi! , even in an open society, there must be logically also a common 
good, and this although, following Popper, an open society should be essentially characterised by 
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the absence of a predestined (i.e. ideological) common good so as to enable the population to 
strive and fight for it (Pesch 2003, pp. 199). If we look closer, however, it is easy to identify, an 
ideological core of the open society, a common good, which is already there and which must be 
protected by the collective against the periphery of enemies around and within it, either in the way 
of assimilating (i.e. therapy them) or excluding (i.e. eliminating) them. This core then is the 
rational, deliberative method of free and egalitarian communication, because this is the only 
legitimate way to define knowledge. Because this way of producing knowledge is the key for ever 
more completion and improvement of society, it gains the character ofa de-facto utopia. 
In this way then, ' historicism and all its misery' is re-introduced and the libertarian vision 
of society is opened again for the logicai inclusion of imperialist and/or totalitarian 
characteristics, ironically exactly because it wants to exclude those. But even more ironically, one 
could claim that it is exactly this similarity of exclusion, the inclusion of exclusion, which makes 
the open society essentially open. And seen from out the other perspectives, from the point of 
view of civilisation and Kultur, one could claim that they, since they employ the very same 
method of exclusion, are not that different from an open society, but are based on the very same 
axiomatic assumptions. 
To make this point clearer, we have to go back to the for a moment to the Hegelian 
discourse dialectics: As stated above, this logic can be perceived as a discursive logic that creates 
meaning, exactly by initially differentiating and subsequently synthesising the differentiation 
within a higher order or whole that is more than its parts. Again we should ask what the 
underlined words actually do: The notion 'subsequently' refers to the dimension of time and the 
word ' higher' refers, first, to the qualitative superiority of the whole over its parts. Secondly, 
when connected to the dimension of time, it means that we can improve our understanding 
through dialectical reasoning. in this way we can make our knowledge ever more complete until 
we are - at some point in the future - able to finally formulate the last synthesis, thus unify 
ourselves with the whole through intellectual absorption of it into our self. Note the paradoxical 
claim, which is entailed here, namely that through dialectical reasoning men, who himself is only 
a part of the whole, can more and more absorb the whole until the moment arrives when there is 
nothing outside of his reason anymore, no meaningless other that cannot be explained and 
controlled, it is in other words exactly the categorical imperative proposed by Kant. 
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it means further that a synthesis once made is the step towards this aim of 'being whole' 
again. It is so to say the binding conclusion for thesis and antithesis, the higher !eve!, which once 
established cannot be dissolved into its parts anymore, because this would mean regression, a step 
backward through the re-establishment of the preceding and qualitatively lower stage. It thus 
cannot be questioned from within, because otherwise it would lose ali sense of direction, no 
progress would be possible but only the never ending change in form of a mere, mutual and 
enduring substitution of thesis and antithesis according to quantitative changes in power (cf. 
Norris, 1994, p. 151 ). In order to prevent this, a synthesis must be understood as the consensus, 
which excludes the re-emergence of an isolated reality of the preceding parts through their 
inclusion, by inte!lectually containing them. 
This is exactly the way in which the historicism of cosmopolitanism works. It is claimed 
that it is the historic successor of the visions of Civilisation and Kultur and their identity politics. 
It is the synthesis that contains the universali sm of Civilisation and the contextualism of Kultur 
and their possible cruel extremism, since it creates a balanced mode between them, between the 
universalism of Civilisation and the contextualism of Kultur in form of an universal method of 
peaceful negotiation of difference, i.e. the deliberative and rationalising democratic discourse that 
perceives identity (whether it is political or ethnical/cu ltural) not as something pre-given, an 
ideological core so to say, but as something in the making (cf. Delanty/Rumford, p.63). 
Cosmopolitans are thus modern democrats that left the narrow-minded mind-set of 
culturally ignorant universalists and the similarly narrow-minded 'boundary-fetishism ' of cultural 
relativists, exactly because they combine both positions in a balanced and reflective way. As 
Tomlinson states: "Cosmopolitan people need to be simultaneously universalists and pluralists" 
(Tomlinson 1999, p. 193). Beck, however, expands on that paradoxical statement with his 
concept of a 'Conıextual Universalism'. This concept is a thoroughly thought attempt to 
synthesise the opposing discursive logics of Civilisation and Kultur, firstly by applying an 
definition of culture, which does, on the one hand recognise the different institutional shape of 
cultures within their contextual basis. On the other hand , he establishes, secondl-y, an universal 
and unitary framework, in which ali the different cultures fit together as a picture. He defines 
culture accordingly as "general human software", which has to be understood as an evolutionary 
process and a trans loca! learning process. (Beck 2000, cf. Hofstede 1991 ). This concept of culture 
thus enables us to perceive the simultaneous existence of several cultures as a "non-separated 
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multiplicity without unity" (Ibid.). It applies thereby the basic universalist assumption that 
cultures overlap in their specifıc systems of meaning, whi1e it simultaneously precludes an 
ideological interpretation of this assumption, since it accentuates that there is rro true core, no 
basic principle to which ali these different cultures adhere. 
With this concept he is also able to rescue theoretically an opportunity for cross-cultura-1 
communication. Beck counts thereby on the "creative power of misunderstanding" of contextual 
universalism, which emphasises on diversity while it at the same time adheres to the principle 
that non-interference with other cultures and the maintenance of internal cultural purity is 
impossible in a global age. Contextual universalism does so in opposition to universalism and its 
conviction that dialogue is not necessary, because the universalists have the true principles on 
their side, and also in opposition to cultural relativism with its principle of non-interference with 
other cultures, since communication is impossible anyway (Ibid, pp. 67). It proposes instead an 
experimental communication, which will be probably rather an "caricature of dialogue" but 
leaves the door open for communication; it implies "that the things we hold most sacred must be 
opened to criticism by others and the sacri lege of polytheism must be committed", so that in the 
end we wi ll at Jeast get a better understanding of ourselves (Ibid , pp. 82). 
Armed with this inclusive defınition of culture, the cosmopolitan wou ld thus be able to 
communicate with his ' fellow' citizen from other cu ltural backgrounds. And although an ideal 
dialogue will probably remain illusionary, communication is at least not useless or a simple 
means of suppression. Seen in this way, it is rather a tool to enlighten the individual, so that in the 
end it indeed becomes a cosmopolitan being, which knows that there is more than one truth to be 
found. The Cosmopolitan would then be able to develop, wbat Tornlinson calls a ' distanciated 
identity': "An identity that is not totally circumscribed by the immediate locality, but embraces a 
sense of what unites us as human beings, of common risks and possibilities, of mutual 
responsibility'', while it at the same time sharpens the cosmopolitan ' s awareness of cultural 
pluralism within the ongoing dialogue with himself and with cultural distanced others (Tomlinson 
1999, pp.193). 
The question now is, however, what exactly this 'distanciated identity' means and how 
can it be developed? The answer is simple. It does not have to be developed, since it is already 
there. It is exactly the form of identity that prevails in open, democratic societies, in which the 
enlightened citizen know that their common good is egalitarian communication, the translocal , 
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synthesising market space of i<leas, which opens up every form of knowledge for criticjsm and 
potential revision ( cf. Zons, pp.5 l ). The only necessary thing to do is to therapy or eliminate the 
anachronistic discursive periphery,_ which stili exists as the enemy within and outside of tlüs elite, 
core-democracy although its 'obsolete', ideologicaL modes of communication are morally 
disqualified. Consistently, it means to exclude the religious monotheists and their 'messiahnism', 
to punish the totalitarian Nazis and their racism, to persecute the all-too powerful and greedy 
capitalists and populists and their manipulation. But it also means to therapy the workers 
unionists who are against export of work to the poorer periphery; it means to teach the 
environmentalist that third-world countries have the same right to pollution and exploitation as 
the industrial countries once practiced it; it means to marginalise the one who fears that the 
increasing presence of foreigner will reduce his privileges. in short, it legit-imises discrimination 
of those who do not have or want to have the necessary ' distanced identity', since they commit 
the only sacrilege possible within a liberal, open society, i.e. being against the openness of 
society, being agai nst its libertarian way of producing knowledge and regulating social relations 
accordingly_ 
it is this essentially ideological , irrational side of democratic cosmopolitanism that 
connects it with its oppositional logics and thus prohibits it from being a more logical and rational 
synthesis of higher quality. This is because, logically every synthesis, is nothing more than a 
antithesis to the thesis/antithesis couple, it is not the dissolution of differences between the 
formerly distinct and oppositional discursive localities, but only a new locality that creates 
difference towards the other two. It can only be depicted as synthesis when one applies the very 
same irrational historicism and the idea of progress, which_ enables its portrayal as the new core, 
that binds and contains the morally defeated periphery. 
Having said this however, one can argue that this criticism is taken exactly from the 
perspective of cultural relativist ideology, which reveals the civilisational imperialism hidden in 
the cosmopolitan logic of contextual universalism and its masking of suppression with the 
shallow rhetoric of ' unity in diversity '. This is true, since this criticism states that there is no 
universal synthesising method that refrains from the usage of core/periphery patterns and 
historicist/collective i.e. irrationally defined visions of 'our' common good. If an universal 
method of deliberative production of knowledge exists, it cannot but be contextual in the sense 
that it must necessarily discriminate against alternative modes of knowledge production, it must 
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marginalise the anti-universalist, ideological methods. in so doing, however, it ceases to be open 
and universal-and begins to be ideological itself, when it stili claims to be universal and open. 
in other words, the open society must be closed for those that want a closed society and it 
only remains morally consistent with itself if it accepts that it is not open for everyone, but only 
for those that share its common good, i.e. its belief that the core ofa society is a open method of 
communication between individual citizen. it is exactly this logic, which is entailed in -the 
quotation from Fraenkel's work on pluralist societies, who-states that the specific context for the 
universalism ofa plural society is its particular Judaeo-Chr-istian 'Leitkııltur' or tradition. in other 
words, he proposes an universal contextualism, denies accordingly the hidden cultural 
imperialism ofa contextual universalism, by proposing instead the actually ' overcome' Kultur 
logic of ' diversity in uni-ty'. With the very same operation, however, he opens up again the 
possibility of legitimate discrimination against those who do not share this Judaeo-Christian 
conviction, the infidels so to say. Accordingly he revives the Kultur logic, by stating that its 
civilisatiorıal universalism is confined to the irrational modes of the collective of those that are 
united in their specific spiritual tradition . This core however, is nothing less then the germ-cell of 
new intemal totalitarianism or, in Fraenkel ' s words, anti-messianic ' messiahnism ' . 
üne can see, if one applies the Jogic of cosmopolitanism to itself, that is its anti-historicist 
denial ofa true core, it breaks up again into a variation ofthe contextualism ofthe Kultur logic. lf 
we, on the other hand, apply its anti-ideological denial of collectivism to it self, it breaks up again 
and forms a variation of the individual universalism of the civilisational logic. The synthesis of 
cosmopolitanism thus ceases to be a synthesis, a new ' third way' of higher quality, but dissolves 
in newiold thesis/antithesis oppositions, when it steps back from its reflective stage and positively 
tries to define - on the hasis of its reflections - a normative vision of society itself. 
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2. Closing or opening up the European Union? -The debate on Turkish Accession caught 
between Kultur and-Ci-vilisation - and what about Cosmopolitanism? 
What .do these abstract thoughts.bave to do with the concrete analysis ofa political discourse, as it 
was initially propesed in respect to-the possible accession of the Turkish republic to the EU? it 
means that every statement witbin pofüics must be morally legitimate, but it only can do so as 
long as it dees not -propo-se- a common direction but merely individually reflection and 
deconstruction of collective propositions. in the moment it proposes a direction, a decision, it 
ceases to be moral since it necessarily enters the realm of historicist speculation and ideology 
with ali its possibly violent repercussions for the other. However, ifa statement is only reflective 
it cannot claim to be morally legitimate either, because it refrains from taking responsibility 
through a proposition ofa common direction and instead proposes merely an passive 'anything 
goes'. Even more so, every reflection is a decision to not act, every deconstruction constructs 
something instead, it necessarily must become ideology itself. 
This, one could conclude, is the moral dilemma of politics, a dilemma that emerges from 
the need of politics for individual reflection on the one hand, and normative speculation beyond 
the individual on the other, without however having the possibility to distinguish between both 
and accordingly define a moral balance in between of both. This is because every kind of balance 
must be voiced as a statement and as such it must be partial and prejudiced, either reflection, or 
decision, whereby, again this either/or distinction is in any case not a valid one, for, in both cases 
they mean each other: a reflection is :a decision not to act, and a decision acts as a reflection on 
reflections, either 'falsifies' or 'verifıes ' them, Both are thus statements, construct each other in 
opposition, without triggering a synthesis, since again this synthesis is a statement, nothing more 
( cf. Popper 2001, p.119). 
Politics is thus marked by the absence ofa balance, a synthesis, i.e. rationality. Politics is 
ideology, since it is based on language, its stereotypical simplifıcations, its implicit historicism 
and its character of connecting the individual statement to the speculative collective/historicist 
beyond (the other/past and future). Every individual formulation of the personal good must be 
done with the help of the collective toolkit of language (cf. Rosenberg 1988, pp.92). Every 
individual statement thus becomes a statement about the common good, claims to be a synthesis, 
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hides thereby iıs character of merely being a personal, prejudiced statement and thus becomes 
ideological, in the sense that it collectivises the individual by simultaneous re-individualisation of 
it in form of the common good. 
I wil-L try to empirically exemplify this in the next part, the analysis of the debate about 
Turkish Accession in Germany and other European societies. However, as a transition to the 
empirical' part, the ideological dimension of political language, will first be connected to the 
construction of the other within identity politics. 
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2.1 Discursive construction of the other 
We have seen, that it is logically impossible to prevent the emergence of ideological or 
stereotypical knowledge about a political problem. This is, as it was claimed in the former 
section, because every knowledge (i.e. communication) is necessarily based on the use of 
language and thereby must rely on its implicit historicist and collectivist character and its inherent 
and indispensable quality to simplify and discriminate. It is thus impossible to free the debate on 
political issues from its ideological horizon, in other words, to distance it from identity politics. 
Identity thereby must be understood as a fragile matter, nothing firm and physical, it is 
instead rather an imagination, always in flux and endangered to lose its consistency. it defines the 
self-understanding of the individual and groups but it is not a set of pre-social characteristic (as 
the Kultur logic would have it). Instead, it is essentially shaped by the social environment in 
which the individual (as cosmopolitanism emphasises) or the group (the focus of civilisation) is 
placed. And as such, identity does change its fabric depending on different (cosmopolitan and) 
personal, (civilisational and) social or (cultural and) environmental situations. (Viehoff & Segers 
1999, p.34) 
Identification ıs thus an ongoing process of imagination, whereby the notion of 
imagination should be perceived broadly, as a tool to construe and distribute meaning to objects, 
thereby setting them into relation to each other. In context of the self and its identity project one 
could say, that this process of imagination construes relations between the subject and other 
objects, be it other individuals, groups, places, things, ete; thereby creating meaning and filling 
the subject as well as the object with it, in a reciprocally constitutive way. This system of 
identification, thereby works through the recognition of sameness (inside or core) and difference 
(periphery or outside) and in order to do so, it is strictly dependent on the use of Janguage. Only 
through Janguage - which itself is a social construct - it is possible to understand the world, to 
distribute meaning and, by this means to create an environment that makes sense, has rules to 
which we can act and react in order to manage a living (Luckmann & Berger 1990, p.49). 
Language, in that way, creates a system of demarcation, that enables the social being to 
discriminate between certain notions, to determine what they express and what not, whereby these 
notions constitute each other in varying levels of difference, ranging from the same (inside), over 
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similar (core) and different (periphery) to contrary outside). Only if we set one notion in relation 
to an other, we can determine the meaning of them, thereby construing them reciprocally 
(Graumann, 1999, p.69). 
As said above, the same accounts for identity. Since language is essentially a social 
construct, and because it is the major tool to identify ourselves and the world we !ive in, one can 
claim that the collective knowledge, of which language is an important part, determines (to a 
certain degree) how we identify ourselves, whereby it does so primarily through the construction 
of difference. This construction of an outside (within Kultur) or periphery (within Civilisation) 
from within the circle of reality and identity production, of an anti-culture so to say, is a decisive 
ideological feature of the identity project. It is a feature, which helps to confine and define the 
self, simply by saying what it is not, thereby resembling again features of language and its quality 
to differentiate and classify objects (cf. Zabusky 2000, p.120). 
The identity project of people is thus in the fırst place an act of demarcation, an 
establishment of difference in form of inside/outside or core/periphery pattems. Thus, it is 
necessary for the construction of the self to construct simultaneously the other. It helps to create a 
system of differentiation which enables us to set up classes of objects and to structure by this 
means our reality in a meaningful way. A social identifıcation is therefore a classifıcation of 
someone into a system of categorisation, by whatever criteria (ethnical , civilisational, political, 
ete.) . These social categories, however, are not neutral (as cosmopolitanism would have it). 
Whether someone is categorized as belonging to us or them can entail decisive consequences for 
the other, but also consequences for our relationship to the other (Graumann 1999, p.61 ). 
How the other will be identlfied, one can say, is therefore dependent on cultural 
conventions, the program, but as well on the particular group and individual identity projects 
connected to it: it is as well possible to identify not against, but with the other, to perceive them 
or him as friend. This for example can be observed within left-wing circles in Germany, where an 
inherent bias exists to perceive other cultures as positive and members of other cultures as 
friends, in order to reassure the leftist identity of tlexibility and openness in opposition to the 
conservative other, which is accordingly produced as narrow-minded, closed and self-complacent. 
Hence, identification and its inherent social classifıcation, is, as Tajfel (1982) states based 
on the emphasis of sameness within and on difference between social categories, whereby the 
one, who gets classifıed is at least in one decisi ve feature similar to all the others of that particular 
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category (pp. 260). Social identification, thus is a method to produce stereotypes or de-
individualise the other person in question as well as oneself. This ideological process of 
stereotype production, however, seems to be a natura! outcome of the imaginative character, 
which is inherent in every identifıcation. In order to create a meaningful system of categories, 
which enables a person to act and react in an efficient and/or accepted way, one has to reduce the 
complexity of objects and minim ise their possible relationships among -each other, as well as to 
one self, to a certain degree (cf. Luckmann/Berger 1990, pp. 103). 
üne can therefore claim, that the construction of individual and group identities always 
runs hand in hand with the construction of difference and excluslon, and self-understanding 
contains always stereotypical/ideological notions of other groups and other nations and their 
culture, history, ete, as well of one' s own group (De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999, p.22) . 
The question, however, is how exactly these stereotypes and symbols, in short, how this 
identity circle is created and maintained. More exactly how are these images about the own and 
the other produced, reproduced and spread by actors in a concrete social context? In order to 
answer these questions, one has to introduce the concept of discourse, explain how it is connected 
to the construction of reality and identity, and then, secondly, one has to illuminated how 
particular actor's discourse strategies are developed 
Relationships between humans and between them and the world are constituted through a 
collective production of symbolic/imagined systems of meaning or knowledge. The analysis of 
the social importance of knowledge and symbolic orders got since Foucault increasingly focussed 
on the terms of discourse, discourse theory and discourse analysis (Keller2004, pp.16). Foucault 
was the fırst one to use the term of discourse. He used it in the context of:the social dimension of 
science, due to its specifıc way to produce knowledge and establish a certain perception of the 
world with consequences for the collective and its self-understanding (Ibid.). 
Discourse thereby, is perceived as a more or less successful attempt to attach meaning to 
certain topics, to interpret them and to establish thereupon a certain systemisation of these 
meanings, and eventually, to produce, stabilise or transform by this means a social order. It is 
assumed, that certain statements about topics are parts ofa broader discourse structure, which is 
temporarily produced and stabilised through specifıc institutionalised contexts ( cf. van Dijk 1995, 
pp. 262). A discourse can be understood therefore, as a concrete framework, in which social 
actors compete for interpretative leadership over institutionalised narratives or meanings about 
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the groups self and its life-world in order to produce, maintain or transform a certain social status 
quo so as to legitimise the continuation of their advantageous socio-economic position or the 
strive for improvenıent of the socio-economic position of dis-advantaged groups (De Cilfia, 
Reisigl & Wodak 1999, p.30). 
This process then can be examined by a discourse analysis, which tries to reveal, by means 
of an em pi rical examination, the connection bet\veen speech/writing as social practi-ce and the (re-
) production of systems of meaning, the role of social actors within these systems, the processes 
that shape them, and the consequences for the social collective. in other words, it tries to 
scrutinise how collectives form themselves and how reality is constructed, maintained or re-
constructed and identities are shaped within this process. 
By doing this, it is necessary to understand that the discursive construction of reality is 
shaped through the use of statements and metaphors (language), that constitute a specific 
knowledge about certain topic, like for example fortress Europe, or Europe as safe haven, ete. 
These statements and metaphors are produced by every kind of text, speech or even by symbolic 
action that aim or extent the perception of the topic, as for example ~ scientific expertise. (Hulls 
1999, p.43). A good example for a symbolic action is Al-Kaida's attack on the World Trade 
Centre. Although this was much more than solely a symbolic action, it nevertheless shaped and 
limited the way of the debate about the relation between American hegemony and lslamic 
fundamentalism and made itself a prominent representative of Tslam in the West although the 
group constitutes only a tiny minority within the discursive landscape. Statements lik.e this shape 
the way in which participants wi ll talk about the topic, whereby they also limit other ways in 
which the topic can be approached. in other words, they construct the topic, the way in which 
people will talk about it and therefore also the knowledge, which will be communicated and 
reproduced, ali to the cost of altemative constmction of knowledge about the same topic. 
Thus, the way in which a topic will be perceived and communicated is essentially formed 
by social institutions, although this must be understood as a broad concept, including formal 
institutions, like schools, media, parties, lobbies, ete, as well as informal institutions, like for 
example language, law, fairytales, urban legends, religious norms, ete (cf. Luckmann & Berger 
1990, pp. 108). On the other hand it is exactly this discourse that influences these social 
institutions through the change in the perception of the topic that it may bring about and the 
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political, cultural, or social action which might follow from it. As Fairclough and Wodak define 
it: 
Describing discourse .as social practice implies a dialecticaLr:elationship 
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) 
and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-
way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions 
and social structures, but it alsa shapes them. To put the same point in a 
di.fferent way, discourse is socially constitutive. as well as socially shaped: 
it constitutes situations, objective knowledge, and the social identities of 
and relationships between people and groups of people 
(Fairclough/Wodak 1997, p.258). 
ln other words, by speaking people act. However, through these speech act,. they (re-)create 
institutions and social structures, which are the bas.is for further action. Within this dialectical 
relationship, social practices (alsa in the objectifıed form of institutions) and discourse, as well as 
the identity projects of people that participate within this discourse, mutually constitute each other 
( cf. Luckmann & Berger 1990, pp.136). 
Important features of discourse analysis are in this context the notions of ideological 
hegemony and representation. The concept of hegemony as tool to explain the discursive 
construction of reality goes back to Antonio Gramsci (1991 ), who stated that power and opinion-
leadership of an (economical) elite or core and its allies enable it to control several social spheres, 
or even the whole society, although this discursive hegemony is never total but partial and 
temporarily confined, since it results from temporary power-alliances (Keller 2004, pp.27). This 
temporary opinion coalition manifests itself in the speech acts of its most prominent 
representatives, an opinion elite or opinion leaders so to say, who, if they succeed to establish 
their opinion, not only lead the discourse, but in a certain sense ' embody' it (Bourdieu, 1989, 
pp.207). Their speech acts determine the quality of the represented collectives, they can create or 
destruct a group. Because the representative exist, because he represents (a symbolic act), so does 
the represented and symbolised group exist, although its is equally true that the group gives 
existence to its representatives or delegates (Ibid.). Again one can speak of a reciprocal 
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constitutive act, although it is, in this case asymmetricaL Without representative, no collective: 
"The group exists-only if it hasa permanent organ of-representation, which is able to represent the 
serial group and its fluctuating individuals, who can oniy speak and act for themselves" (Ibid., pp. 
38 andc214). 
It would be wrong, on the other hand, to conclude that this asymmetry embodies a sole 
top-down construction of r:eality and identity. The discourse, as embodied by the representative's 
statements, is only effective if it is able to conrıect itself to popular motives and personal 
experiences of the represented individuals. Only if experiences, hopes and fears (real or 
imagined) from the life-world of the individuals get included in the representing speech-act, it is 
capable to produce the desired knowledge, or stereotypes about the topic and thereby about the 
group's self (Fach 2005, pp. 29). These speech-acts so- to say, try to monopol ise the interpretative 
dimension of the above mentioned discursive circle of reality and identity production and they 
thereby follow a strategy of maintenance, transformation or destruction of the knowledge, which 
the group has about the topic and the meaning of the group's identity, which is manifest in this 
knowledge. 
If an actor, for example_ can connect his speech-act to the conventional knowledge and the 
stereotypical classifıcations of tbe group about its relation with outsiders, it can be successful in 
influencing the ongoing discourse about, for example, foreigners and their position within 
society. He or she could emphasis the fact that the demographic development of the group is 
precarious, so that the presence of foreigners must be perceived as a demographically necessity. lf 
successful, this construction can Iead to a change of the collective identity (as for example an 
'old ' or 'dieing' nation), succeeded by a change of immigration policy, which in retum will lead 
to an increased inflow of migrants. If instead another actor is successful in shaping the discourse 
in such a way that the major knowledge about foreigners is about their culturally difference and 
un-civilised behaviour, the political conclusion out of the debate will be different. Who in the end 
succeeds in establishing his perception of the world within this discourse depends thereby on 
several variables. It depends on the institutional context in which the discourse takes place, so to 
say the contextual setting, but also on the expertise, the rhetoric ability and the socio-economic 
means of the discourse actors to make their statements heard, and the development of the social 
situation to which the discourse is connected (Keller 2004, pp.41 ). 
58 
As stated above, these actors or discourse participants try to influence the public debate in 
order to shape a certain imaginat-ion_ ef the society as, for example Christian, Liberal, family 
oriented, stable, unjust, multicultural, German, ete. How they perceive and approach a certain 
discursive event depends on the bmader social environment, their predominant group loyalties, 
and tbeir personal experience. To stay in the example of the immigratio~ debate, an academician 
with foreign background, who flies around the world to meet intellectuals from different countries 
will certainly have a different understanding of and stance toward the debate, and most probably 
he will be able to influence the debate more decisively, as for example an unemployed worker, 
who lives in a small remote village. 
Every individual statement ofa debate participant thus has to be set into a broader picture: 
First we have to set it into the context of the discourse structures which frame the statement, i.e. 
the social even national or global and historically derived institutional setting by which the debate 
is framed (from above). Secondly, we have to scrutinise the specific social position of the 
participant's group within this discursive structures, i.e. the specific social position from which 
the debate participant understands the debate and utters his/her statements in order to legitimise 
the so.cial position it occupies (from below). Thirdly, we have to look on the individual life-world 
of the debate participant, i.e. his/her personal experience, his/her changeable embeddedness into 
and overlaps across several social affiliations (gender, class, family, ethnicity, professional group, 
ete) (from within). Fourthly, we have to look on the specific reactions to its statements, how they 
influence his/her argumentation, i.e. the confrontation of it with other debate participant's 
statements, their social and individual perspective and possibly other discursive structures which 
intrude through this reaction into the former's circle of reality production (from without or the 
outside). 
It is obvious that these four dimensions ofa debate constitute a social reality in a mutually 
influencing way and through absolutely complex mechanisms of interaction. If we could re-create 
the specific points of connections between those categories mentioned above, then we would be 
able to write something akin to a total, synthesising model of reality, even more than this: we 
would create a model which could describe reality completely, thus a model which is nota model 
of something real, but which is reality itself. I do not claim to be able to provide such a ultimate 
model ofa di scursive landscape, even more so I claim that it is exactly this endeavour to describe 
a total picture of social reality, which is essentially ideological, since it claims that one statement 
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that is uttered within this complex set of interaction, is able to embody the whole, contain the 
overlapping dimensions, reveal their essence and thus lift itself in form ofa synthesis above the 
compiexlty of reality production, so as to provide a 'true' and accordingly binding, static 
Jcnowledge about it. 
However, if an author refrains from providing a model that at least tries to catch some 
essence, so as to provide some extra-value, i.e. knowledge, than one must ask, why he is writing 
at ali. it is at this point suitable to look on the structure of this essay itself, for what did it initially 
suggest to provide? 
It set out with the claim that the debate surrounding the political decision about whether or 
rrot Turkey should join the EU was much more than a pragmatic debate on pcssible pros and cons 
ofa -possible accession. Instead it was claimed that the debate can rather be understood within a 
complex discursive framework that connected the political issue at hand with much broader 
statements about the envisaged quality of society. The debate was thus embedded in a highly 
normative frame, which connected the specific individual statements about Turkish integration to 
visionary statements about how society should be understood and based on this understanding, 
how it should develop, i.e. which decision in the specific case should be taken. Subsequently it 
was claimed that with the help ofa ideal-type categorisation of the variously employed normative 
frames it would be feasible to structure the debate so to say from above by creating a model of 
three mutually influencing visionary languages or discursive logics, namely the logic of Kultur, 
civilisation and cosmopolitanism. 
Nevertheless, this top-down approach, as it was emphasised, has to be understood as being 
based on a highly arbitrarily constructed and simplifying ideal-type categorisation, that reduces 
the complex and mutually influencing interaction of ali kinds of visionary languages within an 
actual debate, so as to provide an essence or ideal which can be understood. That this 
understanding of an arbitrarily constructed and fictional ideal-type systemisation does have some 
value for the understanding ofa real world debate like the one on Turkish accession , was derived 
from the claim that its ideal-type categorisation is based on the same essential linguistic 
mechanisms which determine our way to structure and thus infuse meaning into reality: 
The first linguistic mechanism is the historicist dimension of language that connects past, 
present and future in a complex web of interaction, whereby this historicism and ideas of 
continuity/disruption help to infuse meaning into discourse positions taken within daily debates 
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about complex political questions. it was claimed that historicism is part of a linguistic 
mechanism that helps to define a certain position within the discourse by supplying it with the 
necessary element of direction and consistency. Simultaneously this claim was qualified by 
stating that this historicism which is important for the legitimation ofa statement does not prove 
that something like a meaningful history exists outside of language. 
Secondly, it was claimed that it is the mechanism of Janguage to structure our perception 
of the world, into a simplifying ideal-type categorisation of differences - ranging from the same, 
over similar, to different and contradictory - which frames every possible statement about the 
quality ofa group through discrimination, i.e. the definition ofa inside (the same) and core (the 
similar) in opposition to a periphery (the different) or even outside (the contradiction). 
Preconditioned by Janguage, this ideal-types suggest a more or less static order based on 
unchanging relations and clear-cut distinctions between the categories employed so as to enable 
the language user to infuse meaning into an otherwise over-complex, undistinguished and thus 
meaningless reality. Again, this claim was qualified by stating that this discrimination is 
important for the legitimation of a statement but that it cannot prove that something like a 
meaningful distinction does exists outside of Janguage. 
Thirdly, it was claimed that it is the essential quality of language to structure the thinking 
and argumentation of an individual through hi storically and collectively derived codification (the 
structures ofa discourse) while it simultaneously is used exclusively by individuals within an 
actual and open-ended speech situation (whether it be private or public), which suggest a 
dialectical understanding of the relationship between individual and collective, between agent and 
structures, past and future, core and periphery, freedom and equality, ete. It was suggested to 
understand this dialectical relationship as linguistic thesis/antithesis construction, which produces 
its conceptual dissolution within a totalising synthesis (citizen, discourse, present, social 
landscape, fraternity, ete), without, however, proving that reality is indeed a synthesis of causally 
linked thesis/antithesis couples. 
This threefold defınition of language, as historicist, reductionist and dialectical was then 
extended to the scope of the articulation of political visions of society within actual debates, 
whereby it was claimed that every legitimate, meaningful statement must obey those rules of 
linguistic ordering. it must distinguish between past, present and future so as to provide direction 
in time, it must distinguish between inside/core and periphery/outside so as to demark a space for 
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action, and it must voiced as a synthesising balance between those thesis and antithesis couples, 
so as to imply a directly causal and legitimising connection of the particular statement to the 
whole, i.e. reality. 
The threefold ideal-type categorisation, of Kultur vs. Civilisation vs. Cosmopolitanism 
was thus accordingly constructed, as logics that try to give direction in time, that reduce the 
complexity of society to a set of selected core qualities vis-a-vis a periphery which should be 
included and an outside that should be excluded. They furthermore ali try to depict themselves as 
un-ideological, realistic balance between collective and individual, freedom and equality, past and 
future, ete. However, in order to depict themselves as synthesising balance they have to produce 
the altemative logic as ideo!ogical, and unrealistic, as anachronistic understandings of society that 
have to be overcome, they have to produce a stereotypical other so as to be able to produce a-
stereotype about the self, and they have to do this, because it is impossible to empirically prove 
their true value for the understanding ofa over-complex, extemal world. They cannot lift above 
their speculative character, their arbitrariness, but they must necessarily claim to do so, because 
otherwise they could not produce any legitimate knowledge, could not mobilise a collective of 
individuals to define a common good, a core quality which legitimately triggers a consistent 
political decision . 
This dilemma then one can also clearly detect within this essay, for it tries to revea-1 the 
ideological qualities of the analysed discursive logics, suggests thereby that it is an un-
ideological , reflective statement, while it necessarily must employ a speculative, selective and 
incomplete core itself. In this respect, the assumed timeless and essential core, was produced by 
the arbitrarily constructed, supposedly key qualities of language, its historicism, stereotyplsation 
and dialectical functioning. From this point of departure, this essay constructed a highly abstract 
classification, which tried to avoid the ideological trap exactly by claiming that it is arbitrarily 
selected, ideologically forged and does not correspond to anything real out there but merely 
reflects the author's prejudices and his identity project. However, in claiming that every statement 
does the same, it implicitly suggested that this approach reveals a true core that directly 
corresponds with reality. 
This ideological speculation, however, is necessary, because otherwise the essay would 
maybe be politically correct but completely meaningless and reading it a sole waste of time. Thus, 
like every statement that tries to be meaningful, it cannot but construct a core and produce 
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boundaries to an outside and like any Jegitimate statement it must propose a direct connection to a 
reaLity. If it would not do so it would be un-criticisable and it would net Jeave any- room for its 
potentiai revision within a discussion, thus it would propose either a meaningless ' anythl"ng goes' 
or formulate an ideological, all-embracing belief-system. In this respect, this essay and the 
proposed ideal-type categorisation should be understood as an attempt to construct a synthesising 
core so as to make the tension between inside/outside, individual/collective, ideology/reality, ete 
explicit and thus trigger discussion and confrontation with the other, the reader. The hasis for the 
essay is thus the 'Popperian' or cosmopolitan mode of communication, which does not refrain 
from formulating a synthesising core, its connection to a periphery and exclusionist boundaries to 
an outside. However, on the other hand it is based on the belief that this core and the boundaries 
containing it, must be thought as being tlexible, permeable and p0tentially revisable within an 
ongoing and open-ended debate. 
Consequently, the debate about Turkish accession to the EU and its connection to the 
normative political logics categorised as Civilisation, Kultur and Cosmopolitanism will be 
analysed or (re-)constructed so as to create a total ising, i.e. synthesising statement, which is 
capable to trigger criticism. In order to do so, I will integrate the ideal-type categorisation of the 
discursive Jogics into the empirical analysis of the statements made within the German debate. 
The hasis of this analysis is accordingly the assumption that any statement about politics, must 
necessarily engage in ideological distortion of ' facts' and thus remains to be no more as a 
prejudiced statement and apart of identity politics. 
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2.2 The Debate in German Newspapers-
The analysis of the recent debate in Germany about whether or not Turkey should jocin the 
European Union will be reproduced by setting pro and contra voices in form ofa dialogue to each 
other. This choice of articles mainly consists of articles published in quality newspapers, which 
engaged in the debate as a forum for exchange of opinions. The chosen articles are predominately 
taken from the period between 2001 tiil 2004. They wi11 be analysed in depth, whereby the main 
strands of the arguments will be connected to the ideal-types set out above_ it will be shown that 
in this debate several representatives ( opinion ieaders who are present at the media levei of 
discussion) try to establish a certain know-ledge about the topic, which emphasises certain pre-
existing commonsensical knowledge in society, while simultaneously de-emphasising other items 
and by this means produces, reproduces or destruct certain stereotypes-of Turkey, Germany and 
Europe according to the representative 's mainly employed normative narrative, whereby it will be 
from special interest to see whether or not it is possible to deduce from those statements a general 
and consistent political vision. 
The fırst article to be analysed is one by Hans Ulrich Wehler, that was published in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ, a centre-right newspaper) in December 2003, which, however, 
summarises earlier newspaper articles by Wehler (cf. Wehler, Sept. 2002), who was one of the 
most discussed and criticised author within this debate from on its beginning. He is a well-known 
social-historian at the University 'in Bielefeld. He is generally seen as being near to the German 
social-democrats (SPD), who were in power at the time and who supported the Turkish bid for 
accession, especially in the Helsinki summit of the Council (Leggewie 2004, p.126). 
The Title of the article is : ' The Turkish question - Europe's citizen have to decide', which 
refers to the then upcoming decision of the Council whether or not Turkey qualifies for accession 
negotiations. lt is important to note that this was a decision of rather technical character, based on 
a evaluation of Turkish progress in the accomplishment of the Copenhagen Criteria. Thus the 
decision was neither concerned with the question whether or not the EU should or finally can 
integrate Turkey, nor was there any direct involvement of the 'European citizen' intended to take 
place. 
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After accusing a not precisely defined group to prevent a rational debate -on the topic, by 
means of 'populist demagogy' , he sets out to analyse the 'sound reasons' for -pro and contra. 
However, before lıe actually does this he- inserts a quotation of Bismarck about the 'oriental 
question', the erosion of the Ottoman Empire, in which the founding father of Germany declares, 
that no state is allowed to act in opposition to its vital interests. Tnis quotation- then is followed by 
a rhetorical question: 'Does it correspond to the vital interests of Germany, and especially 
Europe, to destroy the EU, by taking in a big, non-European and Mus!-im state ["GroBstaat"]?'. He 
explains this suggestive question with a reference to the Ukraine, Belo-Russia, Russia, Moldavia, 
Georgia and Morocco, which can hardly be excluded in case Turkey can join (cf. Meier Nov 
2002). The 'fascinating project of European unity' would thus be traded in for the 'watered-down 
lentil-soup of an over-swelled ["unmaBig aufgeblahte"J free-trade zone from the Atlantic coast to 
Vladivostok' (cf. Pflüger Sept 2003) 'Is it this interest', he asks again, 'which is behind the 
attempt to open the door for Asia Minor only one year after the accession of ten new, eastem-
European Member States, thereby ignoring the pressure on the Union's resources due to the 
condition of those states and thus dramatically increasing the danger of an overstretch onto the 
level of a final test ("ZerreiBprobe")? Does it correspond to these interests to co-opt a non-
European, Muslim state as biggest Member State to a genuine European confederation of states 
["Staatenverein"], a state, which will count a population of over 90 million people in the year of 
accession, which accordingly will have the biggest fraction in the European Parliament and thus 
unavoidably demand political leadership and extra-o[dinary financial benefits? ' (cf. Glotz 2003, 
pp.6). 
With these dramatising words, he actually concludes before he even started to analyse the 
pro and cons. With his references to Bismarck, the oriental question of an eroding Ottoman 
Em pire and the non-European, Muslim character of the Turkish "GroBstaat" he associates the pro-
Turkish German govemment with ambitlous and risky plans for a policy akin to the empire-
building of the German Emperor after he forced Bismarck to resign . As this empire-building of 
the last German Emperor Ied to the destruction of the European 'concert of powers' in the First 
World War, we can read in between the lines, in the same way the recent policy of integration of 
the (etemal) 'sick man of Europe', Turkey, will end the 'fascinating project of European unity'. 
This time however, it will lead to a perversion of the genuine European 'Staatenverein' to an 
empire-like, overstretched free-trade zone, which spans from the Atlantic to the Pacific, i.e. 
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across the world. The question of Turkish accession -thus gets the character of an either-or 
q,uestion: Either a shallow, capitalist Em_pire a la USA that absorbs other cultures in order to 
increase its market trajectory and the pröfits of its capitalist, bourgeois elite, or a culturally 
.unique, genuine European EU, which necessariJy must exclude Turkey, when it wants to remain 
political ly and financially able to further progress in unifying and deepening its political 
institutions so- as to develop the well-being of ali European citizen (cf. Winkler Nov 2002, 
Obemdörfer Feb. 2003)). 
After having set this framing qaestion, he goes on to analyse the - according to him -
three most important pro-Turkish arguments and then, afterwards he elaborates on ten reasons 
which speak against an accession. 
The first 'forma! ' argument he summarises as being concemed with the credibility of the 
EU, stating that the once set course towaFds Turkish accession, which started in 1964 and was 
reinforced during the 1999 Helsinki and 2002 Copenhagen summits, cannot be abandoned 
anymore. 'Not really convincing' he argues, since in over 40 years Turkey made no efforts to 
become more compat ible- to Europe, which are 'worth mentioning' (cf. Kramer Aug. 2004). The 
whole enterprise, was furthermore only a side product of the Cold War, which ended in 1989. A 
new constellation of world politics thus would have made an abandonment of the initial 
' engagement' plausible (cf. Schmidt Dec 2002, Adam Dec. 2002). The often mentioned 
obligation to gratitude for Turkish Ioyalty in the Cold War was in any case already fulfilled 
through the 'very, very big multitude of billions of IMF subsidies' given to Turkey. Yet, 'the 
chance for a clari fying cut was missed at the Helsinki summit and the result was the crooked way 
down to Copenhagen with. its radically shortened accession criteria' . 
The second reason he mentions for Turkish accession is the - 'especially from American 
side often highlighted' - geo-strategical rationale, that Turkey is the most important ally in the 
future conflicts i"n the Near-East crisis-region (cf. Steinbach 2000, pp.56; Fischer Feb 2004, 
Fi seher March 2004). However, he renounces the validity of this argument, by stating that during 
the Second Iraq War, the new ' Islamistic' govemment in Turkey was - ' to the disappointment of 
the American hegemonic power' - not willing or capable to shed war over one of its 'Muslim 
fellow-states' as henchman of American policy and against the ' overwhelming majority of its 
population ' . However, an attempt of the Turkish military to in vade North-lraq and ' suffocate the 
germ-cell' of an autonomic Kurdish quasi-state with its potential influence on the 'big Kurdish 
66 
minority in the East of Turkey', failed only because of an American veto (cf. Kramer July 2003). 
Thus, because .of its own int-erest in the region and the unwillingness of the 'Islamistic' 
govemment to fıght against a Muslim state, Turkey is neither a helpful pacifying power nor a 
strategically useful partner in the Near East region ( cf. Münkler March 2004 ). 
The last reason he mentions and which he sees as the ' most sympathetic' one, is based on 
the daim that it is in .the self-interest of Europe to support the experiment of a democratic 
republic in a Muslim country (cf. Keskin Nov 2002, Lamers Oct 2003). He states, that nowhere 
until now it was proven that this coexistence ofa political and 'a religious constitution' can 
indeed be established, ' not at least because of the high barriers within the Islamic confession '. 
According~y, a positive-example of the Turkish state could deve lopa magnetism for the Near East 
and the Arabic world and in principle influence the 1 ,2 billion Muslims in the world (cf. 
Burgdorf, Jan. 2004). But he asks: Is a Turkey within the 'core of the EU' the only promising 
frame for this laborious process? (cf. Kramer Aug. 2004). This he states is ' rather the 
argumentation of the functional elite within Turkey', who is obviously deeply sceptical that 
Turkey can be successfully 'Europeanised' by an innovating capabi lity from within (cf. Tibi Feb 
2006). However, this mistrust is justifıed , he says further, since the parties of this Kemalistic and 
urban establishment were crushed in the last elections by an 'lslam istic wave' originating in the 
protest-movement of the Anatolian periphery and culminating in the election of the 'Islamistic' 
AKP of Erdoğan , which is a party that probably supports the Europeanisation only at the moment, 
because it fıts their own party objective of pushing back the 'anti-democratic veto-power of the 
military' so as to break with the secular and Kemalistic principles and norms protected by the 
anny and reintroduce the 'Islamistic' altematives (cf. Siemons, Nov. 2002, Öztürk March 2003). 
Other important reasons for this connoting policy of the government are the objectives to get a 
share of the European economic potential, to get a share ofthe tempting EU subsidies and to open 
up a ' basin for the Turkish west migration'. Thus it is in the self-interest of the Union to carry the 
Turkish experiment outside of the EU institutions by granting it the supportive advantages of a 
' privileged partnership'. However, after having said this, he pessimistically goes on with stating 
that it is a na"ive belief that the, 'also in Turkey vigorously advancing Islamism' could be curbed 
through a 'well-meaning' European inclusion of the Turkish state. 'This hope underestimates on 
the one hand the power of religious, and especially fundamentalist movements, and on the other it 
diverts from the fact that these movements can only be tamed by endogen, modernising forces.' 
67 
(cf. Afra Oct. 2002, Belge 2004, Tibi Feb 2006, Kramer Aug 2004). He concludes at this point 
wit-h the- question: 'And precisely an Islamistic majority party ["Mehrheitspartei"] shall be able 
and wiHing after its spectacular triumph to provide this modemisation from within?' 
These three points can be summarised under the framework of Orientalism, that depicts 
Turkey as a modern equivalent of the unchangeably despotic, greedy and connoting Orientaı: who 
only -hides his antagonism and his radical difference, so as to profit financially, to sneak the 
support from Europe against his personal enemies, and open a door to Europe for the 'Muslim 
wave', to infect it and suck up its economic and political strength. That is why Turkey has to be 
excluded, and this has to be done, first, to teach the Orient the lesson, that it only can truly 
modemise alone, and secondly, because a unified Europe is stronger and can more efficiently 
support Turkey in a 'privileged partnership' which gives the crying and demanding Oriental 
infant not everything it wants but instead teaches him the value of renunciation and self-
responsibility. However, the !ast paragraph about the Europeanisation of Turkey especially 
reveals the applied Orientalism, because it claims, first, that Turkey has to modemise itself, but 
then it states that it cannot do so, because it is tom between its Islamistic and despotic majority on 
the one hand and the anti-democratic, militarily protected elite on the other. In other words, the 
Orient is the Orient because it cannot but be and always remains the Orient. It cannot be changed, 
neither from outside nor from the inside, and thus it can never be a part ofa civilised Europe, and 
a na"ive and well-meaning inclusion of the Oriental Turkey would thus only destroy Europe from 
within. The opposite statement consequently is: Europe is Europe, because it was Europe and will 
always be Europe, whereby this definition is accompanied by ali kinds of positive features 
attached to it (cf. Delanty/ Rumford 2005, pp.54). 
Additionally we can see here in Wehler argumentation, that this Orientalism and its 
emphasis on an essential difference between Orient and Europe is connected to a Huntington 
inspired picture ofa clash of civilisations, with the 'Islamistic wave' on the one side and the 
'American hegemonic power' on the other (the second anti-pole however rather implicitly and 
abstractly mentioned) (cf. Huntington, 1993). Europe emerges accordingly in between as the land 
of the free, that has to protect the purity of its unique and single, true culture against the outside 
forces of destruction, the (American) capitalist Empire and the Islamistic barbarians, or in the 
words of Barber ' Mc World ' and ' Jihad' (Barber, 1992, cf. the Manichean !ogic of good vs. evi! in 
Buruma/Margalit, 2004). 
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Wehler then starts to sum up the reasons why this exclusion is necessary and legitimised. 
The first point is that the EU must clearly define its borders to the East and South-East to prevent 
an inclusion of non-European states, Ukraine, Russia, Belo-Russia and 'especially' Turkey, which 
were 'never apart ofthe historical Europe' : 'They are not formed by antiquity, by Roman law, by 
the reformation, there was nothing like Enlightenment, no occidental citizenry with its 
autonomous cities, no European aristocracy, no European peasantry' , and this ali remains true 
although there exists an 'enduring attempt since Peter the Great and Atatürk to catch up' (cf. 
Winkler, Nov. 2004). 'Of course', he qualifies this further, ' Europe is also a changing 
construction, but only within historically tightly defined borders'. In the face of EU enlargement 
and the change it ensues, however, 'it must be decided today, whether the EU will acknowledge 
the character of Europe which grew over the millennia', or whether it will surrender Europe and 
'shrink back to a mere free-trade zone, which does not have anything to do with Europe 
anymore'. 
Again, we can recognise the Orientalist tautology at work: Turkey was and never will be 
European, because it was and never will be European: Maybe it had an aristocracy, citizenry, 
peasantry but it had no European aristocracy, no occidental citizenry, no European peasantry. 
Maybe it tries to catch up the uniquely European cultural , philosophical and social achievements, 
but because it is not European it can never fully and truly develop them, it will always remain in 
the state of catching up,. 
Also for a second time, he confronts the reader with the stale prospect of an degeneration 
of the EU to an essentially non-European free-trade zone, which would be more or less a treason 
to ali that, which grew organically over the past millennia in Europe and thus would not 
responsibly restore or re-construct the pure and past core of Europe so as to maintain it within the 
changing environment (Globalisation?), but instea<l it would through the inclusion of that, which 
was never European, seli it Europeaness out: Europe would cease to exist within the framework 
ofthe EU. 
The second argument he offers, is a variation of this Europe-mantra. However, now he 
emphasis on the 'lasting power of religious understandings of the World', exactly because it is 
nowadays not 'chic' and among dogmatic "Multikulti-Gutmenschen" (politically over-correct 
proponents of multiculturalism) even a 'sacrilege' to remind on the 'cultural-civilisational fault-
line' between 'two cultural zones'(cf. Hüttman 2004, Fach 2004). Their ignorance though does 
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not 'charm' away the fact that this fault-line even grows through the renaissance of Islamism in 
Turkey, which is since the 1980s sponsored by Saudi propaganda of their 'stone-age Islamism' . 
He then adds the examples of the re-emergence of the headscarf in the Turkish public and the 
expulsion of Islamistic cadets from a army academy, so as to come again to the antagonism 
between the Kemalistic tutelage of the anti-democratic military and the recent, quasi one-party 
rule of Erdoğan's ' lslamistic' party (cf. Öger Nov. 2002). 'Admittedly', he states afterwards, the 
AKP passed some 'overdue' reforms of the legislation, but the bureaucracy refrains persistentl_y to 
put those reforms into force: 'The Kurdish minority will thus further be discriminated- as also 
Christian women, Cbristian churches and their officials'; police-torture will equally remain and 
also the 'deeply-rocted' customs of compulsory marriage of children. This all is due to a 
structural problem, which is generally connected to the religion of Turkey (cf. Stoiber, June 
2004). Although there are also some fundamentalist movements within Christianity, Judaism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism, they did not develop a dogmatic antagonism 
to the West. 'Only Islam seems to be able to mobil ise the core of religious convictions ', so as to 
develop, against the threat of domination by Western modernity, into a 'radical anti-Western 
fundamentalism ' (cf. Fokkema, 1999, pp. 52; Buruma/Maragalit, 2004, p. 202). He thus 
concludes with the question, when finally a ' inner-Islamic Enlightenment or Reformation will 
confront itself with those problems' and he subsequently regrets that the Copenhagerr Criteria do 
not mention the cultural difference between Islam and the rest, i.e. the modem World (cf. Öztürk 
March 2003, Adam Dec 2002, Jager Aug. 2002). 
Interesting is the development of the Oriental dilemma within this point: On the one hand 
there is the regressive 'Islamist govemment' that tries to re-establish a Saudi-like 'stone-age' 
society. However, when it accidentally passes modemising reforms, this reforms will be 
sabotaged by the established bureaucracy, which actually can be understood as the modem, 
Kemalistic (but anti-democratic) establishment. In this manner then Wehler is able to summarise 
so multi-faced and different problems, like the veto-power of the military, the headscarf issue, 
police torture, discrimination of Christians, the suppression of the Kurds, compulsory marriage of 
kids, ete, under the unitary umbrella of Islam and its essential anti-Westem, ergo anti-modemist 
character. 
However, from on the third point, he claims to analyse more specifically some concrete 
problems of a Turkish accession. üne of the most important among these is the problem of 
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Turkey' s ' agrarian backwardness' and its social structure which is not liberated from the ' blemish 
of corruption', the connection to organised erime and the ctientele-loyalties to powerful clan-
chiefs ( cf. Hermann 2004 b ). The economic advantage of an accession of such an economy is thus 
highly over-estimated, indeed it would rather be a ' tab without bottom' with an urıending hunger 
for subsidies (cf. Rogowski June 2004). ' Realistic calculations from Brussels' thus estimate 40 
billion annual subsidies from EU funds for Turkey, from which 'one-fifth would-have to be paid 
by the net-contributor Germany.' 
The fourth point, then highlights the problem ofa probable ' migration of 18 millfon, poor 
Anatolians which will be ready to wander to Europe', in case of Turkish accession. Their main 
destination will be like usual Germany and make an integration (at another place he uses the word 
assimilation) of the already 3 million Turks in Germany almost impossible, since it would 
overstretch not only the capability of the German society to absorb migrants, but al so the 
capability of Europe in general (Engin March 2003). 
The sheer size of the Turkish population, he continues ın his fi fth point, would 
fu rthermore overtax the decision-making structures of the EU, which already has to deal wit h the 
consequences of the recent Eastem-Enlargement A Turkish state with a population of 90 million 
in 201 2 and which a few years later will cross the 100 million limit, will make an efficient 
problem so lving mechani sm impossible (cf. Stoiber Dec 2002, Kramer Aug. 2003, Benhabib Dec 
2002). 
In his sixth point, he takes up the geo-strategical argument again, and asks the question: 
' Why should the EU make so attractive states, like the chaotic Iraq, the Syrian dictatorship, the 
Iranian theocracy and the eroding states of Armenia and Georgia to its neighbours, and 
additionally convert the explosive Kurdish question into an intemal problem?' (cf. Schmidt Dec 
2002, Winkler Feb 2003). In opposition to the ' hyper-realist ', global and ' Wilhe!minian ' 
ambition of the German govemment, ' it was proven many times that spatial distance and indirect 
concem is a political advantage'. 
Seventhly, he demands, that the ' tabooing of the murder of Armenians and Greeks ' has to 
stop. These were no minor crimes he states, because, ' after all this is about 1.5 million killed 
Armenians and 1.5 million killed or deported Greeks ', which were the ' victims ofa fixation of 
the Young Turks onto an ethnically homogenous nation-state' . In place of draconian penalties for 
those that want to reflect on these, state-denied genocide-like crimes, there should finally be an 
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open discussion (cf. Luchterhandt, May 2003). The example for this is Germany and its way of 
acknowledging its past: 'Would a single European state have given a- hand to Germany, whert it 
would have denied the murder of the Jews with the same vigour with wfiich Turkey denies its 
own state-crimes stili today? ' 
The eighth point is an almost word by word repetition of the initial either-or frame only 
that he connects it more concretely to the forth Copenhagen Criteria about the obligation of the 
EU 'to uphold the momentum of European integration', which he accordingly sets into relation to 
the right of the citizen to enjoy inner stability and prosperity, and to the duty of the EU to provide 
effıcient decision-making processes and support the maintenance ofa European identity and the 
feeling of belonging (cf. Winkler Nov 2002, Amin 2004). 
He uses this point as a transition-to the next !ine of argument concerning the demoeratic 
deficit of the EU. This defıcit would probably be enlarged by the decision to start negotiations, 
because this would set the course for the integration of an Islamic 'GroBstaat' and thus lead to 
tuming-point, without a prior invoivement ofa clarifying public debate and without a permission 
by the European parliaments. Accordingly, 'Euroscepticism would rise infinitely', and indeed ' the 
fascinating project of European unity would be dead for generations' (cf Stoiber June 2004) 
In his final point then he demands that the campaigns for the 2004 Europe-wide election 
of the EP should be used as a platform for a open discussion of pro and cons of the Turkish 
accession, so as ' not to betray the ideal of the emancipated citizenry' and to encourage the voters 
to openly formulate their opinion. Especially the EP should not 'opportunistically' and 'cowardly' 
refrain from its controlling function 
However, in the !ast concluding paragraph he makes one more time clear how a opinion of 
the common and un-selfish people would look like. Those who do not want to seli out the 
European project have to confront the narrow-minded short-term opportunism of the political and 
capitalist elite and exclude Turkey. Nevertheless, it is less the content of his vigorous plead, his 
estimations and speculations about the costs of Turkish accession, the size of its population in 
2012, the intentions of the AKP govemment, ete. , it is the suggestive stile in which he presents 
his ideas and the normative frame he uses that make clear from the begin that Turkey has to be 
excluded. He uses thereby the self-evident tautology of Orientalism, connects it to vaguely 
defined pessimist outlook on a clash of civilisations, so as to present a static, historicist and 
exclusive identity of an ideal Europe, which has to be defended by the culturally self-esteemed 
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citizen against the naivety of the liberal multiculturalists and the short-sighted greed ofa politico-
capitalist elite, as well as it must be defended against the genuine n0n-European and essentially 
nan-modern, fundamentalist Muslims on the one side and the hyper-capitalist global imperialists 
at the other. Whatemerges-is the European "Sonderweg" in .benveen, which is painted against the 
background ofa dark significant other or outside. This is a picture of an Europe that is besieged 
by antagonistic outside forces and po-i-soned by collaborators inside, who act against the European 
common good just because of their ideological blindness or selfish greed. it is in other words a 
vision that corresponds neatly with the anti-imperialist, culturally-racist and xenophobic Kultur 
logic and its collectivist definition of men as it was defined against a civilisational vision. Wehler 
thus re-act-ivates a purist and past oriented !ine of reasoning which was so typical for the German 
'third-way' until the Second Workl War, the only difference being that he nowadays wraps it up 
in an identity package of European size. However, one also has to underscore his emphasis on the 
necessity of a debate about Turkish accession to prevent Euroscepticism, as well as his strong 
criticism ofa German govemment that decided on this matter without adequately informing the 
public about pros and cons. And in the end one has to admit that his provocative statements 
against the status-quo of an un-interested , ' laissez-faire' understanding of politics in the public, 
triggered much discussion and the formulation of a !ot of counter voices to his vision. 
üne diverging voice was articulated in the Franlifurter Rundschau (a left-wing 
newspaper) on the 28 .12.2002. The article had the title: "The Turkish Mosaic. A mistake to think 
Europe should end at the Bosporus ' and was written by Seyla Benhabib a professor for politics 
and philosophy at the Yale University. She is an descendant ofSephardic Jews that escaped from 
the-pogroms in 15th century Spain through an-immigration to lstanbul. 
She introduces to the topic by reflecting on the Copenhagen summit 2002 and its decision 
to postpone the decision on a Turkish accession one more time. She regrets this, as it is a 'fatal 
mistake' for Turkey and also for the EU: 'The European Union had the opportunity to reinforce 
the precious inheritance of its own enlightenment tradition, which states that men everywhere in 
the world are capable to obtain democracy, civil conditions, peace and prosperity through the 
right usage of reason and a wisely steered will.' However, this did not happen, due to 'European 
defensive instincts ' and 'only scantly veiled Ethnocentristic prejudices' Why, she asks, did the 
EU, which integrated ten formerly communist countries set the limit at the Bosporus and why are 
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even peopte tike the former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Dec 2002), who cannot be 
accused ofa racist and anti-Muslim attitude, so vig_orousty against Turkish Accession? 
First, she states, there is a repeating mentioning of economicat reasons: Because a 
membeı:ship in the EU is accompanied. by free movement of persons, goods and services, the 
opponents of Turkish accession fear, that an integration of Turkey woutd increase the amount of 
the already huge number of Turks in Europe and the carefut control of migration would thus be 
rendered impossible. However, this argument is only on the first sight ptausible, she states, 
because in the tong run an illegal migration of workers coutd be curbed with a more flexible 
contract regulation. ' The recent negotiations with Potand atready set an positive exampte in that 
direction' . Furthermore, would the inflow of European capitat into Turkey create employment 
there and accordingty lead to a decrease of migration ( cf. Pieper Nov 2002, Hüttmann 2005). 
The second argument she analyses is about the political repercussions of Turkish 
accession and· the fear that a quickly growing Turkish population would put the EU under the 
' predominance ofa Muslim majority'(cf. Stoiber Dec 2002). Within the EP however, Turkey 
would be one among many actors and in no way a leading force within a partiament consisting of 
26 different national detegations. The most decisions on EU !evet are in anyway not taken by 
majority voting and it wou td thus be not more than a distortion of facts ("Ablenkungsmanöver"), 
to claim that Turkey woutd , due to its amount of votes in the Council , change the decision 
making structures of the EU. The institutional setting of the EU is in opposition buitd on the 
betief that politicat representation should not only be based on demographic principles. The EU 
already used-this conviction to establish with 'institutional creativity' a balance between France, 
Germany, the UK and Jtaly although these countries differ in the size of their populations. 'The 
same would have been possible in the case of Turkey' and especially with focus on the different 
ways of representation and decision-making which will be necessary in the future , Turkish 
accession could have been seen as a chance to reform the anachronistic and inflexible dogma of 
proportional representation ('one person, one vote ' ) so as to open up the discussion of new 
models within an entarged EU (cf. Prantl Nov 2002, Thumann Dec 2002). 
The !ast argument she detects on the side of the opponents of Turkish accessıon ıs 
concemed with the ' Human Rights record and the non-democratic Islamic heritage of Turkey'. 
She admits, that the Turkish State is notorious for its violations of Human Rights and the 
scepticism of the 'Europeans' that the ' hasty legislative reforms conceming the death penalty and 
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a revaluation of the Kurdish Ianguage could solve these problems is thus absolutely legitimate' . 
However, a retreat from Turkey would in any case not help those people in need. 'There can be 
no doubt that the ru can achieve much more for the improvement of the terrible Turkish Human 
Rights -rec.ord and the defence of minority rights', when it further critically involves itself in 
Turkish inner affairs. Instead of 'self-righteously' and 'hypocritically lament' over the indeed bad 
condition of Kurds and-other ethnical and religious minorities, Europe should at !ast acknowledge 
its 'historical responsibility ' and constructively engage in Turkey, so as to find a just solution for 
the Kurdish problem (cf. Diner Dec. 2002, Hermann, 2004 a). 
After having thus analysed and criticised the cons of Turkish accession she coocludes by 
stat-ing that Turkey today is at the 'cross-roads' : If Europe would 'disregard ' Turkey, the 
Is-l:am-istic fundament of the AKP, 'which is more conservative than the rulin_g elites ', would 
undoubtedly force its Jeadership to approach closer to the Islamic world (cf. Kramer 2003, 
Özdemir June 2003). She finally refers back to the title of the article and states that Europe does 
not end at the Bosporus, because 'Turkish history was and will remain tightly intertwined with 
Europe, even if Europeans like Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who are dreaming of purity, do not 
acknowledge thi s' (cf. Tordjman Dec. 2002). 
This picture of Turkey at the ' cross-roads' resembles the claim of Wehler, that Europe 
would stand at the cross-roads of either further developing political unity or degenerating into a 
free-trade area. ln Benhabib's, Turkish version, this means, either a Euro-Turkey, which would, 
followin g her argumentation , not hamı the EU, or an Islamistic Turkey, which would harın its 
own population and most probably also Europe (cf. Öger Nov 2002, Seufert Aug. 2002). 
She -develops the topic accordingly more from a distanced position towards Europe, which 
is also marked by her usage of formulations Iike ' the Europeans missed a chance' , or, ' those 
Europeans' This does however not mean that she refrains from a normative and hist-0ricist use of 
the noti-on. Instead she, as Wehler, describes a true core of Europe, which is its philosophical 
tradition and its egalitarian, universal understanding of mankind. However, the Ethnocentric and 
xenophobic ' instincts ' of contemporary Europeans led to the fatal decision of postponing Turkish 
Accession, Again, we have a rather historicist, true Europe, embodied in an impersonal, rational 
tradition and a Non-European Europe embodied in the instinct-driven, irrational or opportunistic 
individual called ' European ', who hypocritically leans back on his history as ona pillow, instead 
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of doing what history gave him as his burden, namely, to modernise the backward and 'indeed' 
brutal Orient. 
However, interesting is especially her second point when we compared it to Wehler's 
vision, because it indirectly refers to his ideal of progressive unity, i.e. deepening of the EU. In 
her second point, she states that the EU is a political institution which is unlike the ethnically 
defined nation-state not build on the premise of proportional representation of 'one man, one 
vote'. Instead the EU can be understood as a historical caesura, since it - 'with institutional 
creativity - established a kind of balance of power between the biggest but differently populated 
EU member States. lt is a mechanism that tames the power of the bigger states and it could have 
done so as well in the case of Turkey. In stating this, she thus forrnulates a more or less static 
vision of the institutional character of the EU, which will not change its character of being a 
rather realist, balance of power system between EU states and also towards states on the outside. 
Despite her neglect of the lively debate around the German proposal to make the EU 
institutions more proportional to demographic size, she thereby also reveals that her Ideal-EU is 
not the political union of an European citizen-community as Hans-Ulrich Wehler proposes it, but 
a wider, flexible and balancing conglomerate of nation-states, which however, is bound together 
by the common institutional tradition of these nation-states and their mission of balancing the 
world and helping the (ethnical) minorities in need. 
Interesting thereby is the diametrically opposed picture of the European inside and World 
outside, which she develops against Wehler' s depiction, although she is using the same historicist 
basis . Wehler is pleading to the public and the citizenry of Europe to keep the organically grown 
and genuine European tradition alive in their community, to defend it against an impersonal 
capitalist free-trade system on the one and a collectivised, undistinguished, global tribe and his 
ideology, Islamism, on the other hand, so as to enable the citizen to complete their mission of 
establishing internal equality and unity. Benhabib instead designs a collectivised Europe of 
Nation-states, in which the tradition is embodied within the impersonal, and balancing system 
between those European and connected states like Turkey. This elite system then must be 
defended against the irrational individual within Europe so as to enable the community of 
European states to accomplish their mission of helping other states to develop equality and 
freedom within ·a progressively united world. 
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This is the competition between the political visions of Kultur and Civilisation, however, 
some items seemed to have changed camps, when we compare the two articles to the ideal-type 
categorisation set out above. While Benhabib is using the future focussed horizon of Civilisation 
on the one hand, which highlights engagement with the other instead of distance from it, she 
equally employs on the other hand the Kultur-like defınition of men, when she describes the 
European as irrational, dreaming and prejudiced creature, who's rationality is essentially 
embodied within the national politics of his state, thus within the collectivised part of his being. 
Wehler instead is mixing the civilisational conviction ofa rational individualised citizen with the 
essentially culture relativistic dogma of an fundamentally different and antagonistic collectivist 
outside. 
The key to understand this on the fırst sight paradoxical mix is to recognise the different 
focus of their respective vision and the corresponding other, which they have to develop in order 
to Jegitimate their ideal. Wehler's vision is focussed on the intemal side of the EU, where he 
places historical development and rational individuals, progress, unity and equality, ete. The other 
side of the coin, is the timeless, undistinguished, threatening, irrational world collective outside. 
To keep up the European "Sonderweg" it is thus necessary to enlarge the fault-line between 
Europe and the rest, i.e. lslam, to raise the walls of the defensive Fortress Europe. 
Benhabib, however, focuses on the external side of the EU. For her history is world 
history, individuals are world-humans, unity does also only legitimately exist on global scale, ete. 
She humanises the world, creates a world-family of national minorities, so as to counteract the 
exclusivity of the Kultur logic. The European "Sonderweg" she designs is thus one of engaging 
with the other outside, since history, if it is living history, is not directed on an illusionary, pure 
and past core, but on future development of the world. Through this positioning of history 
outside, however, she creates a static picture ofa intemally never changing EU. And through the 
creation of the rational world-citizen and the world community of nations, she creates the 
' irrational European individual within the EU which must be contained by the rational (elite-
steered) state that engages with other groups outside, because it knows, that only out there, in the 
confrontation with other groups, the individual will emerge. 
It thus depends highly on the direction of the vision - either offensively directed towards 
the other outside ('das Fremde') or defensively directed towards the intemal own ('das Eigene' ) -
whether we can classify it as being within the frame of Kultur or Civilisation. This is because 
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they are structurally similar to each other, they both create a common good and a correspo.nding 
evil, thus a dialectical opposition, which is Jegitimised by history. They both explai-n the world as 
an either-or, i.e. two dimensional plate, so as to trigger a political decision. They thus engage 
necessarily in identity politics by adding a normative dimension, which, however, a~ways must be 
formulated as an un-ideological, responsible reflection on reality, so as to enable the formulation 
ofa "Sonderweg", a way in between, which is framed on both sides by the ideological distorted 
dogmas of the evi!, trying to Jead us astray. 
Of course, this is a highly simplified way of looking at such a complex topic as a debate 
and its discursive (re-)construction of reality, and of course, there are also many different voices. 
üne, rather varying voice is the commentary of Christian Meier, who published his article 'Where 
is Europe placed? Historical Reflections on the debate', in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Swiss 
centre-left newspaper, 08.02.2003). He is a historian, Iike Wehler, and the dean of the faculty of 
ancient history at the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich. 
Meier starts off with some reflections on the character of the EU, which is according to 
him 'the only political entity that is constantly busy with itself ', with 'widening and deepening', 
constantly under construction and re-construction '. it differs in so doing from ali other 'states or 
confederations', because it will never be completed and the 'feeling of unsatisfaction with 
established solutions is thereby the main precondition for its dynamics ' . However, the question of 
Turkish accession sheds a new light on the debate about the character of the Union, because it 
adds the question of 'what is the European' to the catalogue of rather technical questions about 
currencies, competition, alp-transit and institutional settings. 'Can also Turkey be a member?' 
'After ali', he states, ' it is a country of complete different origin, and its quickly growing 
population is - despite ali Western orientation of its upper class - at least to a great share not 
similar to what is commonsensical in Europe' (cf. Jager August 2002; Keskin Nov.2002). 
He then expands on the question, by elaborating on the dilemma of an open-ended Europe. 
'The EU has precisely defined accession criteria', but 'does this mean that it has to accept Turkey 
when it fulfils these criteria? ' Like Wehler he makes a connection of the Turkish case with 
obviously non-European countries, tike Israel , Cameron and Morocco and describes the difficulty 
of excluding them in case Turkey could join. Unlike Wehler, however, he makes the point more 
explicit, when he claims, that ' political entities of at Jeast some homogeneity have to include as 
well as they must exclude. Or they are empires, which absorb ali kinds of peoples' . Nonetheless, 
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he claims, that ' the EU cannot be such an empire', but yet, it ' did never coldly tumed the back 
towards someone' . ' Does this mean it is infinitely enlargeable? ', he asks accordingly and draws 
the picture of an ' Eurasian' or 'Euro-Mediterranean Union ' (cf. Pflüger Sept 2003, Wemicke, 
Dec 2002). 'Or does the conventional partition of the world not play .a role, so that one can 
politically include Turkey, as well as others into Europe? 
in the following paragraph, he goes back to the Greeks, and their invention of the initially 
mere geographic notion of Europe, which, however after the Persian Wars got a nonnative, 
political dimension, which were build around the ideals of freedom, bravery, citizen-rule and 
distinguished Europe against the negative picture ofa despotic, defeated and weak Asia. 'And up 
until today the notion Europe is frequently bound to feelings of supremacy' Even Kant, who he 
quotes directly, was speaking about a 'progressive improvernent of the state-constitution withirı 
our continent (who probably once will give Jaws to ali the others)' However, Kant does not Live 
today and the conviction ' that Europe has to teach the other parts of Humanity how to develop 
civilisation ', Jies instead ' far behind us' (Adam, Dec 2082.) 
Europe today is rather helpless ["Ohnrnachtig"] , ' culturally impotent', 'sleepy' and has a 
highly limited ability to serve as a role-model. Despite thi s there is also the tendency nowadays to 
make no other di fferences between peoples anymore than on socio-economical level, because one 
would otherwise 'all-too qu ickly' be Jabelled as racist. 'Men are equal, why not also peoples?, is 
the argumentation and especially in the case of Turkey one could observe the approximation to 
' European standards' in many respects: it is a ' modern, secular state, that took over E uropean 
legislation, and has many modem institutions, good universities, ete' (cf. Obemdörfer, Dec. 
2003). 
However, he critici ses this view in his next paragraph, where he states, that the 'laic 
reform ' was established top-down and is thus not based ona ' broadened spirit of enlightenment' 
(cf. Siemons, Nov. 2002). It furthennore Jed to discrimination of Christian churches and is 
dependent on the military as the guardian of democracy (cf. Höffe Dec. 2002). This raises at least 
doubts on the general Euro-compatibility of Turkey, although supplementary reform - conceming 
economics, the emancipation of women and the Kurdish problem - could certainly lift it across 
the ' hurdle of the criteria'. 'Nevertheless', he asks, 'would it be mere arrogance, if the Europeans 
would find that there are differences between peoples, which can not so readily be overcome' , 
differences for example stemming from a cultural and political history that, despite ali the 
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segregation it caused, is common to ali 'Europeans', 'whereas Turkey had almost no share in it?' 
After this reflections he then asks-the central question of his article: 'Does -a pofüical -entity like 
the EU not also have a right to aspire a certain homogeneity? '(cf. Winkler Nov 2002,) 
A possible reason for an exdusion 0f Tuı:key could be Christianity since it for centuries 
formed the societies of European countries ( cf. Wehler Sept. 2002, Glos Jan 2003). And-although 
one can neither claim that it stili is the predominately practiced religion in a progressively secular 
continent, nor that politics and economics in Europe were particularly influenced by the 'moral 
norms we cali Christian', one nevertheiess has to admit that the Christian belief (and including 
the polemical rejection of it) formed 'European thought, the development of individuality', of 
'personal responsibility' and even formed 'to the -highest degree the way in which reality is 
perceived in Europe'(cf. Kusclıel 2004, Adam-Dec.2002) 
Next to Christianity, there are other historical developments, which are uniquely European 
or at least unfolded their strongest influence in Europe, namely, Greek-Roman antiquity, the 
divitle between the different Christian confessions, the invention of nationality, of science, the 
early reception of Roman Law and ali the ensuing developments, tike the split between religious 
and worldly power, the state, capitalism, and enlightenmenı. Ali this, he concludes, put Europe on 
a world-historical "Sonderweg", which enabled it to indeed spread its legislation and out-pace 
other cultures, which were 'as fruitful and important', but unfortunately not able to stand war and 
competition (cf. \Vehler, Sept.2002; Winkler Feb. 2003). 
Nevertheless, he asks in the next paragraph whether these common historical experiences 
of the European countries stili are of importance today, and whether we stili have a consciousness 
for 'our common history of suffering, sacrifice and change', or if it is detached from us today and 
its legacy readily transferable into other parts of the world, so as to be fitted into other societies 
'like an artificial hip in-to the body' (cf. Öztürk, March 2003). He answer this question by using 
the concept of ' post-historical societies' of Fukuyama, which are steered by the 'same scientific, 
technical, organisational , economic processes' worldwide, so that the '-belonging' ("das 
Herkommen") does almost have no meaning anymore. 'In opposition, the long-term oriented 
peculiarity is levelled-down ["planiert"] and undermined ["ausgehöhlt"] everywhere. No, 1 cannot 
see' , he concludes pessimistically, ' that in this Europe the historic traditions, including their 
respectively particular way to cope with new demands, are stili living. What is worked out in this 
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history ' has become ' teachable and leamable', ' it has become transferable within the scope of the 
EU accession criteria-' 
Because this peculiari-ty of European tradition does not live anymore, it makes no 
difference whether Turkey will be included or not: 'Democracy and citizen-responsiveness' 
("Bürgemahe") ' cannot be obtained by the EU anyway' .and the ' idea of an unification towards an 
European society is utopian '. Having said this, he discusses the possible repercussions of Turkish 
Accession in the Iight of political cooperation, the ' deepening' of structures anda potential future 
establishment ofa federation ("Bundesstaat") (cf.. Wehler Dec 2002, Kramer 2003). It will be 
more difficult with Turkey, because then 'Europe would be apart of the Near East', would have 
to cope directly wrth American oil interests and had to make the interest of the Turkish states in 
Asia to its own. 'A Europe with Turkey' thus would have to engage in world politics and with a 
look on the aggressive American foreign poiicy, it maybe even ' has to - and should - take this 
risk' (cf. Gumpel 2004). However, as a result from world political engagement, such a Europe 
would have to spend enormous resources on foreign -policy, ' maybe financed by a, at Ieast 
temporary reduction of the welfare state' _ Such an Europe would also have to deal with situation 
in its interior which cannot be grasped ' by the harmless EU accession criteria'. Finally, he states, 
that it wi ll be in any case difficult fo r Europe to by-pass 'the fundamental changes of this time' 
and to further live calmly in the 'wind-shadow' of the US. 
This pessimistic fin -de-siecle cosmopolitanism of Christian Meier one could conclude 
puts together the strands of Civilisation and Kultur in a qu ite un ique way, which reminds strongly 
on the ' cultural pessimism' of the Frankfurter School. Politics and its roots in culture is 
accordingly seen as being devalued , on the one hand by the history of racism and nationalism and 
on the other, by the globally spreading, impersonal and organisational system of technocratic 
economics, which levers-down historical differences so as to maximise efficiency (cf. 
Vertovec/Cohen 2001 , pp.99). 
Politics and collective identity based on the emphasis of differences towards other 
collectives, as the fırst part of the argument states, was ali too often abused as an ideological 
instrument to legitimise exploitation and domination. However, ' in reality' there are no 
differences between political communities or peoples, because, after ali it always boils down to 
the same materialistic problems ofthe individual, namely 'how to !ive a life which pays off best', 
whereby politics is only a means of some (national) entrepreneurs to monopol ise power through 
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exclusion, who thus contra-productively maximise their profits by creating 'second-class' people, 
that are victimised so as to legitimatel_y- rob them of their property or exploit them. This 
argumentation then, one could say, -leads to the ideal of an ' administered world' (Horkheimer 
1994, pp. 170), which is essentially based on a (liberal) economical ideology that values 
difference only on the narrow-minded but 'true' hasis of cost-utility calculations, thereby treating 
politics and eulture as mere, irrational sources of collectively legitimised contra-productivity and 
inefficiency in the form of exploitation, war or a welfares state (which is only another form ofa 
collectively legitimised robbery: The elite of successful, efficient producers gets robbed by the 
inefficient, lazy parasites), ete. That is why individuals have to detach themselves from their 
cultural-historical belonging, have to refrain from politics and its irrational, totalising and 
difference-creating definitions ofa common good and instead should develop an ' instrumental 
reason', which does not ask- 'the last but unanswerable questions of how to live a good life' 
anymore, but instead focuses on concrete, technical questions of how to raise personal or 
collective efficiency (cf. Gmünder 1985, pp. 39). The only problem of the individual 
entrepreneur then is how he can most efficiently explo it himself and meet the demands on him, so 
as to raise his profits on the all-embracing market. However, in order to make this liberal 
individualistic-ideology work, that is to endow it with moral supremacy over its collectivistic 
cultural-political counterpart, it puts a veil of ignorance on the historically widening socio-
economic fault-line between social groups and their different access to economical power. While 
it plays down ıhe cultural history of the collective, which di stinguishes it from other collectives, it 
is essentially build on the history of capital that is the hereditary, dynastical accumulation of 
weal-th within the group ofa globally acting money-aristocracy, and enables as well as legitimises 
the world-wide robbery of the undistinguished multiplicity of the individualised, i.e. victimised 
poor (cf. Pieterse-2001 , Amin 2004). in the end, one could conclude we end up again in the realm 
of politics and exdusion. 
This dilemma between a globally-spanning, capitalist civilisation build on instrumental 
individuality and a discriminatory and exclusivist cultural relativism, the either-or they seem to 
propose, is the source for Christian Meier' s pessimism. By applying this reflective pessimism, 
however, he creates a fatalist balance in between them, the distanced cosmopolitan perspective of 
an academician, who unlike Wehler or Benhabib, does not want to chose one of these ' rotten 
fortresses ', does not want to decide whether Turkey should join or not. He does not want to enter 
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politics and decide between these two forms of evi!, so as to rescue his impartiality his individual 
'third-way' ~ which is embedded in a reflective but des-illusionist 'anything goes', marked by his 
frequent combination of the words 'maybe', 'could', 'would' with the word 'anyway' 
['~so.wieso"]. Instead of choosing between the castles, one could thus conclude, that he prefers the 
melancholy loneliness ofa hermit, who lives in his tent out there in the desert far away from any 
e-ivilisation or culture, because only there, in his denial, he can be morally consistent with 
himse!f, only there he can be an individual. Nevertheless, within his individual and pessimistic 
cosmopolitanism be reproduces both, the cultural operation of creating distance to the other (in 
his version he does so individualistically), and the civilisational operation of assuming an 
universal truth (in his version pessimistically). 
The preceding, metaphorical depiction of Meier as hermit can additiona!ly serve at this 
point as a transition to a more explicit discussion of religion within the German debate about 
Turkish EU accession. The framework of religion is thereby often build on the questions, of how 
Christian Europe or the EU is, how Islamic Turkey is, and whether religion in general can serve 
as an argument pro or contra accession. 
The former Catholic Cardinal Ratzinger, argues in favour of a Catholic Europe, in his 
article, 'On the search for peace' , published in the Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, in June 2004. 
The cultural and political foundation of Europe, he states, is a ' direct product of Christian 
thought'. This is apparent for example in the establishment of the European Union, as it was done 
by the catholic founding fathers (Schuman and Adenauer): ' They took their moralistic idea of the 
state, law, of peace and responsibility from their Christian belief, after it passed the test of 
Enlightenment and purified it self against partial distortion of law and moral. They did not want 
to create a religious state, but a state that was forrned by moralistic reason, and their belief helped 
them to re-erect this reason, which suffered so much under ideological tyranny.'(cf. Huber 2004) 
With this statement he obviously tries to use the debate to re-introduce Catholicism as a 
cultural important feature of European identity. The secularised reason is, according to this quote 
a civilisational progress, but, without a moral content, which is embodied in religion , it is empty. 
Only the moralistic, Christian reason leads the people to peace and responsibility (cf. Kuschel 
2004 ). He opposes this statement, furthermore with the counterparts of pathologic religion - as it 
exists 'far away within Turkey' - and pathologic reason, which develops its destroying effect on 
society especially in the West: 'Reason, which liberates itself from god [ .. . ] loses its orientation 
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and opens thereby the door for the forces of destruction ' . Religion and reason thus (must) come 
together in Europe, and to defend Europe means to fight against wrong and dangerous world 
orders and pathological beliefs. Like Meier, he thus creates a cosmopolitan operation, which is 
both, civilisational and cultural , exactly by distancing itself from both: It is distinguished from the 
impersonal pathological reason of western civilisation, as well as it is not a pathological belief 
like it exist in Turkey and the rest of the Islamic civilisation. The core of Europe is instead 
marked by a cosmopolitan Catholicism, which unifies universal reason and universal belief in its 
unique culture. He thus adds the item of cultural uniqueness so as to define a way in between the 
civilisational pathologies of universal reason, and universal belief. This Catholic 
Cosmopolitanism is thus both secularised, but still reI-igious, as well as it is culturally limited, but 
simultaneously can be universally extended, by spreading Catholicism, by making the world 
'European ' in form of spreading its true core, by implanting it, so to say, not artificially into the 
body of other cultures, but supernaturally into the body of other civilisations. Thus in opposition 
to Meier 's reflective, individualised and passive civilisational cosmopolitanism, which wants to 
be neither Kultur nor Civilisation (but in the end creates a civilised, rational and detached 
individual), Ratzinger defınes a version , which wants to unify both, civilisation and Kultur within 
the ideal core of Catholici sm. Accordingly, one could claim that he opposes the reflective, 
passive and individualist cosmopolitanism of Meier, wi th an activist, aggressive and collectivist 
cultural cosmopolitanism, whose ideal figure would consequently not be the lonely hermit in the 
desert, living forever alone in his tent, but instead the engaging missionary in the jungle, who 
builds monasteries and churches and converts the lost souls so as to found a future family with 
them. He ends up thus by defining a potentially, tyrannical ideology ofa civilising culture (cf. 
Fach 2004). 
Armin Adam, a private docent at the Geschwister-Scholl lnstitute for Political Science 
(Munich), argues against such a version of an essentially Christian Europe, in his article: 'The 
normative core. Is it possible to create an idea of Europe which does not counterfeit its religious 
history?', published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung (centre-left, 20.12.2002). He states in his 
introduction, that the debate on Turkish Accession serves primary to identify the 'normative core' 
of Europe, which is defined as consisting of democracy and human rights (cf. Diner Dec 2002). 
However, the background of this core is frequently an assumed Christian essence of human rights 
and democracy in Europe, which serves ' for many' as the primary reason to exclude an Islamic 
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society. The discussion on the 'secular norms' thus only veils 'the politico-theological zeal of this 
combat', because after ali 'such a zeal is actually not allowed within a secular Europe'(cf. Birand, 
Nov 2002). 
Yet, despite this zeal, it remains true, that the idea of an 'unified Europe' is nota Christian 
idea. In opposition, the idea of Europe is based on 'pushing back religion'. 'The taming of 
confessional conflicts: This is the core of the European state-system ', how it was developed 'on 
the devastated field, which the confessional wars left over'. 'Europe and the idea of Europe is 
developed by humanists and not by theologists', and 'indeed', he states, the 'fading-out of 
religion is the precondition for Europe.' Thus, 'if one wants to fiil the term with a normative 
meaning, then one would rather have to define Europe as a space for peace ["Friedensraum"], 
which is determined by communication' and revitalized through the 'experience of two world 
wars and the memory of totalising tyrannies that were concealed by quasi-religious symbolism'. 
Nevertheless, to assert that the core of an Europe identity is in consequence to be found in 
its secularism can equally provide no satisfactory answer, since, ' the claim of secularisation, and 
connected with it the claim of political enlightenment, is in itself highly questionable ' (cf. 
Horkheimer/Adomo, 2002). It is neither enough to emphasis on the ' pre-eminence of the rule of 
law in defıning the relation between state and religion, nor on the pretension ["Schein"] of 
secularity and laicism within exactly this rule of law'. Thus, ' the one who speaks of Europe, must 
undoubtedly also mention the Catholicism of Spain, Italy, Austria and Ireland and the 
Protestantism ofthe Scandinavian states and the Netherlands.'(cf. Tobin April 2003,) 
'Europe is a paradoxical continent', he summarises this condition, and the oxymoron-like 
defınition of Europe within the debate on Turkey, which emphasises equally on the Christian core 
of Europe and on secularisation as the core of European identity, seems to be a consequence of 
this. However, Adam rejects this unsatisfactory conclusion, by stating that the driving force 
behind European integration was neither Christianity nor secularisation, but the experience of the 
devastation in the two world wars and the identification of the East-West-divide (cf. Kocka, Nov. 
2002). This identifying Cold War divide was until today the major source of distinction between 
good and evil and the ' interpretation of human rights' served thereby as the key 'hermeneutical 
instrument' in establishing this difference between West and East, between Europe - 'and the US 
belonging to it in a normative sense' - and the oriental despotism of Asia (cf. Said 2003). But 
then he again asks, whether one can perceive human rights as a tool that was initially originating 
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from Christian thought and only subsequently transferred into the East-West distinction. And 
again, he rejects this interpretation, by stating that already a 'short look into the history of hum an 
rights reveais' its rooting ' in an absolute heathen contract theory, in a renaissance of stoic natura! 
law, in a re-d iscovery of individual dignity and in the struggle against the political power of the 
church(es)'(cf. Kuschel 2004, Huber May 2004). 
Christianity thus can not serve as a framework for the discussion of the normative core of 
Europe and whether or not it allows an accession of Turkey to the EU. It makes more sense to 
understand this discussion within the framework 'of what we cali Westem culture And, in case 
one wants to define secularisation and the laic division between state and religion as an essential 
part of an 'European political culture' , then Turkey would undoubtedly qualify more easily for 
membership, 'as the United Kingdom, where the prime-minister appoints the archbishop' , oı 
'Germany with its intertwinement of state and church.'. 
However, he effectively ruled out this reading of the problem before, by asserting that 
European integration is not based on Christianity or secularisation, but on the ideal of continental 
pacification after the great wars and unity vis-a-vis the despotic, communist Orient. The 
nomrntive core of Europe, Human Rights and democracy, thus should not be understood as 
originating from Chri stianity, but instead from a heathen culture and its humanist contract theory 
of society, like it prevailed in Western culture and set itself offagainst its negative of the heathen 
culture, how it prevailed in the non-West. Christianity or secularisation accordingly cannot serve 
as an frame for arguments pro or contra Turkish accession, instead Western culture and its unique 
way of structuring the relationship between state and church moves in its place. Consequently, 
Adam does not say anything compulsory over Turkish accession but just switches frames by 
substituting Western culture for Ratzinger' s concept of Christian culture. Nevertheless, his 
reflections on Orientalism prevent him from being a naive proponent ofa Westem culture and 
one could at least not rule aut that his normative core can be found in non-European heathen 
traditions as well, in case one can leave the simplifying identification of West-East behind. 
in fact he remains in between, un-decided like Meier, distancing himself from the debate 
by means of an elaborate contribution, that does not trigger any conclusions. in so doing, he 
succeeds in remaining a free, reflective individual, that neither supports the ideology of 
Christianity, nor the one of Westem culture. Like Meier's, so does alsa his debate contribution 
primary serve the endeavour to wash his hands in innocents, to refrain from being part of identity 
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politics, so as to create the morally superior identity of the ideologically, culturally, religiously 
distanced cosmopolite. After ali , we could conclude that the lonely desert of the hermit is getting 
crowded, that it is situated in an hinterland -of culture/civilisation and that the anti-culture of 
academicians who want to get out of historicism, ideology, politics, cannot do without it: Their 
' new' desert-culture, will have to institutionalise itself and compete för the donations made by the 
people from the city or farmland , on which this hinterland is depending, donations, however, 
which are made because of bad-consciousness, adoration or pity. A solution then could be - if 
one does not want to play the prophet iike Wehler and- go into the city to preach the ideal 
communitarian life of the countryside, or to go like Benhabib to the farmland to liberate the 
people there from their narrow-mindedness - a solution could equally be, to even move further 
into the desert, so as to regain individuality and-avoid competition.In any case one has to distance 
oneself from an identity, which after all is not that distanced as it claims to be. 
The last debate-contribution analysed will thus be the article by Heinz-Kramer published 
as part of a study of the 'Institute for Science and Politics' in Berlin (Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Poli tik, SWP). He is the leader of the institute' s research group on external relations of the EU 
and his article: EU-compatible or not? About the debate on Turki sh membership in the European 
Union' was publi shed by the institute in August 2003. 
He starts of by setting the frame of the debate in between the Copenhagen Summit 2002, 
the Euro-elections in the spring of 2004 and the Thessalonica Summit in December 2004, where 
the Council 'wants to decide whether or not one can start negotiation with Ankara'. Then he 
limits the scope of his analysis, by asserting, that it will focus on the quaiity of the articulated 
arguments and set them into a broader frame, but that it is not meant to ' decide in one or the other 
direction' Instead, it is intended to ' put the debate on a more rational hasis, so as to -enhance 
further discussion ' 
The conclusion from his analysis are, first, that the debate is ' a remake ["Neuauflage"] of 
a century-old argument ' and 'except of some actualisation of <lata', it is essentially discussed with 
arguments already known (BurgdorfJan. 2004). 
Secondly, it shows, that the arguments against EU accessıon of Turkey, which are 
concemed with the danger ofa ' loss of European identity' and the ensuing ' end of the European 
project ', are theoretically and empirically inadequately founded and accordingly not suitable to 
serve asa reason for exclusion (cf. Winkler Nov 2002, Meier Feb 2003 , Wehler Dec 2003). This 
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ıs because the 'European project ıs much more complex and contested than these debate 
contributions suggest'(cf. Delanty/Rumfoı:d 2005, pp. 181). Until now, however,_ it is 'neither 
analytically nor politically defined in such a precise way that it would-be feasible to adequately 
evaluate Turkish membership'. And also the 'cultural fault-line' that would be crossed by an 
accession of Turkey can accordingly not öe defıned precisely, 'un:less it will be defined as 
religious delimitation against Islamic states aı:ı-d societies'(cf. Wehler Dec 200T, Winkler Feb 
2002, Birand, Dec 2002, Senocak Jan 2003). 
Thirdly, he focuses on the socio-economic frame and concludes, that the 'expected high 
social and economical costs are the result of status.-quo projections, which are based on so 
unrealistic and uncertain as-sumptiorrs, that they cannot lead to compulsory results.' At the present 
moment 'no honest cost-evaluation ofa Turkish- EU membership' is possible, since 'it lies so far 
in the future (approx. 2012)', and therefore 'ali the relevant costs-factors can be politically 
influenced and thus be steered by the EU'. Nevertheless, 'the more Turkey catches-up to the EU, 
the less problems a membership would cause'(cf. Hermann 2004 b) 
ln his-fıfth paragraph he concludes his evaluation of the contra arguments, by stating that 
one can hardly use those 'unsound' arguments, to legitimise the abandonment of forty years of 
EU policy concerning Turkey. However, concerning_ the pro-side of the debate, he asserts, that 
'also the arguments in favour of Turkish accession are not convincing', because ' they cannot 
exclude the possibility that the potential advantages of accession can also be obtained without 
Turkish membership'. The most convincing ar_gument is,_ in his view, tbat is why the one, which 
highlights the already accomplished positive influence of EU integration policy on the democratic 
modemisation of Turkey and the ensuing chances for stability for Turkey and the EU. '(cf. Jahner 
Dec 2004, Özdemir June 2003). 
However, a rejection of Turkey would, 'almost certainly', not 'destabilise' the country and 
surrender it to ' Islamism ', instead the 'state-controlled democracy based on the national-
Kemalistic fundament ' will probably continue (cf. Seufert, Aug. 2002). Even a 'total turn away' 
from Europe is not likely to happen, since the 'politically and economically un-attractive 
altematives' would increase the costs of such an endeavour enormously (cf. Belge, 2004). Finally, 
he states, that a Turkey which is critically distanced but connected to Europe will also not cause 
'unbridgeable problems for the establishment ofa foreign and security policy (cf. Keyder 2004). 
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The same is true for the arguments conceming.the economic advantages. They are equally 
not verified, since the are basically already accomplished thr-ough the customs union with Turkey 
(cf. Tordjman Dec. 2002, Rogowsh June 2004). Tne deepening of economic relations, as well as 
energy trade, is sirnilarly not 'depending on membership in a strictly direct sense.' (cf. Öger Nov. 
2002). 
He then concentrates ın the following paragraphs more on arguments conceming the 
background of the debate, which is, according to him the question about the political aim of the 
Union. What this aim should be, however, is ' highly contested between the Member States' and 
he states further, that accordingly, ' there exists no compelling need' to decide now ' where the 
borders of the Union· should be situated, 'as long as it is left undecided how much independent 
state-ness ("Staatlichkeit"] the EU finally should obtain '. In case of Turkey, it thus ' should be left 
to the politica! decision-makers', which factors they, at the moment, perceive as more important 
than others. Thereby, he warns, it must be clear, that ' Europe would lock itself into its history' , 
when one 'declares its historically grown culture to the yardstick for an European self-
understanding' and not its ' political principles of democracy, human ri ghts and laicism ' . This 
could lead to the danger, that in the present 'a highly threatening outside will be created by 
Europe' (cf. Winkler Sep. 2002 & Feb. 2003; Siemons, Dec. 2002). 
Conceming the argument of an overstretch of the political institutions of the EU in case it 
had to absorb Turkey, he states, that the recent Eastern Enlargement causes 'much greater 
political, economical and hi stocical-cultural heterogeneity' and the already resulting paralys is of 
the decision-making process must be reformed with or without Turkish membership. However, if 
a reform successfully solves the problem of heterogeneity in a Union of 27 states, ' then a 28. state 
can certainly be integrated as well ' (cf. Thumann Dec 2002, Wehler Dec 2003, Winkler Nov 
2002). 
Nevertheless, in case this membership is not wanted, then one has to provide a convincing 
political reason for the abandonment of 40 years of EU policy towards Turkey, which always had 
the aim of final membership (cf. Schmidt Nov 2002, Wehler Dec 2003). This, however, will be 
hard to achieve, especially since the !ast thirty years were highly successful in furthering Turkey' s 
ability to join the EU (von Kyaw, March 2003). In face of this development, he asks: 'Which 
effect on the Union ' s intemational reputation would result from an open confession that Turkey 
was deceived about the true motivations of the EU states ali this years?' . And how would the 
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Union 'cope with the accusation, that it, vis-a-vis Turkey and aut of political opportunism ignores 
its obligations unde.r intemational law? ' (cf. Ünal Dec 2002). On the other hand, he asserts that 'a 
general hange of political direction cannot be ruled-out apriori' , only, it must be 'politically and 
juristica:ly well-founded' and this change additionally would have to be accompanied by a 
'trustworthy, new policy towards Turkey, which is more than the abandonment of the former' (cf. 
Winkier Sept 2002} 
Kramer makes this point more explicit, by referring to the proponents of a 'privileged 
partnership' who, according to him,_ignore the fact, that Turkey already possesses this privileged 
partnership (which only a 'few other non-EU states enjoy'), in form of the customs union and the 
institutionalised 'intensive political dialogue' with many EU institutions' (Sen, Nov 2002). 
Nevertheless, the Association Agreement could be a framework far the further intensification of 
cooperation, without integrating Turkey completely, which is, though, a possibility, that does not 
p-lay a role, 'neither far Ankara nar the EU, since here and there the problem is solely recognised 
from aut the perspective ofthe accession question' 5• 
To shorten things here, I will summari se Kramer' s additional points as follows : Turkish 
accession is, according to him not necessary, so as to prove ' the mu!ti-culturalism of the EU' , as 
well as it is not necessary in order to prove the Union ' s friendship to and engagement with 
political entities from other cultural background (as long as a rejection of Turkey is not 
Jegitimised by pointing to its Islamic character) (cf. Afra Oct. 2002; Prantl, May 2004). it is 
furthermore not indispensable far the improvement of the Union' s stance in world politics: an 
optimisation of existing resources would suffice, although, he states, that Turkey' s potential in 
respect to its security and military capabilities could certainly facilitate the Union's strive to 
assume a ro le as global actor (cf. Schmidt Dec 2002, Diner Dec 2002, Steinbach 2000). 
After this evaluation, he concludes by stating, that ali arguments, whether pro or contra 
Turkish accession, can be matched by objections, so that in the end there 'cannot be an 
objectively right answer'. Accordingly, the decision has to be formulated and legitimised within 
the political process. it is thus the task of the decision-makers to assert the reasons to which they 
attach more importance than to others, they have to decide 'whether Turkish accession really 
means the end to the European Union, or whether the stability-political risks resulting from a 
5 
cf Schauble, Interview in ZDF Morgenmagazin, available: 
http://www.c:lucsu.de/section_ 2/subsection _ 3/id _ 811 /Meldungen.aspx 
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withdrawal of the accession perspective, and especially the chances, which were gıven away 
throu_gh sıIGh a retreat, weigh much heavier than the risk of an instituti-0nal overstretch of the EU'. 
As fo the case of Adam, this concluding remark, cannot really convince, since one could 
.ask how a responsible decision can be asserted by the decision-makers, when there is obviously 
no single valid reason for or against Turkish accession? This refers to the basic dilemma of 
politics that naturally no-one will know the future , but that on the other hand an objective 
evaluation ofa historic development is impossible as well, because we cannot grasp it totally and 
always must select some features, which, arbitrarily taken out of their context cannot inform 
sound politics, but must stay a prejudiced selection, which furthermore does not say in any way 
that the future will be like this. This, we could accordingly conclude necessarily leads to the 
fatal-ism, that any debate on complex political questions will be fought with 'old arguments' and 
unsound ' projections of the status quo' into the future . What remains then, is the danger that 
politics is locked into the present and the only valid yardstick fora decision is, what appears to be 
political opportune right at the moment, whereby concrete principles or a concrete hi story are so 
flexible as to legitimise whatever policy choice. Sustainable development and responsible politics 
thus is ruled out in favour of ' positivist ' and technocratic management of the status quo or 
opportun istic populism, and hence the threat emerges that history will be forgotten , that principles 
will be abused and a dangerous future wi ll be created. 
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Conclusion 
The discursive frame of the German debate thus can be understood as being constructed among 
the opposing camps of civilisation and its inclusive idea of widening the core, of the logic of 
Kultur, which instead emphasises on the closure of the EU so as to maintain and deepen its 
unique modes of social organisation, and a cosmopolitanism, which emphasises on the 
complexity of social reality and in so doing does not trigger any conclusions drawn from the past 
and decisions directed towards the future, but instead confines itself to a supposedly reflexive 
analysis of the present. 
However, in order to preserve a meaning, i.e. a history anda future , Wehler and especially 
Winkler try to argue in favour ofa ' deep European Union ', which is build on a (more or less) 
homogenous society, with a common identity and delimited by an exclusive, ' ethnicised ' cultural 
history. They argue fora direct, anti-elite, but ' majoritarian' democracy within the EU, in which, 
ideally, the general wi ll decides and not a representative elite (cf. Satori 1992, pp. 241). This 
normative model is based on the idea of a collectively homogenous body of individuals (i .e. 
citizen), who, however, do not have to speak with one voice, because the winner of whatever 
electoral process, i.e. the majority, is not distinguished from the losers (in a normative sense): 
This is because winners and losers principally share the historically, culturally derived 
homogenous and pre-political set of ideals, and the winners thus will not be willing (or better: 
able) to abuse their won powers to the disadvantage of the defeated. Hence, this culturally derived 
'normative-egalitarian ethos' opens-up the political process for a legitimate, democratic 
competition for the final establishment of the most efficient way to put the commonsensical and 
unchanging norms and values in action, whereby it allows, even presupposes diverging opinions 
conceming the right means to reach the generally accepted ends. Nevertheless, it does not allow 
for diverging opinions about what the common good of society is and accordingiy discriminates 
against the outsider, the culturally (even individually) different, who follows another ideal. This is 
because without a common culture the common good would cease to be common and the political 
process would degenerate into a mechanism of domination, an inefficient and static zero-sum-
game between culturally separated interest groups, their ambitious leaders and their particular 
ideologies. 
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However, this is not a suitable way to understand the complex democracy in a plüralist, 
i.e. politically, occupationally and culturally segmented, modem and individualistic society, and-
especially not fora political entity like the EU. Benhabib and the proponents of the civilisational 
approach, define accordingiy a different ideal of democracy, which allows for diverging minority 
cultures and their particular visions of the common good. it is even a necessary precondition, so 
as to enable the pluralist society to strive for the best vision of the common good. The ideal core 
of such a society is thus not the illusionist assumption of a homogenous culturally derived and 
unchanging common good, but instead an deliberative ethos, which allows for the competition 
about a version of the common good, that fits the need of the society best to cope with future 
(common) problems, i.e. to reach a consensus over the most efficient norms and va-lues. This 
'positivist-egalitarian ethos ' consequently prevents the 'a priori ' exclusion of different versions 
of the good and thus allows for inclusion of ali kinds of peripheral minorities, which do not share 
the culture of the majority. In fact there is, ideally speaking, no majority, no general will, but only 
a generally accepted way of communication between ali kinds of minorities ( e.g. cultural, gender, 
ethnic, professional , confessional , political, ete) and their respective group-culture, so as to reach 
society 'at the end ' in an ideal consensus between the groups. However, this civilisational vision, 
presupposes thereby an unchanging and commonly accepted way of institutionalised 
communication, i.e. it transfers the culturalist assumption about the fixed ends towards the 
means: In order to prevent a degeneration of the political process into a static, counter-productive 
zero-sum-game, the minorities must be willing or forced to stick to the once established 
consensus. The resuit is a version, that, like its counterpart, the culturalist vision, presupposes a 
collectively homogenous body of individuals (i.e. citizen). However, unlike the-former, it is not 
rooted in a pre-political 'ethnicised' culture and egalitarian community, but in a political, 
civilisational-egalitarian communicative system. Accordingly one could claim, that it opens up 
the door for the ' a posteriori ' exploitation of the weaker, peripheral other, who cannot make 
himself heard within the deliberative process, but must accept its conclusions. The majority of 
socio-economic power thus replaces the majority of votes by determining political exclusion and 
exploitation, whereby only the order is changed. Now it is not exploitation through exclusion of 
the outsider, but exclusion through exploitation of the periphery. 6 
6 
cf. for example the French/English civilisational nationalism vis-a-vis the extemal majority of the colonised by an 
elite that defıned what is civilised and what not with the German culturalist imperialisrn vis-a-vis the intemal Jewish 
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In respeet to the debate on Turkey, we eould consequently claim that both, the 
argumentation against and in favour of Turkish aeeession are more or less diseursive deviees, 
whieh are meant to maintain certain stereotypes about European/German identity, so as to 
legitimise social , eeonomie-politieal power positions, the only diffürenee being, whether one 
excludes the other on basis of an ideological distorted, eulturalist version of eommunity (so as to 
vietimise and exploit it), or whether one exploits the other by an ideologieally distorted 
eivilisational version of communieation (so as to vietimise and exclude it). Both do this by 
establishing a symbolie boundary to an other (the different Turk, the xenophobie European, the 
nai"ve multi-eulturalist, ete), whieh allows to eonstruet a eertain sociat identity by emphasising of 
what it is not. Thereby they are able to make the imagination ofa group sa1ient (businessmen, 
historians, thus ali kinds of minorities, i.e. sub-groups) within a topie that eonneets with the life 
world of the represented group but simultaneously eonnects this group's identity with the 
imagined eolleetive of the soeiety (the ideal society of elite German/European historians, or 
multi-eulturalist business-women ete.) (ef. Zabusky 2000, p.127). Consequently, eivilisation and 
Kultur produee (as discursive devices) an European reality that represents and reassures the 
stereotypes of their elient-groups. They frame the topie in a eertain way that emphasises some 
aspeets of European/German soeiety, while simultaneously ignoring other aspeets. By 
representing their group stereotypes within the media, that is the broad publie debate, however, 
they try to transform the overall discursive self-pereeption of the German soeiety, depending on 
their stanee, toward a conservative, more defensive and exclusive identity, based on eultural 
unlqueness (Kultur) , or towards a more liberal, offensive and inclusive identity, based on a 
eivilisational universality (eivilisation). 
The imagined community of Turkey and the imagined 'individual ' Turk, thereby serve in 
any ease as the 'significant other' against or with whom speeific groups in Germany identify 
themselves, against whieh the historieist either-or is projeeted. Within the Kultur approaeh 
Turkey is pereeived as a different historieal being with no (or at least an own) future, and 
aeeordingly it must be excluded from the EU, so as to keep it pure an guarantee a future for the 
insiders (or even the own future ofa pure Turkey). In the eivilisational logie, on the other hand, 
Turkey is ereated as a historieally different but eonneeted being, and it is the responsibility of the 
minority, which was formulated by a majority that defıned what is German and what not. 
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EU to support the Turks to have a future within the EU, whereby the EU will simultaneously 
profit from such an inclusion or at least not be harmed, whereas exclusion of Turkey would-make 
the future for the EU dangerous, even impossible. 
The cosmopolitan logic does - in 0pposition to those logics - emphasize on a future 
objective nor on a historic origin, instead it presupposes an eternal present, to 'reveal' how future 
and history get constructed by a Civilisational or Kultur operatioı:ı, so as to legitimize the creati.on 
of another. it accordingly does not propose any action (informed by history and aimed- at the 
future), but retlection on the self and on the other and how this oppositional device is used to 
create past and future and legitimise power positions within society. ldeally speaking, it thus 
neither focuses on the origin of society (continuity), nor on the (new) direction it has to take, -that 
is continuity/change in time, but instead focuses on how it constructs a present reality, i.e. 
extension in space. it can thereby analyse how individual power intluences social structures and 
the other way round . But it cannot explain, why these structures change at a certain time and a re-
distribution of power results from that. S-imilarly it cannot explain why structures are stable and 
work over time as channels for the distribution of power. Instead it only delivers a picture of a 
moment, produces an individuali sed artefact, which is without history, without future and thus 
meaningless, because objectifıed , unchangeable, inhuman. It thereby prevents the emergence of 
an ideological synthesis tike it results from the Kultur logic, which is build on the premise: It is 
what it was. And equally it prevents the emergence of the ideological synthesis of the 
civilisational logic, claiming that it is what it will be. Instead however it produces an ideology of 
even more absolute character: It is what it is, thereby precluding the possibility of change, 
rendering ali nonnative speculation useless and proposing thus a fatalist state of an absolu!e 
detached individuality. 
This is as true and untrue as the other two logics. However, the question here, is not about 
truth, the question is, fınally how to come to a good decision in the case of Turkish accession but 
also more in general within politics. We have seen, that it is logically impossible to prevent the 
emergence of ideological or stereotypical knowledge about a political problem . This is, as it was 
claimed in the fonner section, because every knowledge (i.e. communication) is necessarily based 
on the use of language and thereby must rely on its implicit historicist and collectivist character 
and its inherent and indispensable quality to simplify and discriminate. Language, in that way, can 
be understood as a system of demarcation that enables the social being to differentiate between 
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certain notions, to determine what they express and what not, whereby these notions constitute 
each other in varying levels of difference, ranging from the same, over sim~far to different and 
contrary (Graumann; 1999). 
However, language thereby ıs not an unhistorical ,_ .neut-raJ tool (as cosmopolitanism 
suggests), which enables the individual to distribute meaning according to its own gusto. In 
opposition, it transports models of meaning which were invested into the language before the 
individual uses it, and by leaming the lan_guage, the individual gets educated according to the 
collective model of meaning and leams thereby to perceive its self and its environment in a 
certain way ( cf. Hofstede 1991 , pp. 169). 
This defınition , nevertheless, must be extended by an introduetion of a dynamic 
dimension, which emerges exactly thro-ugh the fact that the carrier of collective knowledge, 
language and other forms of cultural practices, get reproduced from generation to generation, 
from group to group, by different sub-groups and individuals, and this reproduction, opens the 
door for changes in meaning and transformation or even destruction of knowledge: As words can 
be forgotten, or change thei r meaning over time and new words are introduced, so can also 
communicative practices, as fo r example, symbols, rituals, ete, lose their meaning, change it or 
pave way for new practices to come. (Luckmann & Berger 1990, p.50). 
The tension between stabi-lity and change within la nguage and communicati ve practices in 
general, the hi story of language so to say, results from the tension between first, adjustment of a 
(co llective) language to the specifıc life-world of the individual that uses them and, second, the 
adjustment of the individual life-world to the (collective) language used: First, individuals adopt a 
different language depending on the context in which they speak. They will (consciously or 
unconsciously) speak differently at home than on work, differently when they talk to members of 
a another group, they use other words when they communicate with people from a different age, 
use another language when they are abroad, ete. This is done in order to enable the individual to 
communicate with others, so as to extent and vary the own language and adjust it to other 
circumstances and the confrontation with other life-worlds (the civilisational mode). 
At the same instant, and secondly, however, they try (consciously or not) to stabilise their 
language so as to prevent dis-orientation and contradictions in meaning. Then they use language 
not as a tool to communicate but instead to prevent communication with others: Youngsters use a 
language that cannot be understood by elders, technicians have a different code that distinguishes 
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them from non-insiders, families attach certain meanings to expressions that make no sense for 
non-family members, ete. In other words, the different group-language distinguishes the 
-individual life-world from others. This happens through more intensive communication with 
certain li fe-worlds than with others, due to-approximate development of those life-worlds but also 
through deliberate exclusion of outsiders so has to forge a common and stable life-world (the 
cultural mode). 
A connection between both modes of language use could be described as the 
civilisational-cultural mode, namely the one that is stabilising non-communication vis-a-vis other 
life-worlds, without however preventing the inclusion of individual life worlds into it. This can be 
found in usages of Ianguage that increase their spectrum, whereby this can be done ( conscious or 
not) in form of aggressive communication from out the inside, by forcing others to learn your 
language in order to communicate with you. üne the other hand, this interaction can be based on 
(conscious or unconscious) mimetical adoption of the inside language by outside groups or 
individuals, for example by using fashionable words from a certain slang or Anglicisms (cf. 
White 2000, p.68}. 
This leads to another aspect ofa language game, namely the spontaneous re-definition of 
language within a public of private speech situation. This can be understood as the creation of 
new lingujstic proximity within the communicative contact between two individuals, who act and 
re-act to each others statements. Thereby they create through mis-understanding new ways for 
understanding, and through understanding, new ways for distinction, whereby these possibilities 
can only be created on the basis of a new, common language, that is distinct from their former 
separated- languages. This can be found, for example, within dialogue situation, where two non-
native speakers use English to communicate, whereby this English they speak is a English that 
never would be spoken in a dialogue between native speakers. The same is true for 
communication between individuals of different groups (the cosmopolitan mode). 
Important to note in this respect is the difference between a concept of language, which 
allows for temporary shifts between the three ideal-types, and a concept of language, which is 
based on one of those, thereby proposing a pure cosmopolitan, pure cultural or civilisational 
mode. 
The pure cosmopolitan mode would presupposes a veil of ignorance on the cultural-
civilisational mode, i.e. it would only make sense in a pre-social and timeless communication of 
97 
two individuals whidı are neither social beings (embedded in separating social institutions) nor 
strive for the establishmenı ·of common social institutions, to be understood as communicative 
practices, which are binding for both and allow, in the form ofa synthesis, future development 
and present stabi!ity (i.e. construction of common communicative practices). It would thus only 
be feasible in a situation in which communication is essentially free but also unnecessary. The 
pure cultural-civilisational mode on the other hand ignores the relevance of spontaneous 
cosmopolitan dynamics, in the sense that it precludes individual confrontation within a 
communicative space that is not predetermined by the usual social setting of the individuals 
involved, but essentially open ended, a private, non-public communication, in which the usual 
commtmicative structures are broken up for a mutual re-defınition . The pure cultural-
civilisational mode would thus only make sense within an absolute social and historically pre-
determined communication of social beings, which are neither individuals nor strive for a 
dynamic and mutual re-defınition of separating social institutions, i.e. the establishment of 
communicative practices, which are open for both and allow, in form of thesis/antithesis, present 
development and future stability (i.e. deconstruction of traditional communicative practices). 
The synthesising concept of language, then can be perceived as the way in which humans 
indeed speak with each other, applying a language which is historically and group-specifıcally 
derived, which is furthermore individually spoken and reflects thereby the need to spontaneously 
define a distinction of oneself from an other, so as to secure one's own future. However, the 
_c.onfrontation with the other thereby makes it necessary to redefıne ali three aspects 
(history/future, self/other, language) to develop new distinctions and new inclusions, and a new 
language. That is why everything changes, (the own and the other history, the own/other self, the 
own/other future) , exactly in the moment when one engages in communication. 
The question thus is not so much whether Turkey should join the EU or not, whether the 
debate on this issue is ideological or not, whether Wehler is right, or Benhabib, or Kramer. The 
most important point is the increase of communicative engagement between individuals, the 
creation of more and more situations of communicative confrontation, which already took and 
stili is taking place under the umbrella of (real or imagined) entities like Europe, Turkey, the EU. 
In this respect then, the negotiations with Turkey are already a success-story because they caused 
the establishment of various communicative channels between formerly distinct individuals, and 
because they created much communicational confrontations between individuals within their 
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respective societies. For the future this means to intensify this communication, to have more 
debates about Turkey, EU, Europe ete and what they have to mean for the individual and its life-
world. Whether this happens with a Turkey within a European Union, is thereby not so important. 
it is important that it does happen. 
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4. Annex 
4.1. Hans Ulrich Wehler; Die türkische Frage. Europas Bürger müssen entscheiden. In: 
Frankfurter Allgemdne Zeitung, 19.12.2003 
Noch ein knappes Jahr, dann wird die Prüfungskommission der Europaischen Union feststellen , 
ob die Türkei die Beitrittskriterien erfüllt oder aber ihnen nicht gerecht wird. Je naher diese 
Vorentscheidung heranrückt, desto dringender wird die Klarung der damit verknüpften Probleme, 
desto schriller wird aber auch der Ton der Auseinandersetzung. Die Berliner Regierung hat sich 
inzwischen trotz ihrer jahrelang vorherrschenden Bedenken für die eindeutige Befürwortung des 
Beitritts entschieden. Ihr Drangen fallt zur Zeit so massiv aus, als ginge es bereits um die 
Abstimmung nach vollzogenen Beitrittsverhandlungen, obwohl doch die Hürde der Aufnahme-
Kriterien von der Türkei noch langst nicht genommen ist. 
Unstreitig verdient die Türkei Unterstützung und Mitgefühl nach den barbarischen 
Anschlagen vom November. Aber seit wann dienen Attentate als Empfehlung für die Aufnahme 
eines Staates in die EU? Kann man von einem Sicherheitsgewinn für die Bundesrepublik 
sprechen, wenn ein fundamentalistisch-islamistischer Untergrund, offenkundig bereit und fahig 
zur ,Action Directe', mit der Kooperation der Türkei ebenfalls in die EU aufgenommen würde? 
Anstatt den Bericht der Prüfungskommission abzuwarten und vorher mit der regierungsamtlichen 
Prajudizierung behutsam umzugehen, feuert eme populisti.sche Effekthascherei mit 
Schimpfworten wie charakterlos, herzlos, bedenkenlos die Kontroverse weiter an. Wie sieht aber 
der Argumen-tationshaushalt der ernsthaften Gründe für ein Pro oder Contra aus? 
Über die damals so genannte ,orientalische Frage', die Erosion des Osmanischen Reiches, 
urteilte Bismarck einmal, dass es einem Staat nicht anstehe, anders als nach MaBgabe seiner 
Interessen zu handeln. Entspricht es aber vitalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik, erst recht 
Europas, durch die Aufnahme eines nichteuropaischen, muslimischen GroBstaates der EU den 
TodesstoB zu versetzen? Entspricht es diesen Interessen, sich durch eine solche Fehlentscheidung 
zugleich auch aller triftigen Argumente zu begeben, die gegen die Aufnahme der Ukraine (die 
bereits 2011 als Wunschterrn in für ihren Beitritt forrnell beschlossen hat), W eiBrussland und 
Russlands selber, Moldawiens, Georgiens, aber auch Marokkos sprechen, dessen Beitrittsgesuch 
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ın Brüssel bereits vorliegt? Entspricht es diesen lnteressen, das faszinierende Projekt der 
europaischen Einigung gegen das verwasserte Linsengericht einer unrruillig aufgeblahten 
Freihandelszone von der Atlantikküste bis Wladiwostok einzutauschen? Entspricht es diesen 
lnteressen, nur ein halbes Jahr nach der Aufnahme der zehn neuen osteuropaischen EU-
Mitglieder, deren Zustand ohnehin eine extreme Anspannung aller Ressourcen der Union der 450 
Millionen erfordert, dem muslimischen Kleinasien das Tor zu Beitrittsverhandlungen zu öfföen , 
so dass der herannahende ,Overstretch ' bis zur ZerreiBprobe dramatisch _gesteigert wird? 
Entspricht es diesen Interessen , in einen genuine europaischen Staatenverein einen 
nichteuropaischen muslimischen Staat als gröBtes Mitglied zu kooptieren, das im Beitrittsjahr 90 
Millionen Einwohner zahlen, die gröBte Fraktion im StraBburger Parlament stellen, mit einer 
politischen Führungsrolle und finanziellen Sonderleistungen unvermeidlich liebaugeln würde? 
Mit einem solchen Interessenkalkül könnte man noch langer fortfahren , und durchweg 
fiele die Kosten-Nutzen-Abwagung gegen den türkischen Beitritt aus. Worum geht es im Kem 
der Sache? Sollen die Europaer als Folge einer verfehlten Politik von 1964 his 2002 ihre 
groBartige Zielutopie von einer nach innen und auBen handlungsfahi gen Union durch die Türkei-
Aufnahme sehenden Auges zerstören, sich von ail en Einheitshoffnungen apathi sch-res igniert 
verabschieden und mit der blassen Ersatzlösung einer Freihandelszone trösten? Offenkund ig 
soll te es durchschlagende Argumente geben, welche die EU zu einer derart selb-st-mörderischen 
Verzichtsleistung nötigten. Welche Gründe sind aber, bis die Prüfungskommission der EU 2004 
grünes oder rotes Licht gibt, bisher geltend gemacht worden? 
1. Durchweg wird zunachst das fo rmale Argument ıns Feld geführt, dass man die 
Grundlinie nicht mehr verlassen könne, die 1964 mit der Zusage, die Türkei a la longue in die 
Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft aufzunehmen, vorgezeichnet und dann im Dezember 1999 
in Helsinki, im Dezember 2002 in Kopenhagen emeut bekraftigt wu-rde. Überwaltigende 
Überzeugungskraft besitzt die Berufung auf solche Proklamationen freilich nicht. Seit den frühen 
sechziger Jahren hat die Türkei über fast vierzig Jahre keine nennenswerte Anstrengung 
untemommen, um europakompatibler zu werden. Wie bei einem über vier Jahrzehnte hinweg 
nicht honorierten Eheversprechen hatte man daher in Helsinki von einem Erlöschen der 
ursprünglichen Zusage ausgehen können. Überdies war diese ganz und gar ein Nebenprodukt des 
Kalten Krieges, der 1989/91 an sein Ende gekommen ist. Insofem ware eine Distanzierung auch 
die plausible Konsequenz einer neuen weltpolitischen Konstellation gewesen. Der angemahnten 
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Verpflichtung zur Dankbarkeit für geleistete Dienste bei der Eindammung der Sowjetunion war 
durch viele, viele Milliarden an amerikanischen und IWF-Zuwendungen Genüge getan worden. 
Die Chance eines klarenden Schnitts wurde in Helsinki jedoch verpasst, das Ergebnis war die 
schiefe Bahn nach Kopenhagen mit seinen radikal verkürzten Aufnahmekriterien. 
2. Durchweg ist, maBgeblich von amerikanischer Seite, wie etwa von Madeleine Albright 
in Helsinki, zugunsten der Türkei das geostrategische Argument vorgebracht worden, dass sie als 
zuverlassiger Stützpfeiler des Nato-Walls gegen die Sowjetunion fungiert habe, auBerdem bei 
künftigen Konflikten im Nahen üsten ein unentbehrlicher Allianzpartner sei. Beim ersten Irak-
Krieg wurde die Türkei den amerikanischen Erwartungen noch gerecht. Im zweiten Irak-Krieg 
erwies sich die neue islamistische Regierung, die gegen einen muslimischen Staat nicht zum 
zweiten Mal als Helfershelfer der amerikanischen Politik Krieg führen wollte, zur Enttauschung 
der Hegemonialmacht nicht willens oder imstande, über den Willen einer erdrückenden 
Bevölkerungsmehrheit hinwegzugehen und anı Krieg aktiv teilzunehmen. Wohl aber scheiterte 
der vom türkischen Militar anvisierte Einmarsch in den Nordirak, um die drohende kurdische 
Autonomie als Keimzelle eines befürchteten Kurdenstaates mit seiner Ausstrahlung auf 
vierundzwanzig Millionen Kurden - einschlieBlich der groBen kurdischen tviinderheit in der 
üsttürkei - mit Waffengewalt zu ersticken, nur anı amerikanischen Veto . Der zweite Irak-Krieg 
hat daher mit aller nur wünschenswerten Klarheit dementiert, dass die Türkei ein belastbarer 
strategischer Partner ist, zumindest solange die islamistische Mehrheitspartei regiert und -
wichtiger noch - sobald es gegen einen muslimischen Staat anzutreten gi lt. Um wen anders als um 
muslimische Staaten wird es aber bei künftigen Nahost-Konflikten gehen? 
3. Zweifellos anı tauglichsten ist das sympathische Argument, dass es ım 
woWverstandenen Eigeninteresse Europas liege, dem demokratischen Experiment in einem 
muslimischen Land wie der Türkei endlich zum Erfolg zu verhelfen. Bisher ist der Beweis für 
diese Koexistenz von religiöser und politischer Verfassung, nicht zuletzt wegen der hohen 
Barrieren in der islamischen Religionslehre, noch nirgendwo gelungen. Die Ausstrahlung eines 
positiven Ausgangs des türkischen Anlaufs reiche daher über den Nahen üsten und die arabische 
Welt hinaus, im Prinzip könnte sie global auf 1,2 Milliarden Muslime einwirken. Kann dieser 
mühselige Prozess aber nur im Gehause der EU von der Türkei erfolgversprechend fortgesetzt 
werden? So argumentieren seit langem die westlichen Funktionseliten des Landes, die ohne diese 
Yollintegration diese Aufgabe einer erfolgreichen Europaisierung aus eigener [nnovationskraft 
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offenbar mit tiefer Skepsis begegnen, welche durch die islamistische Welle in der Politik und im 
Alltag standig genahrt wird . Ihre Parteien sind von der islamistischen ,Gerechtigkeits-par:te-i' 
unlangst weggefegt worden, und es ist weiterhin ei"ne offene Frage, ob Erdogans Partei diese 
Fusion aus Erbakans , Wohlfahrtspartei.' und Pr-0testbewegung der anatolischen Peripherie gegen 
das kemalistische und urbane Zentrum, überhaupt auf Dauer für die beschleunigte Europaisierung 
des Landes streiten wird, wenn erst einmal wesentliche Parteiziele erreicht s!nd. Dazu gehören 
etwa die Zurückdrangung der anti-demokratischen Vetomacht des Militars, das aber auch als 
Hüter des sakularisierten Staates und der kemalistischen Prinzipien fungiert hat; dazu gehört die 
Durchbrechung eben dieser Prinzipien und Norrnen zugunsten. der islamistischen Alternative; 
dazu gehört auch der direkte Anschluss an das europaische Wirtschaftspotential , an die 
verlockenden SubventionsqueHen der EU, an das Auffangbecken för die türkische 
Westm igration . 
Kurzum : Kann das im Grunde auch durch den Charakter der Erdogan-Partei in Frage 
gestellte türkische Experiment mit der Demokratisierung eines muslimischen Landes nicht 
ebenso gut unterstützt werden, wenn die Türkei weiter aul3erhalb der EU bleibt, aber die 
hilfre ichen Vorzüge einer privilegierten Partnerschaft geniefü? Der geradezu neurotische Druck, 
Kleinasien endlich als "europaisch" anzuerkennen, verdrangt doch nur das fundamentale 
Problem, dass diese kompl izierte Transformation aus eigener Kraft erfolgen, und di e 
fund amentali stische Bewegung primar von endogenen Modernisiernngskraften gezahmt werden 
muss. Dazu sollte ausgerechnet die neue islami stische Mehrheitspartei nach ihrem spektakularen 
Triumph auf die Dauer bereit und fühi g sein? 
Überzeugend sind daher die wichtigsten Gesichtspunkte, die derzeit für einen Türkei-
Beitritt angeführt werden, mitnichten. Zehn Gegenargumente sollte man sich vielmehr in aller 
Kürze vergegenwartigen . 
l. Russland, Weil3russland und die Ukraine, erst recht die Türkei sind nie Bestandteile des 
historischen Europa gewesen. Sie sind nicht durch die Antike, das römische Recht, die 
Reformation, geschweige denn die Aufklarung, nicht durch das okzidentale Bürgertum mit seinen 
autonomen Bürgerstadten, durch den europaischen Adel , das europaische Bauemtum gepragt 
worden , auch wenn die Aufholjagd seit Peter dem Grol3en und Atatürk anhalt. Zugegeben: 
Europa ist auch eine historische, allerdings nur innerhalb enger Grenzen sich wandelnde Gröl3e, 
die öfters neu bestimmt worden ist. lnsofem ist sie eine zeitabhangige "Konstruktion", über die 
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auch heutzutage wieder entschieden werden muss. Will die- EU der 25 - demniichst um 
Rumanien, Bulgarien, Kroatien, spiiter wohl noch um weitere Balkanstaaten erweitert - zu dem 
über Jahrtausende hinweg gewachsenen Charakter Europas stehen? Oder will sie kapitulieren, im 
Grunde auf ihren Namen verzichten und bis zur Unkermtlichkeit auf eine Freihandelszone 
zurückschrumpfen, die mit Europa nichts mehr zu tun hat? 
2. Im Hinblick auf d-ie Türkei kommt die Grenze zwischen zwei Kulturkreisen hinzu, die 
seit der Gründung der laizistischen Republik vor achtzig Jahren keineswegs überwunden worden 
ist. Es gilt derzeit nicht als schick, an diese kulturellzivilisatorische Grenze zu erinnern, und 
dogmatische Multikulti-Gutmenschen _sehen darin geradezu ein Sakrileg. Ihr diffamierender 
Klageruf iindert aber nichts anı Charakter dieser eingeschiiffenen Grenze, die in der letzten Zeit 
durch den türkischen Islamismus sogar wieder vertieft worden ist. Seit den 1980er Jahren ist das 
Land von einer islamistischen Propagandaweile überflutet worden, hinter der offenbar der 
wahabitische Steinzeitislamismus der finanzkriiftigen Saudis steckt. Die Moscheen in Atatürks 
laizistischer Republik sind liingst wieder überfüllt. 
Die Regierungen in Ankara haben mit GroBzügigkeit gegenüber islamistischen 
Forderungen, ja mit Kooperation mit der bedrohlich anschwellenden Strömung reagiert. An den 
staatlichen Schulen wurde der Religionsunterricht wieder eingeführt; islamistische Schulen 
fanden sich staatlich finanziert; 1990 \Vurden sie bereits von fünfzehn Prozent aller höheren 
Schüler besucht, und die Absolventen drangten mit Macht in den Staatsdienst. Das Kopftuch für 
Miidchen und Frauen, demonstratives, vom Koran keineswegs verbindlich vorgeschriebenes 
Symbol orthodoxer Rechtgliiubigkeit, wurde weithin wieder erlaubt. im Herbst 2002 gewann 
Erdogans islamistische ,Gerechtigkeitspartei ' die Wahlen triumphal. Warum gilt die seither 
faktische Einparteienherrschaft europiiischen Politikem auf einmal so attraktive? Warum riiumen 
sie emer Islamistenpartei derart naiv einen hohen Vertrauensvorschuss ein? Zugegeben, seither 
sind langst überfallige Reforrngesetze endlich verabschiedet worden. Doch politische Herrschaft 
ist im Alltag, wie Max Weber wusste, ,Herrschaft der Verwaltung'. Die Bürokratie aber stiiubt 
sich hartnackig dagegen die Gesetze in Verordnungen für die Alltagspraxis umzugieBen. Die 
kurdische Minderheit wird daher ganz so unterdrückt wie christliche Ehefrauen, christliche 
Kirche n und ihre Amtstriiger. 
Amnesty Intemational berichtet glaubwürdig über zahlreiche Fiille der noch ımmer 
weitve rbreiteten Polizeifolter; tiefverwurzelte Briiuche wie etwa die europiiisches Recht 
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verletzende Zwangsehe im Kind-esa:lter oder die kraft Patriarchenbeschluss erfolgende 
Verheiratung junger Töchter aus A-natolien mit ihnen vorher völlig unbekannten Auslandstürken 
sind-noch nicht einmal auf die Tagesordnung des Gesetzgebers gesetzt worden. -
Yon den sieben grollen Weltreligionen haben das römische und das reformatorische 
Christentum, das Judentum, der Hinduismus, der Buddhismus, der Konfuzianismus und der 
Shintoismus trotz aller gelegentlich heftigen Kritik keine dogmatisch verankerte Feindschaft 
gegen den Westen entwickelt. Unstreitig gibt es auch fundamentalistische Strömungen unter 
nordlrischen Protestanten und Katholiken, im evangelischen "Bible Belt" der Vereinigten Staaten, 
unter orthodoxen Israelis. Doch allein der Islam kann offenbar einen Kembestand von religiösen 
Überzeugungen mobilisieren, die gegen die Gefahr der Überwaltigung durch die westliche 
Modeme zu eirrem radikal antiwestlichen Fundamentalismus gesteigert werden können. Wo 
bleibt nur eine innerislamische Aufklarung oder Reformation, die sich solcher Probleme endlich 
annimmt? 
3. Die Türkei ist ein Land wirtschaftlicher Rückstandigkeit geblieben, das gerade einmal 
zwanzıg Prozent des derzeitigen durchschnittlichen europaischen Bruttosozialprodukts 
ef\vİrtschaftet. Wahrend der Krise seit 2001 ist die Jahresleistung noch einmal um zehn Prozent 
geschrumpft, und die jahrliche Inflationsrate von gut vierzig Prozent wirkt sich zusatzlich als 
Plage aus. Mehr als fünfunddreil3ig Prozent der Erwerbstatigen arbeiten in einer teilweise 
archaisch erstarrten Landwirtschaft, meist auf der Basis zwergbauerlicher Subsistenzbetriebe. 
Welche ökonomische Rationalitat spricht dafür, dass die EU eine Wirtschaft kooptiert, die sich 
seit langem als Fass ohne Boden mit einem riesigen Bedarf an Subventionen erwiesen hat und 
sich zudem vom Makel der Korruption, der Verbindung zur organisierten Kriminalitat und des 
KlienteJwesens einflussreicher Clans noch nicht befreit hat? Konservativen Schatzungen zufolge 
würden schon die Vor-Beitritts- Hilfen für die Türkei ein riesiges AusmaB erreichen, in der EU 
aber sollen die Zuschüsse aus den europaischen Fonds jahrlich zwanzig Milliarden Euro betragen. 
Realistischere Brüsseler Kalkuhıtionen gehen sogar von vierzig Milliarden aus; ein Fünftel 
entfiele jeweils auf den Nettozahler Bundesrepublik. 
4. Das Migrationsproblem kann durch elastische Übergangsregelungen nur notdürftig 
abgemildert werden. Nach dem Urteil türkischer Experten könnten sich zehn bis achtzehn 
Millionen verarmter Anatolier z-ur Wanderung nach Europa bereit finden. Gerade wer auf der 
Integration besteht, darf vor der Dimension einer neuen Wanderungswelle und ihren Folgen nicht 
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die Augen verschliegen. Obwohl die Bundesrepublik zwischen 1950 und 2000 die weltweit 
höchste reiative Zu-wanderungsrate erreicht hat, ist sie bisher, aufs Ganze gesehen, damit 
bravourös umgegangen. Sie sollte aber, zumal im unmittelbaren Gefolge von durchaus möglichen 
Waru:lerungsbewegungen nach der Ost-Erweiterung, die drastische Überdehnung ihrer 
Aufnahmefühigkeit nicht riskieren. 
5. Überhaupt wirft die schiere Gröf3e der türkischen Bevölkerung eigene Probleme auf. 
EinschlieB!ich aller Auslandstürken mit beibehaltener Staatsbürgerschaft kommt man zurzeit auf 
75 Millionen Türken, die-über einige Jahrzehnte hinweg aus einer Zuwachsrate von jahrlich 3,4 
% hervorgegangen sind. Selbst wenn man einer Hochrechnung nur 2,5 % zugrunde legt, obwohl 
ein so auffüll-iger Rückgang der Geburtenrate noch nicht zu erkennen ist - und ohnehin, wie etwa 
die italienische und spanische Erfahrung lehrt, ein , Wirtschaftswunder' voraussetzt - , kommt 
man für das Beitrittsjahr 2012 bereits auf rund 90 Millionen, wenige Jahre spater auf 100 
Millionen Türken. Warum will man nicht einsehen das damit die Probiembewaltigungskapazitat 
der EU unmittelbar nach der Osterweiterung völlig überfordert wird? Dem sich hyperrealistisch 
gebardenden Argument der Berliner Regierung, dass man es auch ohne direkte Nachbarschaft 
ohnehin mit der Krisenregion östlich der Türkei zu tun habe, da Deutsch\and nicht nur am 
Hindukusch verteidigt werde, merkt man die in der letzten Zeit spürbare wilhelminische 
Grof3mannssucht an, denn raumliche Distanz und indirekte Betroffenheit haben sich oft genug als 
politischer Vorteil erwiesen. 
6. Das geostrategische Argument zugunsten der Türkei hat seme dunkle Kehrseite. 
Warum nur sollte sich Europa so attraktive Nachbarn wie den chaotischen Irak, die syrische 
Diktatur, die iranische Theokratie und erodierende Staaten wie Georgien und Armenien zulegen, 
überdies auch noch die explosive Kurdenfrage zu einem ihrer Binnenprobleme machen? 
7. Wenn unter Berufung auf die Erfolge der Kemalismus von türkischer Seite immer 
wieder die bereits realisierte Zugehörigkeit zur westlichen , Wertegemeinschaff beschlossen 
wird, muss die sanktionsbewerte Tabuisierung des Armenier- und Griechenmordes endlich ein 
Ende haben. An die Stelle hoher Strafen für die Erörterung dieses staatsoffıziell geleugneten 
genozidahnlichen Massenmords - immerhin geht es um 1.5 Millionen ermordeter Armenier und 
1.5 Millionen ermordete oder vertriebene Griechen a\s Opfer der jungtürkischen Fixierung auf 
einen ethnisch homogenen Nationalstaat - so llte endlich die freimütige Diskussion treten. Hatte 
auch nur ein einziger europaischer Staat der Bundesrepublik einen Finger gereicht, wenn sie den 
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Judenmord so hartnackig-unbelehrbar geleugnet hatte, wıe das die Türkei mit ihren 
Staatsverbrechen noch immer tut? 
8. Ein im Verlauf der Kontroverse ziemlich selten zitiertes Kopenhagener Kriterium 
verlangt, auch bei der Aufnahme neuer Mitglieder "die StoBkraft der europaischen Integration zu 
erhalten". Integration heiBt zum einen Gewahrleistung der inneren und auBeren Sicherheit aller 
EU-Mitglieder - eine Aufgabe, deren Bewaltigung durch traditionelle Binnenkonflikte und die 
geo-strategische Lage der Türkei offenkundig erschwert wird. lntegration heiBt zum andern eine 
Wohlstandssicherung und -mehrung ım Verein mit einer zivilen Regelung der 
Verteilungskonflikte. Das wirft schon bei fünfundzwanzig Mitgliedern heikle Probleme auf. 
Warum sollte da der überdimensionierte Dauerversorgungsfall Türkei noch hinzugenommen 
werden? Integration heiBt zudem, glaubwürdige Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfühigkeit mit der 
erforderlichen Legitimationskraft zu praktizieren. Wo soll bloB der Gewinn liegen, wenn ein auf 
ganz andersartiger historischer Basis beruhender Staat wie die Türkei hinzukommt? 
9. Die Eröffnung von Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei würde das Demokratiedefizit 
der Europai schen Union verscharfen, denn die Weichen würden für die Aufnahme eines 
islamischen GroBstaats gestel!t, ohne dass dieser fatale Wendepunkt der Europa-Politik in einer 
klarenden Debatte von der europaischen Öffentlichkeit und den europaischen Parlamenten 
gebilligt worden ware. Die Euroskepsis würde ins Unermessliche steigen. 
l O. Die Frage nach dem türkischen Beitritt gehört deshalb auf die Entscheidungsagenda 
der Wahlbürger. Der Europa-Wahlkampf des Jahres 2004 muss, wenn denn das Ideal des 
mündigen Bürgers nicht verraten werden soll, auch als ein unmissverstandliches Pro oder Contra 
Beitritt angelegt werden. Überdies gilt es aber schon jetzt, an die Wachsamkeit der 
nationalstaatlichen Parlamente in der EU und der StraBburger Versammlung zu appellieren , damit 
sie opportunistischer Nachgiebigkeit und Konfliktscheu das eigene Kontrollrecht und eine klare 
Option entgegensetzen. 
107 
4.2 Seyla Benhabib; Das türkische Mosaik. Ein Irrtum zu meinen, Europa müsse am-
Bosporus enden. in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 08.02.2003 
Die Entscheidung der fünfzehn europaischen Staats- und Regierungschefs, die Aufnahme der 
Türkei in die Europaische Union auf absehbare Zeit zu verschieben, ist nicht nur für die Türkei 
verhangnisvoll, sondem auch für die EU selbst. Der Europaischen Union bot sich die Chance, das 
wertvollste Erbe ihrer eigenen Aufklarungstraditionen zu bekraftigen, demzufolge Menschen 
überall auf der Welt durch den rechten Gebrauch der Vemunft und einen klug gelenkten Willen 
in der Lage sind, Demokratie, zivile Verhaltnisse, Frieden und Wohlstand zu erlangen. Statt 
dessen trugen europiiische Abwehrinstinkte und notdürftig verschleierte ethnozentrische 
Yorurteile den Sieg davon. Trotz- einer Erweiterung um zehn ehemals kommunistische Lander 
zog die EU eine Grenze an den Wassern des Bosporus. Warum konnte sie den türkischen 
Mitgliedschaftsantrag nicht annehmen? 
In den Wochen vor der Entscheidung von Kopenhagen führten nüchteme und sorgfültige 
Beobachter, denen rassistische und anti-muslimische Einstellungen fem liegen - so etwa Ex-
Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt - verschiedene Gründe an. Zum einen wirtschaftliche 
Erwagungen: Da mit der Mitgliedschaft in der Europiiischen Union die "Freizügigkeit von 
Personen, Waren, Dienstleistungen" zwischen den Staaten der Union einhergeht, so die 
Befürchtung, würde mit einer Aufnahme der Türkei die ohnehin schon betrachtliche türkische 
Bevölkerungszahl in Europa - rund 1 ,9 Millionen in Deutschland und rund 800 000 in Frankreich 
- noch einmal schlagartig anwachsen. Die jetzt noch sorgfültig überwachte Einwanderung wiire 
nicht mehr zu stoppen. 
Dieses Argument ist allenfalls auf den ersten Blick plausibel. Zunachst einmal 
ermöglichen Abkommen zur Familienzusammenführung, auf die sich die EU geeinigt hat, ganz 
offiziell die Einwanderung der Angehörigen von Gastarbeitem. Eine gewisse Zahl türkischer 
Bürger kommt so jahrlich legal in die EU. Zudem unterliegen die Arbeitsmarkte in der Union 
einer genauen Regulierung. Wahrend sich wahrscheinlich in den ersten Jahren nach einem Beitritt 
der Türkei ein Schwarzmarkt von billigen türkischen Arbeitskraften vor ailem in Landwirtschaft 
und Baugewerbe bilden würde, könnte man Iangfristig eine illegale Arbeitsmigration durch 
tlexiblere Arbeitsvertrage in den Griff bekommen. Die gegenwartigen Yerhandlungen mit Polen 
werden hier vielleicht einen Weg weisen. Ohnehin kommen auch EU-Bürger, die in ein anderes 
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Mitgliedsland umziehen wollen, nicht ın den Genuss uneingeschrankter 
Sozialversicherungsleistungen und Aufenthaltsrechte, solange ihnen die Niederlassung nicht von 
den örtlichen Behörden erlaubt wurde. Warum sollte dies im Fat-1 einer türkischen ED-
Mitgliedschaft völlig anders sein? 
Den wichtigsten Einwand aber liefert einer der wesentlichen wirtschaftlichen Vorteile 
emer EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei: Europaisches Kapital würde in das Land flieBerr und 
Arbeitsplatze schaffen, die zu einer Abnahme der Migration führen . Wenn man bedenkt, um wie 
vieles leichter als Arbeitskrafte sich Kapital in der EU bewegt, dann darf man wohl vermuten, 
dass nicht so sehr Horden von Türken in Berlin, Frankfurt, Wien, London und Paris einfallen 
werden; vielmehr könnten Horden von Deutschen, Schweden, Danen, Franzosen und Belgiem die 
für strahl-enden Sonnenschein und landschaftliche Schönheit bekannten türkischen Agais- und 
Mittelmeerküsten erobem, wenn sie <lort Ferien und Ferienhauser kaufen dürften. 
Die Gegner einer türkischen Mitgliedschaft führen ein weiteres Argument an, namlich die 
politischen Folgen der türkischen Bevölkerungsentwicklung. Die Türkei zahit heute an die 
siebzig Millionen Einwohner, und ihre relativ hohe Geburtenrate beschwört im Zusammenspiel 
mit dem sich abschwachenden Bevölkerungswachstum vieler europaischer Lander die Furcht 
herauf, die EU könnte unter die Vorherrschaft einer muslimischen Mehrheit geraten. Mit Blick 
auf das Europaische Parlament, in dem jedes Land durch seine eigenen national gewahlten 
europaischen Parteien vertreten wird, ist dieses Argument allerdings fragwürdig. Die Türkei ware 
einer von vielen Akteuren und in keiner Weise tonangebend in einem Parlament von 
sechsundzwanzig nationalen Delegationen. Da so viele wichtige Entscheidungen auf EU-Ebene 
nicht durch Mehrheitsverfahren getroffen werden, ist es ein Ablenkungsmanöver zu behaupten, 
der den Türken aufgrund ihrer GröBe zustehende Stimmenanteil im EU-Ministerrat würde die 
internen Regierungsstrukturen der EU verandem. Mit institutioneller Kreativitat und der 
Bereitschaft, Neuland zu betreten, wurde im Ministerrat ein Gleichgewicht zwischen Frankreich, 
Deutschland, dem Vereinigten Königreich und Italien geschaffen, obwohl diese Staaten 
unterschiedliche Bevölkerungszahlen aufweisen. Dasselbe ware auch im Fail der Türkei möglich 
gewesen. 
Liefe dies auf eine Mitgliedschaft zweiter Klasse hinaus? Nein - sondem nur auf die 
Bekraftigung, dass nicht allein demograph ische Prinzipien die Mechanismen der politischen 
Reprasentation bestimmen. In der Politikwissenschaft wird derzeit eine weitreichende und 
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wichtige Diskussion über Möglichkeiten der Reprasentation von Gru_ppen geführt, die auf 
anderen Prinzipien der Verhaltnismal3igkeit als "one person, one vote" aufbauen. Voraussichtlich 
wird sich die EU zukünftig in wachsendem MaB auf ·verschiedenartige Mechanismen der 
politischen Willensbildung und Reprasentation stützen. Warum sollte man die Frage nach der 
politischen Rolle der Türkei in einer erweiterten Union nicht im Lichte neuer Modelle des 
Verhiiltniswahlrechts stellen? 
Das letzte Argument der Aufnabmegegner betrifft die Menschenrechtsbilanz und das 
nicht-demokratische islamische Erbe der Türkei. Tatsachlich ist der türkische Staat berüchtigt für 
seine Missachtung von Menschenrechten und Rechtsstaatlichkeit; die Skepsis der Europaer, dass 
ein im Sommer 2002 eilig verabschiedetes Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Todesstrafe und zur 
rechtlichen Aufwertung der kurdischen Sprache diese Probleme lösen könnte, ist nur zu 
berechtigt. Aber wie beim Kampf gegen die Apartheid in Südafrika vor zwei Jahrzehnten heiJ3t 
die Altemative: Rückzug oder Engagement. Kein Zweifel , dass die EU weit mehr erreichen kann, 
um die schreckliche Menschenrechtsbilanz der Türkei zu verbessem und die Minderheitenrechte 
zu schützen, wenn sie sich weiterhin engagiert. Glaubt irgend jemand in Europa ernsthaft, die 
Türkei könne das Kurdenproblem allein lösen? Warum nimmt man sich nicht Wand zum Vorbild 
und sucht nach einem föderativen Rahmen, der dem über die Türkei, Iran, Irak und Syrien 
ausgebreiteten kurdischen Volk kulturell e Rechte und Selbstverwaltung garantiert? 
Es ist jedenfa lls heuchleri sch, angesichts des Kurdenproblems die Hande über dem Kopf 
zusammen zu schlagen und sich entsetzt zurückzuziehen, sobald sich eine Chance auftut, einen 
emsthaften politischen Wandel herbeizuführen. Fast schon hat es Tradition in Europa, den 
Umgang der Türkei mit ihren religiösen und ethnischen Minderheiten - wie Griechen und 
Armeniem - zu bejammem, aber die Übemahme historischer Verantwortung zu verweigern, wenn 
sie anı nötigsten ware. Ein konstruktives Engagement der EU für die Türkei hatte zu einer 
gerechten Lösung des Kurdenproblems wesentlich mehr beitragen können als ali das gottgefüllige 
Klagen über deren unzweifelhaft miserable Menschenrechtssituation. 
Die Türkei steht heute anı Scheideweg. Die islamistischen Wurzeln der regierenden Partei 
für Gerechtigkeit und Emeuerung sind aktenkundig. Von Europa verschmaht, wird die Basis der 
Partei, konservativer als die herrschenden Eliten, ihre Führung zu einer Annaherung an die 
islamische Welt drangen. Die Aussicht auf einen Krieg im Irak, die quer durch das politische 
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Spektrum von rechts bis links auf Ablehnung stöBt, wird die offenen Fragen auf türkischer Seite 
nur vermehren. 
Enden Europas Grenzen an der Meerenge des Bosporus? Wohl· kaum. Die türkische 
Geschichte war und ist mit der europai-schen- verflochten und wird es- auch bleiben, ob von 
Reinheit traumende Europaer wie Hans-Ulrich W ehi er dies anerkennen oder nicht. leh denke hier 
an meine Vorfahren, sephardische Juden aus Spanien, denen das Osmanische Reich Ziıflucht bot, 
als sie nach 1492 von der katholischen lnquisition verfolgt wurden. Die Osmanen, die 1453 
Konstantinopel erobert hatten, luden die spanischen Juden in ihr Reich ein. Und sie karnen; über 
fünfhundert Jahre Jang lebten sie nach ihren eigenen Trnclitionen und ihrem eigenen Glauben und 
fungierten als Mittler zwischen Europa und dem Osmanischen Reich. Mein Grol3vater, Untertan 
dieses Reiches und e-in Seideı:ıhandler, der zwischen Frankreich und der Türke-i und mittels seiner 
Cousins auch mit Manchester Hande! trieb, ware sehr überrascht gewesen-über die Entscheidung 
der EU, Europa anı Bosporus enden zu Jassen. 
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4.3 Cristian Meier: WiJ liegt Europa? Historische- Rejlexionen - aus gegebenem Anlass. in: 
Neue Zu-rcher Zeitung, 08.02.2003 
Die Europaische Union ist das politische Gebikl-e unserer Welt, das sich standig selbst auf der 
Agenda hat. Denn auBer mit der Erledigung ihrer Geschafte ist sie ja stets mit Vertiefung und 
Erweiterung, alsa ibrem eigenen Aus- und Auföau, beschaftigt. Was sonst Staat oder Staatenbund 
sein will , ist irgendwann fertig. Die EU nicht. Das Empfinden immer wieder nur unzulanglicher 
Lösungen ist Voraussetzung ihrer Dynamik. Da wird so leicht nichts zu Ende gedacht. in diesem 
Prozess aber widerführt ihr jetzt etwas ganz Neues. Angesichts des Aufnahmekandidaten Türkei 
taucht hinter ailen Fragen der Union, von Wettbewerb, Alpentransit und Wahrung bis zum 
Institutionengefüge, eine anders geartete auf: die nach dem Europaischen. Worin besteht es? 
Kann es auch der Türkei eigen sein? Kann also die Türkei dazugehören? Immerhin ist sie ein 
Land ganz anderer Herkunft, dessen rasch wachsende Bevölkerung - bei aller westlichen 
Ausrichtung seiner Oberschicht - zumindest in vielem dem in Europa sonst Gewohnten wenig 
entspricht. 
Die EU hat genaue Aufnahmekriterien. Doch wenn die Türkei sie erfüllt, ware man dann 
genötigt, sie aufzunehmen? Und wenn man sie aufnimmt, mit welchen Argumenten könnte man 
d-ann gegebenenfalls etwa lsrael, Marokko oder Kamerun , bei Erfüllung der Kriterien, die 
Aufnahme verweigem? Politische Einheiten von einiger Homogenitat müssen sowohl ein- wie 
ausgrenzen. Oder sie sind Reiche, die sich aile möglichen Völker einverleiben können. Was die 
EU nicht sein kann. Trotzdem ist sie so leicht nicht saturiert, hat sie noch keinem die kalte 
Schulter gezeigt. Ist sie also beliebig erweiterbar? Will sie eine eurasische oder vielleicht eher 
eine euromediterrane Union sein? Oder spielt die konventionelle Erdunterteilung weiter keine 
Rolle, und kann man die Türkei wie vielleicht andere einfach im politischen Sinne zu Europa 
schlagen? 
Die Unterscheidung zwischen Europa und Asien haben die Griechen getroffen, um das 
Land westlich von dem östlich der Agais abzugrenzen. Das Kriterium war geographisch. Denn 
dazwischen verlief keine kulturelle, zunachst auch keine politische Grenze. Beiderseits des Meers 
sowie auf seinen Inseln (die man übrigens teilweise Asien zurechnete) saBen griechische Stadte. 
Geographische Wissenschaft ging noch einen Schritt weiter: Sie unterschied ganze Erdteile 
voneinander, vornehmlich Europa, also die Landmasse nördlich der Küsten zwischen Gibraltar 
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und dem Schwarzen Meer, von Asien, dem Land südlich beziehungsweise östlich vom weiteren 
Küstenverlauf. Da war ein ordnender _S,inn am W erk. 
Mit dieser Unterscheidung (als dritter Erdteil kam Libyen, wir sagen Afrika, dazu) 
verknüpfte sich im fünften Jahrhundert v."Chr. aber eine andere. Die Griechen setzten Asien mit 
dem Reich der Perser gleich, die sie gerade besiegt und zurückgeworfen hatten. Und je starker ihr 
Stolz auf den Sieg, den sie dergestalt über "ganz Asien" (Aischylos) erfochten hatten, sich zu 
einem Überlegenheitsgefühl steigerte, umso mehr verband sich ihnen Europa mit Freiheit, 
Tapferkeit und, was sie selbst anging, der Fahigkeit zu politischer, also bürgerschaftlicher 
Organisation, wahrend die Asiaten weichlich, unfrei und wenig wehrfahig sein sollten. Diese 
Ansicht wurde ımtennauert mit klimatologisch-medizinischen und philosophischen Theorien. 
Pauschal , wie sie war, hatte sie in der Praxis weiter keine Konsequenzen. 
Alexander hat baid darauf das Perserreich für Makedonen und Griechen in Besitz 
genommen; für die Römer spielte die Unterscheidung von Erdteilen, deren Sinn übrigens schon 
Herodot bezweifelte, kaum e-ine Rolle. Auch in der Folgezeit erwies sich immer wieder, dass die 
Agais weit mehr verbindet als trennt. Doch lehte die Einteilung weiter, sie gewann neue Inhalte, 
so dass man Europa als Erdteil bis heute künstlich aus Eurasien heraushalt. Und bis heute 
verknüpft sich mit der Vorstellung von Europa vielfach ein Überlegenheitsgefühl. Europa ist der 
"Weltteil, worin die Kultur aufs Höchste gestiegen", so drückte etwa Wieland das aus. Durch 
seine "immer fortschreitende Ausbi ldung" habe es die "unendliche Obermacht" über die übrigen 
Völker des Erdbodens gewonnen. Kant sprach von einem "regelmal3igen Gang der Verbesserung 
der Staatsverfassung in unserem Weltteile (der wahrscheinlicher Weise ailen anderen dereinst 
Gesetze geben wird)". Bald kam man darauf, dass von Europa aus die übrige Menschheit zur 
Zivilisation zu erziehen sei. - Ali das liegt weit hinter uns. Ganz abgesehen von der Ohnmacht 
Europas, von seiner recht geringen kulturellen Potenz, seiner Verschlafenheit und seiner höchst 
eingeschrankten V-0rbildrolle herrscht heute die Tendenz vor, unter den Völkem (mit wenigen 
Ausnahmen) auf3er im Ökonomischen und Sozialen kaum mehr Unterschiede zu machen. Allzu 
schnell regt sich sonst der Verdacht des Rassismus. Menschen sind gleich, warum nicht auch 
Yölker? Gerade für die Türkei lassen sich in vielen Hinsichten starke Annaherungen an 
europaische Standards beobachten: ein sakularer, demokratischer Staat, der sein Recht aus 
Europa übemommen hat, mit vielen modemen Einrichtungen, guten Universitaten usw. 
Trotzdem könnte man sich etwa fragen, ob die von oben, und nicht aus einem verbreiteten 
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Gei-st der Aufklarung, dekretierte Laisierung (samt starker Benachteiligung christlicher Kirchen) 
unddie Rolle cles Militars als Wachter der Demokratie so ganz zu Europa passen. Manches davon 
könnte man zwar kurzfristig andem, könnte auch den notwendigen wirtschaftlichen 
Aufhotprozess beschleunigen, so dass das Land über die Hürde der Kriterien hinauskame. Die 
-Stellung der Frauen lieBe sich verbessem, der Kurdenkonflikt herabstimmen auf das MaB des 
spanischen mit den Basken. Allein , ware es nur Hochmut, wenn die Europaer fünden , es gebe 
Unterschiede zwischen den Völkem, die nicht so leicht zu beheben seien, Unterschiede etwa, die 
aus der Geschjcl:ıte bedingt sind, jener Geschichte der Kultur, auch der politischen, die neben 
ailem Trennenden den Europaem gemeinsam war, wahrend die Türken daran kaum teilhatten? 
Und - soilte nicht selbst so ein Gebilde wie die EU das Recht haben, eine gewisse Homogenitat 
anzustreben? 
Zwei Fragen stellen sich hier: Was ist das Europaische, das die Mitglieder der 
Europaischen Union aufweisen sollten? Und wo verlaufen die Grenzen, über die hinaus die EU 
aus G ründen sowohl ihrer inneren Ordnung wie ihrer Fahigkeit zu weltpolitischem Engagement 
nicht erweitert werden sollte? 
Zeichnen sich europaische Völker vielleicht dadurch aus, dass sie christlich sind, woraus 
sich ergabe, dass ein islamisches Land nicht zu ihnen gehört? Das wird man zurzeit ganz 
unabhangig davon, dass Religion inzwischen zur Privatsache geworden ist, allenfa lls fü r den 
Vatikanstaat und Polen behaupten können. Zahit man nur die praktizierenden Glaubigen, so sind 
wachsende Bezirke in der EU langst mehr islamisch als christl ich. In der Stadt Brüssel war 2001 
Muhammed der anı haufigsten an mannl iche Neugeborene vergebene Name. 
lndes könnte es diese Lander charakterisieren, dass sie jahrhundertelang durch das 
Christentum stark gepragt worden sind. Nicht, dass sich in nennenswerten Teilen europaischer 
Politik und Wirtschaft, und gar gegenüber den Nichteuropaern, die Tugenden sonderlich bewahrt 
hatten, die man gemeinhin christlich nennt. Doch kann kein Zweifel sein, dass christlicher 
Glaube, Theologie, das immer neue Sichbesinnen auf die christliche Offenbarung, das Ringen mit 
Gott und seinem unerforschlichen Willen (samt der polemischen Abwendung von ihm) das 
europaische Denken, die Ausbildung von Individualitat und persönlicher Verantwortlichkeit, 
überhaupt die Wirklichkeit und den Wirklichkeitsbezug in Europa aufs Starkste bestimmt haben. 
Letztlich sind es historische Argumente, die hier vorzubringen waren: die ganze besondere 
Geschichte, die nicht zuletzt das westliche, gerade auch das in Konfessionen gespaltene 
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Christentum hervorgebracht hat, die sich aber auch in der Ausbildung des Stadtbürgertums, der 
Wissenschaft, der Universitaten aufs Vielfültigste auswirkte. Die frühe Rezeption des römischen 
Rechts samt ali den daraus erwachsenden Folgewirkungen, die so vielfültige Krafte freisetzende 
Spannung zwischen weltlicher und geistlicher Gewalt, den Staat, den Kapitalismus, die 
Aufkliirung - wo hat es das gegeben auBer in Europa? Die griechisch-römische Antike - wo ist sie 
auf eine derart tiefgreifende, weit über die Wissenschaften hinaus zielende Weise und Breite so 
nachhaltig und fruchtbar in die eigene Welt aufgenommen worden wie hier? Wo sonst sind 
solche Bewegungsspielriiume eröffnet und wahrgenommen worden, hat ein solcher Druck, eine 
solche Dynamik immer neue Krafte und damit stets auch neue Alternativen produziert? Wo sonst 
ist ein ganzer Weltteil gerade dadurch bestimmt worden, dass aile Ordnung immer wieder 
durchbrochen und zur Disposition gestellt wurde? 
Ali dies und vieles andere hat Europa früh auf emen welthistorischen Sonderweg 
gebracht, hat dazu geführt, dass es schlieBlich die ganze Welt in seinen Bann ziehen, allen 
zumindest viele seiner Gesetze geben, auch aufzwingen (und unendlich vieles zerstören) konnte. 
Seine Eigenart, von der Ermöglichung eines "Gemeinschaftshandelns" (Max Weber), von 
Rechtsstaat, Demokratie, Wissenschaft bis zu den dynamischen Geschichten seiner Kunst und 
Philosophie sowie breiter allgemeiner Bildung, hat sich gegen die anderer, ihrerseits bedeutender, 
fruchtbarer, aber eben in Krieg und Wettbewerb unterlegener Hochkulturen durchzusetzen 
vermocht. 
Was aber bedeutet es heute, dass die europaischen Liinder diese Geschichte durchgemacht 
haben, die Türkei aber nicht? Die Frage ist nicht zuletzt in Hinsicht auf Europa zu stellen. Leben 
wir noch aus dieser Geschichte? Sind ihre treibenden Kriifte noch unter uns wirksam? Ist uns das 
Fragen noch so dringend? die Auseinandersetzung? der Wandel? die Antike? Yon ali den 
Herausforderungen christlichen Glaubens zu schweigen. Und haben wir überhaupt noch ein 
Bewusstsein von dieser Geschichte und nicht nur ailenfalls von einigen ihrer Errungenschaften, 
haben wir wenigstens noch ein Wissen, an das ein solches Be,vusstsein anschlieBen könnte? 
Gewiss, die Vermiichtnisse dieser Geschichte sind noch liberali greifuar, in Stadtbildem 
wıe in Bibliotheken und Museen, aber auch in Rechtsordnung, Verfassung, Wissenschaften, 
Verhaltensregeln, in den so genannten Werten (vielleicht gar in ihrer Offenheit zu 
Umwertungen). Allein, sind diese Vermiichtnisse nicht sehr gut auch anderswohin übertragbar? 
Hat die Türkei nicht viele von ihnen ihrerseits angenommen? 
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Zumindest eines ist doch wohl neu gegenüber der bisherigen Weltgeschichte: dass die 
Errungenschaften der Geschichte, die die heutige Welt bestimmen, auf Flaschen zu ziehen und in 
alle Teile der Welt exportierbar sind. Wofür die Europaer Jahrhunderte einer höchst wechsel-, 
leid- und opferreichen Geschichte brauchten, lasst sich im Crash-Kurs nachholen, weil es auf 
einer ziemlich voraussetzungslosen, breit zuganglichen Form der Rationalitat beruht. Recht, 
Verfassung, Ökonomie, Schulwesen, Wissenschaft und anderes sind lehr- und lembar geworden. 
Sie sind anderswo einzubauen wie künstliche Knie und Hüften in den menschlichen Körper. Und 
die Bereitschaft, sie zu übemehmen, wenn sie Erfolg versprechen, ist weit verbreitet, gerade auch 
in der Türkei . 
Insgesamt sind die "fortgeschritteneren" Lander, Fukuyama würde sie "nachhistorisch" 
nennen, so sehr von den überall mehr oder weniger gleichen wissenschaftlichen, technischen, 
organisatorischen, ökonomischen Prozessen bestimmt, dass das Herkommen dagegen kaum mehr 
eine Rolle spielt. Im Gegenteil , das langfristig angelegte Besondere wird weithin planiert und 
ausgehöhlt. Nein, ich vermag nicht zu sehen, dass in diesem Europa noch viel ven seinen 
histori schen Traditionen samt der Je besonderen Weise, sie auf neue Erfordernisse hin 
weiterzubilden, lebendig ist. Was ın dieser Geschichte erarbeitet, was im Katalog der 
Aufnahmekri terien der EU abfragbar ist, das kann auch auBerhalb Europas, zumindest über kurz 
oder lang, hergestellt werden. 
Die eigentlichen Probleme einer Aufnahme der Türkei in die EU liegen ganz woanders. 
Zum einen fragt sich, ob diese nicht langst dabei ist, an die Grenzen ihrer Erweiterung zu stoBen. 
Die Frage, was eine neuerliche starke Erweiterung für die künftige Struktur dieses politischen 
Gebildes ausmacht, scheint mir eher technischer Natur zu sein. Ein irgend nennenswertes 
AusmaB an, wie es gem heifü, Bürgernahe oder gar Demokratie kann die EU ohnehin nicht 
erreichen. Der Gedanke der Integration zu einer europaischen Gesellschaft ist utopisch . 
Und wıe sehr die Möglichkeiten der Union zu eınem engeren politischen 
Zusammenschluss, etwa zum Aufbau eines Bundesstaats, durch die Erweiterung auf Kleinasien 
belastet werden , das hangt nicht an ihrer GröBe, sondern an der politischen Geographie. Die 
Türkei grenzt an Georgien, Armenien, Iran, den Irak und Syrien. Mit ihr wird Europa Teil des 
Nahen Ostens, gerat es in die Peripherie Zentralasiens mit all seinen virulenten Problemen, unter 
andem den amerikanischen Ölinteressen, muss es die engen verwandtschaftlichen Beziehungen 
der Türkei zu den Turkvölkern zu den seinen machen - und werden weitere, dann wiederum 
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europiiische Nachbarn im Kaukasus an seine Tore pochen und um Aufnahme bitten. Auch müsste 
ein solches Europa doch wohl versuchen, mehr als einen Ful3 in die Welt seiner arabischen 
Nachbam zu setzen, wo sich die USA zurzeit so breit machen. 
Vielleicht muss - und sollte - man das riskieren. Doch sollte man sich nicht darüber 
tauschen, was das bedeutet. Das Europa, das die Türkei einschliefü, müsste Weltpolitik treihen, 
müsste beachtliche Mitte) aufbringen, um dies angemessen zu tun; vielleicht wenigstens zeitweise 
unter Vemachlassigung des Sozialstaats; müsste also ein anderes Europa werden - und müsste 
auch damit rechnen, dass es in seinem Innem es mit Faktoren zu tun bekommt, die anhand der, 
daran gemessen, ziemlich harmlosen EU-Aufnahrnekriterien nicht zu erfassen sind. Doch könnte 
es sein, dass der Wandel der Zeit jedenfalls umwalzend ger:ıug ist, um Europa die Fortsetzung 
seines bisherigen Lebens - dies und jenes hier- und dorthin beitragend, im Ganzen aber- im 
Windschatten der USA (sofem nicht britische oder französische Spezialinteressen im Spiel sind) 
dahintreibend - schwierig zu machen. 
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4.4 Kardinal Josef Ratzinger; Auf der Suche nach dem Frieden. Gegen erkrankte Vernunfi 
und mijJbrauchte Religion. in: Frankfurter AHgemeine Zeitung, 11.06.2004. 
Als anı 6. Juni 1944 das debarquement der _alliierten Tmppen in dem von der <leutschen 
Wehrnıacht besetzten Frankreich begann, war das für die Menscfıen in der weiten Welt und auch 
für sehr viele Menschen in Deutschland ein Signal der Hoffnung au-f einen baldigen Frieden und 
auf Freiheit in Europa. Was war geschehen? Einem Verbrecher und seinen Parteigangem war es 
gelungen, in Deutschland die Macht des Staates an sich zu reiBen. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass in 
der Herrschaft der Partei Recht und Unrecht ineinander verknotet wurden und oft fast untrennbar 
ineinander libergingen. Die Rechtsordnung selbst, die zum Teil im Alltagsleben weiter 
funktionierte, war gleichzeitig zur Macht der Rechtszerstörung geworden. Dieser Herrschaft der 
Lüge diente ein System der Furcht, in dem keiner dem anderen trauen durfte, weil jeder irgendwie 
sich unter der Maske der Lüge schützen musste, die einerseits dem Selbstschutz diente, zugleich 
aber zur Festigung der Macht des Bösen beitrug. So musste in der Tat die ganze Welt eingreifen, 
um den Ring des Verbrechens aufzusprengen, um Freiheit und Recht wiederherzustellen. 
Dafür, dass dies geschehen ist, danken wir in dieser Stunde, und es danken nicht nur die 
von deutschen Truppen besetzten und so dem Nazi-Terror ausgelieferten Lander. Es danken auch 
wir Deutschen selbst, dass uns Freiheit und Recht durch diesen Einsatz wiedergegeben worden 
sind. Wenn irgendwo in der Geschichte, so ist hier offenkundig, dass es sich bei dem Einsatz der 
Alliierten um ein bellum iustum handelte, das letztlich auch dem Wohle derer diente, gegen deren 
Land der Krieg geführt worden ist. 
ln Europa wurde uns nach 1945 eine Friedensperiode geschenkt, wie unser Kontinent sie 
über eine so lange Zeit hin wohl in seiner ganzen Geschichte nicht gekannt hat. Das ist zu einem 
nicht geringen Teil das Verdienst der ersten Generation von Politikem nach dem Krieg -
Charchill, Adenauer, Schuman, De Gasperi, denen wir in dieser Stunde zu danken haben: Wir 
haben dafür zu danken, dass nicht der Gedanke der Bestrafung oder gar der Rache und der 
Demütigung der Unterlegenen bestimmend wurde, sondem ailen ihr Recht gewahrt werden sollte. 
Sagen wir es offen: Diese Politiker haben ihre rnoralische ldee des Staates, des Rechts, des 
Friedens und der Verantwortung aus ihrem christlichen Glauben genommen, der durch die 
Prüfungen der Aufklarung hindurchgegangen war und im Gegenüber zur parteilichen Verdrehung 
von Recht und Moral sich weiter gereinigt hatte. Sie wollten nicht einen Glaubensstaat 
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konstruieren, sondem einen von der sittlichen Vemunft geforrnten Staat, aber ihr Glaube hatte 
ihnen geholfen, die von der ideologischen Tyrannei geknechtete und-entstellte_ Vemunft wieder 
aufzurichten. 
Durch Europa lief eine Grenze, die nicht nur unseren Kontinent, sondern die ganze Welt 
zerschnitt. Ein groBer Teil Mitteieuropas und Osteuropa standen unter der Herrschaft einer 
Ideologie, die den Staat der Partei unterstellte, also- parteifü~h machte. Auch hier war eine 
Herrschaft der Lüge die Folge. Nach dem Zusammenbruch dieser Diktaturen sind die ungeheuren 
wirtschaftlichen, ideologischen und seelischen Zerstörungen sichtbar geworden, die aus dieser 
Herrschaft folgten. im Balkan kam es zu kriegerischen VerwickJungen, in denen freilich auch aite 
geschichtliche Lasten neue Explosionen der Gewalt mit sidı brachten. 
Wenn Eurnpa seit 1945, von den Verwicklungen aufclem Balkan abgesehen, eine Periode 
des Friedens erleben durfte, so war freilich die Situation der Welt im Ganzen alles andere als 
friedvoll. Von Korea über Vietnam, lndien, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algerien, Kongo, Biafra-
Nigeria bis in die Auseinandersetzungen in Sudan, in Ruanda-Burundi , Athiopien, Somalia, 
Moçambique, Angola, Liberia, bis Afghanistan und Tschetschenien reicht ein blutiger Bogen von 
kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen, denen die Kampfe in und um das Heilige Land und im Irak 
anzufügen sind. Es ist hier nicht der Ort, die Typologie dieser Kriege zu untersuchen. Aber zwei 
in gewisser Hinsicht neue Phanomene möchte ich etwas naher beleuchten. 
Das eine besteht darin, dass der Zusammenhalt des Rechts und die Fahigkeit, in 
unterschiedlichen Gemeinschaften zusammenzulehen, plötzlich zu zerbrechen scheint. Ein 
typisches Beispiel für das Zerbrechen der tragenden Kraft des Rechts und damit das Absinken in 
Chaos und Anarchie scheint mir in Somalia vorzuliegen. Die Ursachen für diese Auflösung des 
Rechts und der Versöhnungsfühigkeit sind vi-elfültig. Die eine und andere davon können wir 
benennen. Der Zynismus der Ideologie hatte in ali diesen Raumen die Gewissen verdunkelt. 
Neben dem Zynismus der Ideologien und oft eng mit ihm verquickt steht der Zynismus der 
Interessen und des groBen Geschafts, die gewissenlose Ausbeutung der Reserven der Erde. Auch 
hier wird das Gute durch das Nützliche beiseite geschoben und Macht an die Stelle von Recht 
gesetzt. 
Das andere neue Phanomen ist der Terror. Weil der Terror oder auch das ganz 
gewöhnliche organisierte Verbrechen, das sein Netz immer weiter verstarkt und ausbreitet, auch 
Zugang zu Atomwaffen und zu biologischen Waffen tinden könnte, ist die Gefahr erschreckend 
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groB geworden, die hier droht: Solange diese Zerstörungspotentiale allein in den Handen der 
GroBmachte waren, konnte man immer hoffen,_ class die Vernunft und das Wissen um die 
Geführdung des ergenen Volkes und Staates die Verwendung dieser Waffensysteme ausschiieBen 
würde. 
Terror kann nicht durch Gewalt allein überwunden werden. Gewiss, die Verteidigung des 
Rechts gegen die rechtszerstörende Gewalt darf und· muss sich unter Umstanden ihrerseits einer 
genau abgewogenen Gewalt bedienen, um das Recht zu schützen. Aber damit die Rechtsgewalt 
nicht selbst Unrecht wird, muss sie sich strengen Ma.Bstaben unterwerfen. Sie muss auf die 
Ursachen des Terrors achten, der seine Quelle sehr oft in bestehendem Unrecht hat, dem keine 
wirksamen MaBnahmen entgegentreten. Sie muss daher auf die Beseitigung des vorausgehenden 
Unrechts mit allen Mitteln bedacht sein. Yor allem ist es wichtig, immer wieder einen Vorschuss 
an Vergebung zu gewahren, um den Ring der Gewalt zu durchbrechen. Wo das "Aug' um Auge" 
gnadenlos geübt wird, ist kein Ausweg aus der Gewalt zu tinden. Gesten einer die Gewalt 
durchbrechenden Menschlichkeit, die ım andern den Menschen sucht und an seine 
Menschlichkeit appelliert, sind auch da notwendig, wo sie auf den ersten Blick verschwendet 
scheinen. 
ln ali diesen Fiillen ist es wichtig, dass nicht eine bestimmte Macht allein als Wahrer des 
Rechts auftritt. Allzu leicht mischen sich dann eigene Interessen in die Aktion ein und 
verunreinigen den Blick auf die Gerechtigkeit. Ein wirkliches ius gentium ohne hegemonische 
Übergewichte und entsprechende Aktionen ist dringend : Nur so kann klar bleiben, dass es um den 
Schutz des gemeinsamen Rechts aller geht, auch derer, die sozusagen auf der anderen Seite der 
Front stehen. Aber bei dem gegenwartigen Zusammenprall zwischen den groBen Demokratien 
und dem islamisch motivierten Terı:or sind noch tiefer reichende Fragen im Spiel. Es scheinen ja 
zwei groBe kulturelle Systeme mit freilich sehr verschiedenen Formen der Macht und der 
moralischen Orientierung aufeinanderzuprallen - der "Westen" und der Islam. 
Aber was ist das: der Westen? Und wer ist das: der Islam? Beides sind vielschichtige 
Welten mit groBen inneren Unterschieden - Welten, die in vielem auch ineinandergreifen. 
Insofern trifft die grobe Gegenüberstellung Westen-Islam nicht zu. Manche tendieren indes zu 
einer weiteren Vertiefung des Gegensatzes: Es stehe die aufgeklarte Vernunft einer 
fundamentalistisch-fanatischen Religionsform gegenüber. Daran ist richtig, dass das Verhaltnis 
von Vernunft und Religion in dieser Situation von entscheidender Bedeutung ist und dass um das 
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rechte Verhaltnis beid·er zu ringen zum Kem unserer Bemühungen in der Sache des Friedens 
gehört. Es gibLPathoiogien-der- Religion - wir sehen es; und es gibt Pathologien der Vemunft -
auch das sehen wir, und beide Pathologien sind lebensgeführlich für den Frieden, ja, im Zeitalter 
unserer globalen-Machtstrukturen für die Menschheit im ganzen. 
Gott oder die Gottheit kann zur Verabsolutierung der eigenen Macht, der eıgenen 
Interessen werden. Aber es gibt: auch die Pathologie der von Gott ganzlich losgelösten Vemunft. 
Hitler muss man ·wolıl als einen Irrationalisten bezeichnen. Aber die groBen Verkünder und 
Vollstrecker des Marxismus verstanden sich durchaus als Konstrukteure der Welt allein aus 
Vemunft. Vielleicht der dramatischste Ausdruck dieser Pathologie der Vemunft ist Pol Pot, wo 
die Grausamkeit einer solchen Rekonstruktion der Welt anı unmittelbarsten in Erscheinung tritt. 
Aber auch die geistige- Entwicklung im Westen tendiert immer mehr zu zerstörerischen 
Pathologien der Vemunft. War nicht schon die Atombombe eine Grenzüberschreitung, mit der 
die Vernunft, anstatt eine aufbauende Kraft zu sein, ihre Starke in der Macht des Zerstören-
Könnens suchte? 
Wenn die Vemunft nun mit der Erforschung des genetischen Codes nach den Wurzeln des 
Lebens greift, tendiert sie immer mehr dazu, den Menschen nicht mehr als Geschenk des 
Schöpfers (oder der "Natur") zu sehen, sondern ihn zum Produkt zu machen. Der Mensch wird 
"gemacht" , und was man "machen" kann, kann man auch zerstören. In alldem verflacht zugleich 
der Begriff der Vemunft immer mehr. Nur noch das Verifizierbare oder genauer: das 
Falsifizierbare gilt als vernünftig; die Vemunft reduziert sich auf das im Experiment 
Überprüfbare. Der ganze Bereich des Moralischen und Religiösen gehört dann dem Raum des 
"Subjektiven" - er füllt aus der gemeinsamen Vemunft heraus. Für die Religion sieht man das 
nicht als weiter tragisch an - jeder tinde die seine, das heiBt, sie wird ohnedies als eine Art 
subjektiver Verzierung mit eventuell nützlichen Motivationskraften angesehen. im Bereich der 
Moral versucht man doch nachzubessem. 
Die erkrankte Vemunft und die missbrauchte Religion treffen sich im gleichen Ergebnis. 
Der erkrankten Vemunft erscheint schlieBlich aile Erkenntnis von definitiv gültigen Werten, alles 
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Stehen zur Wahrheitsfahigkeit der Vernunft als Fundamentalismus. Ihr bleibt nur noch das 
Auflösen, die Dekonstruktion, wie sie uns etwa Jacques Derrida vorexerziert: Er hat die 
Gastfreundschaft "dekonstruiert" , die Demokratie, den Staat und schlieBlich auch den Begriff des 
Terrorismus, um dann doch erschreckt vor den Ereignissen des 11. September zu stehen. Eine 
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Vernunft, die nur noch sich selber und das empirisch Gewisse anerkennen kann, lahmt und 
zersetzt sich selber. 
Eine Vernunft, die sich völlig von Gott löst und ihn bloB noch im Bereich des Subjektiven 
ansiedeln will , wird orientierungslos und öffnet so ihrerseits den Kraften der Zerstörung die Tür. 
E s ist die Aufgabe von uns Christen in dieser Zeit, unseren Gottesbegriff in den Streit um den 
Menschen hineinzustellen. Gott selbst ist Logos, der rationale Urgrund alles Wirklichen, die 
schöpferische Vernunft, aus der die Welt entstand und die sich in der Welt spiegelt. Gott ist 
Logos - Sinn, Vernunft, Wort, und darum entspricht ihm der Mensch durch die Öffnung der 
Vernunft und das Eintreten für eine Vernunft, die für die moralischen Dimensionen des Seins 
ni-cht blind sein darf. 
Dazu kommt aber noch ein zweites. Zum christlichen Gottesglauben gehört auch, dass 
Gott - die ewige Vernunft - Liebe ist. Es gehört dazu, dass er nicht ein beziehungslos in sich 
kreisendes Sein darstell t. Gerade wei l er souveran ist, weil er Schöpfer ist, weil er alles umfasst, 
ist er Beziehung und ist er Liebe. Der Glaube an die Menschwerdung Gottes in Jesus Chri stus 
und an sein Leiden und Sterben fü r den Menschen ist der höchste Ausdruck für diese 
Überzeugung, dass die Mitte aller Moral, die Mitte des Seins selbst und sein innerster Ursprung 
Liebe ist. Diese Aussage ist die starkste Absage an jedwelche Ideologie der Gewalt, sie ist die 
wahre Apologie des Menschen und Gottes. Vergessen wir aber darüber nicht, dass der Gott der 
Vernunft und der Liebe auch der Richter der Welt und der Menschen ist - der Garant der 
Gerechtigkeit, vor dem alle Menschen Rechenschaft ablegen müssen. Es gibt Gerechtigkeit, di e 
von der Liebe nicht aufgehoben wird . 
Noch ein drittes Element der christlichen Überlieferung möchte ich erwahnen, das in den 
Bedrangnissen unserer Zeit von grundlegender Bedeutung ist. Der christliche Glaube hat - vom 
Weg Jesu her - die ldee der politischen Theokratie aufgehoben. Er hat - modern ausgedrückt - die 
Weltlichkeit des Staates hergestellt, in dem die Christen mit Angehörigen anderer Überzeugungen 
in Freiheit zusammenleben. Davon unterscheidet der christliche Glaube das Reich Gottes, das in 
dieser Welt nicht als politische Wirklichkeit existiert und nicht als solche existieren kann, 
sondern durch Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe ankommt und die Welt von innen her verwandeln 
sol!. Aber unter den Bedingungen der Weltzeit ist das Gottesreich kein Weltreich , sondern ein 
Anruf an die Freiheit des Menschen und eine Stütze der Vernunft, dam it sie ihre eigene Aufgabe 
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erfüllen kann. in den Versuchungen Jesu geht es letztlich um diese Unterscheidung, um die 
Abweisung politischer Theokratie, um die Relativitiit des Staates und das eigene Recht der 
Vernunft, zugleich um die Freiheit der Wahl, die jedem Menschen zugedacht ist. in diesem Sinn 
ist der laikale Staat eine Folge der christlichen Grundentscheidung, auch wenn es langen Ringens 
bedurfte, um dies in ailen Konsequenzen zu verstehen. Dieser weltliche, "laikale" Charakter des 
Staates schlieBt seinem Wesen nach jene Balance zwischen Vernunft und Rel igion ein, die ich 
vorhin darzustellen versuchte. Er steht damit freilich auch dem Laizismus als einer ldeologie 
entgegen, die sozusagen den Staat einer reinen Vernunft bauen ınöchte, der von ailen 
geschichtlichen Wurzeln gelöst ist und dann auch keine moralischen Grundlagen mehr kennen 
kann, die nicht jeder Vernunft einsichtig sind. So bleibt ihm anı Ende nur der Positivismus des 
Mehrheitsprinzips und damit der Verfall des Rechts, das schlieBlich von der Statistik gelenkt 
wird. Wenn die Staaten des Westens sich vollends auf diese Stra5e begeben würden, könnten sie 
auf Dauer dem Druck der Ideologien und der politischen Theokratien nicht standhalten. Auch ein 
laikaler Staat darf, ja, muss sich auf die pragenden morali schen Wurzeln stützen, die ihn gebaut 
haben; er darf und muss di e grundlegenden Werte anerkennen, ohne die er nicht geworden ware 
und ohne die er nicht überl eben kann. Ein Staat der abstrakten, geschichts losen Vernunft kann 
nicht bestehen. 
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4.5 Armin Adam; Der ideelle Kern. Liisst sich eine Vorstellung von Europa gewinnen, die 
seine religiöse Geschichte nicht verfiilscht? in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20.12.2002 
In den Diskussioı:ı über einen EU-Beitritt der Türkei der letzten Tage und Wochen ging es um den 
ideellen Kem der Europa-Idee. Als dieser Kem werden Demokratie und Menschenrechte 
bezeichnet. Doch, und das gibt dieser Diskussion ihr Gewicht, den Hintergrund dieser Diskussion 
bildet unausgesprochen die Behauptung von der Christlichkeit Europas. Weil Europa ein 
christliches Gebilde ist, kommt eine Aufnahme der Türkei für viele nicht in Frage. Die 
Diskussion über die politischen sakularen Werte versucht, den politico-theologischen Einsatz 
dieses Gefechtes zu verschleiem - nicht zuletzt, wei l es einen solchen Einsatz im sakularen 
Europa gar nicht geben darf. 
In religiöser Hinsicht ist Europa ein christlicher Kontinent. Allein, weder bezeichnet ,,das 
Christentum" eine Identitat, noch ist damit etwas über die politische Bedeutung der Religion 
gesagt. In religiöser Hinsicht wird Europa in seiner Christlichkeit durch Differenzen bestimmt: 
römischer Katholizismus, lutherische Landeskirchen, reformierte Landeskirchen, Kirche von 
England, Orthodoxie, Gallikanismus, von den vielen kleineren Glaubensrichtungen ganz zu 
schweigen. Die Wahrnehmung einer tiefen Kluft zwischen diesen Positionen bestimmt die 
Geschichte Europas zwischen dem 16. und dem 20. Jahrhundert. Zu behaupten, dass Europa ein 
christlicher Kontinent sei, dass die Christlichkeit zum Wesen Europas gehöre, kann nur heiBen, 
dass die Erfolgsgeschichte des Christentums auf diesem Kontinent geschrieben wurde. Kann nur 
heiBen, dass auf diesem Kontinent - sagen wir seit Karls ,,Bekehrung" der Sachsen his in die 
Gegenwart hinein - die christlichen Konfessionen das religiöse Bekenntnis schlechföin darstellen. 
Doch was ist damit gesagt? Nicht viel, wenn man sich vor Augen halt, welche Bedeutung eben 
dieses Bekenntnis für die europiiischen Individuen einerseits, für dle europaischen Staaten 
andererseits bedeutet. Man mag sich die Statistiken zum Kirchgang zu Gemüte führen, der nicht 
einfach ein zufülliges Anhangsel des Christentums ist, um zu sehen, dass es mit der Christlichkeit 
Europas nicht weit her ist. 
Die ldee eines vereinten Europas ist keine christliche ldee. Im Gegenteil setzt die Idee 
Europas eine Zurückdrangung des Religiösen voraus, wie sie im Prozess der neuzeitlichen 
europaischen Staatsbildımg zu beobachten ist. Wenn man versuchen möchte, das Konzept 
Europas ideell aufzufüllen, dann wird man Europa als einen durch Kommunikation bestimmten 
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Friedensraum definieren können, der nicht nur die Erf.ahrung der zwei Weltkriege des 20. 
Jahrhunderts teilt, die Erinnerung an totalitiire Herrschaft, die sich mit pseudo-religiöser 
Symbolik verschleiert. Sondem auch die Erinnerung daran, wann und wie, auf welchem 
Trümmerfeld dieser Friedensraum entstanden ist. Und man wird nicht in die- vierziger und 
fünfziger Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts zurückgehen, sondem ins 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Man wird 
an den Augsburger Religionsfrieden und den Westfülischen Fried·en denken, an die junge 
Blütezeit des Völkerrechts. Europa entsteht auf dem verwüsteten Feld, welches die 
Religionskriege zurückgelassen haben. Die Zahmung der konfessionellen Konflikte: das ist der 
Kem der europaischen Staatenwelt. Europa und die ldee Europa gedeiht bei den Humani.sten, 
nicht bei den Theologen. Tatsachlich ist die Ausblendung der christiichen Pragung die Bedingung 
Europas. 
Doch wir brauchen uns nichts vorzumachen : Sakularisierung im Sinn der politischen 
Abstandnahrne zum Religiösen als den Kem einer europaischen Identitiit zu behaupten, führt 
auch nicht sehr weit. Nicht nur weil wir laizistische Republiken kennen, die ultra-katholisch sind, 
weil wir Staatsreligionen haben , und weil in den Landem des Reiches die Herrschaft der 
landesherrlichen Konsistorien bis ins spate 19. Jahrhundert angehalten hat. Sondern auch, weil 
die Behauptung der Sakularisierung - und mit ihr verbunden die der politischen Aufklarung 
fraglich genug ist. Es genügt weder, sich auf die rechtliche Normierung des Verhiiltnisses von 
Staat und Kirche(n) zu beziehen noch auf den Schein der Sakularizitiit und Laizitiit in eben diesen 
Normierungen. Wer von Europa spricht, der wird ohne Zweifel auch den Katholizismııs 
Spaniens, Italiens, Österreichs und Irlands und den Protestantismus der skandinaviscben Staaten 
und der Niederlande ins Auge fassen müssen . 
Wie gesagt: Europa ist ein widersprüchlicher Kontinent. in der Diskussion um die 
Erweiterung der Europaischen Union wird einerseits von politisch klar definierter Position aus 
der christliche Kem Europas hervorgehoben, andererseits die Sakularisierung mit ihrer 
politischen Konsequenz der Trennung von Staat und Kirche als Kem europiiischer Identitiit 
hervorgehoben. Beides scheint mir falsch. Der Rückblick auf die treibenden Krafte im Prozess 
der europaischen Einigung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg hat ja dazu geführt, den gesamten 
Prozess, sozusagen freimaurerisch , unter Generalverdacht zu stellen. Namentlich die eindeutige 
Stellungnahme des Vatikan unter Pius XII. führte dazu, das Untemehmen Europa als das 
Ergebnis einer katholischen Verschwörung zu deuten. Und nicht zufüllig war gerade die 
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protestantische niederlandische Regierung gegenüber einer jeden ,,S-ouveranitatsübertragung" an 
diesen Bund sehr skeptisch. Eine Skeps-is, die übrigens-aparterweise erst in einem einstündi-gen 
Gesprach des - wie Schumann Lothrin-gischen - Kardinars Trisserant mit Königin Juilana zu 
Beginn des Juli 1952 gebrochen wurde. 
Tatsachlich belegt der Blick in die Dokumente, dass die Christlichkeit eines Vereinten 
Europas keine Rolle spielt. Die Erfahrungen der Verheerungen des 1-. und 2. Weltkrieges und die 
Identifizierung des Ost-West-Gegensatzes waren zu stark, als dass die Idee eines Vereinten 
Europas noch durch ein weiteres Wertefundament unterfüttert hatten werden müssen. Natürlich 
gibt es nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges noch einmal einen Aufschwung der 
Abendlandliteratur. Politisch relevant ist diese Literatur nicht wirklich. Und in der Konstruktion 
des politischen europiiischen Raumes findet sie keinen Niederschlag. Natürlich hatte Adenauer 
Vorstellungen von einem christlichen Europa, in dem namlich Politik un_d öffentliche Meinung in 
allen Staaten Europas unbehelligt von nationalistischen Einfiüssen ware. Doch das Bonmot 
Adenauers, dass die Kirche in der Politik nur Amen zu sagen habe, gilt auch für seine-Europa-
Politik, die viel stiirker dur-eh das Element der Bürgerlichkeit und die West-Orientierung als durch 
eine wie auch immer geartete Religiositat bestimmt ist. 
In den Jahrzehnten der poJitischen Blockbildung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum 
Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion, ja bis in die Gegenwart hinein, wurde die Deutung der 
Menschenrechte zum hermeneutischen Instrument einer Unterscheidung zwischen Gut und Böse, 
zwischen West und üst, zwischen Europa - und dazu gehören in ideeJler Hinsicht natürlich die 
USA, Kanada und Australien - und Asien - orientalischer Despotismus. Man hat die 
Menschenrechte als die ,,reifsten Früchte einer christl-ichen Kultur" bezeichnet, ,,nicht im Sinne 
einer selbstverstiindlichen Falligkeit, sondem als Erfüllung einer tiefsten Möglichkeit." (Fritz 
Emst). Doch auch diese Position ist fraglich genug. Es gibt keinen vernünftigen Grund, die 
Herrschaft und Bedeutung des Systems <ler Menschenrechte im Europa der EU in Frage zu stellen 
oder abzuleugnen. 
Doch sind die Menschenrechte etwa eine Frucht der christlichen Kultur? Oder sind die 
Menschenrechte nicht gerade einer christlichen Kultur gegen deren heftigen Widerstand 
abgerungen worden. leh möchte dazu nicht nur an den Syllabus Pius JX von 1846 erinnern, diese 
Liste, welche die lrrtümer der Moderne verzeichnet, und das heiBt den gesamten liberalen 
Ideenkomplex. leh möchte auch an die Diskussion über die Frage der Religions- und 
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Gewissensfreiheit im spaten 16. und 17. Jahrhundert erinnem, urui daran, dass die Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika sich gerade einer ganz besonderen Abwehr des institutionellen Anspruches 
der christlichen Kirchen verdanken, ohne dass die Christfichkeit der Gesellschaft dadurch in 
Frage gesteUt worden ware. Ein- kurzer Blick auf die Geschichte der Menschenrechte erweist 
femer sehr schnell, dass ihre Wurzeln n.icht in einer dezidiert .christlichen Kultur liegen, sondem 
in einer ganz und gar heidnischen Vertragstheorie, in einer Renaissance des stoischen 
Naturrechtes-, in einer Neuentdeckung der Würde des lndividuums und im Kampf gegen die 
politische-Macht der Kirche(n). 
Die Frage nach der Erweiterung der Europaischen Union rückt neben ökonomischen auch 
Fragen des ideellen Fundamentes i-n den Vordergrund - wenngleich, und dazu braucht man nicht 
unbedingt ideologiekritische Vorentscheidungen zu treffen, sicherlich nicht nur, um in diesem 
Sinn über die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Wertegemeinschaft .zu entscheiden. Und hier gilt nun, was 
sich seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg als europaisches Bekenntnis zu den Menschenrechten etabliert 
hat: eine relativ eindeutige Interpretation eben die.ser Menschenrechte im Horizont dessen, was 
wir die westliche Kultur nen.nen. Was in diesem Kontext allerdings die Frage der Religion 
betrifft, so wird schon die Frage fraglich. Die Christlichkeit Europas ist so fraglich, dass sie kaum 
als Kriterium einer Entscheidung_ ü-ber d1e Zugehörigkeit zur europaischen Wertegemeinschaft 
dienen karın - und die deutsche Rechtsprechung bete-iligt sich ja stark genug anı Abbau der Reste 
eineneligiösen Kultur. Wenn man andererseits Sakularisierung als politische Abstandnahme zum 
Religiösen als den Kem einer europaischen poJitischen Kultur bezeichnen möchte, dann wiire die 
Trennung von Staat und Kirche ein entscheidendes Kriterium für die Zugehörigkeit. Das ist 
sicherlich eher der Fail in der Türkei als im Vereinigten Königreich, in dem der Premierminister 
gerade i.iber die Emennung des Erzbischofs von Canterbury entscheidet oder als in der 
Bundesrepublik mit ihrer Verflechtung von Staat und Kirche. 
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